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This thesis is motivated by two main considerations in response 
to which it is divided into two parts. The first purpose, which I 
attempt to fulfil in the first five chapters, is to provide a systematic 
analysis of the relationships between those criteria for the inter-
pretation of physical theories which are contentious in the quantum 
mechanical context. It is surprising that such an analysis has, to 
my knowledge, not been attempted previously. It seems particularly 
important in this field which is riddled with controversy. In the 
second part, (actually from the end of the first part), I abandon my 
'impartial' stance and, using conclusions drawn from the first part, 
I formulate an objective, realist interpretation of quantum mechanics. 
While the analysis of the first part, especially where it is 
expressed in terms of conditional propositions, is relatively clear-
cut, the arguments of the second part are consideraly more complicated. 
This is indicated by a profusion of cross-referencing and repetition. 
This is partly a consequence of the fact that I found it very difficult 
to formulate arguments which are both compelling and intellectually 
honest, in full awareness of their necessarily subjective character. 
It is also a consequence of the extremely novel and complicated nature 
of the subject matter. Although there is a fairly straight-forward 
spine to my argument, I fear that this may be partially obscured by 
the numerous digressions I have felt necessary. Finally, I must 
acknowledge that some of the complications arise because of a lack of 
clarity in my own mind. It is f or the reader to assess whether this 
is justifiable in the face of the demonstrably novel aspects of physical 
reality as it is comprehended by quan"tum mechanics. 
The above remarks have bearing on the note of pessimism which occurs 
in the final chapter. While I believe I have formulated a valid 
realist interpretation of quantum mechanics (i. e ~ it is not incorrect ) , 
I cannot accept it wholeheartedly as t he interpretation of quantum 
mechanics. This is mainly because it fails to fulfil an important, 
but vague criterion for the interpretation of a physical formalism: 
that a fully acceptable interpretation should 'ring true'. I have 
experienced no such revelation with respect to my interpretation or 
any other. 
Too many people have assisted me in this work for me to mention 
them individually. I must thank my friends and colleagues allover 
the world who, by their interest in my work and by their communications 
and papers, have provided a rich source of encouragement. Acknowledge-
ments are due to the C.S.l.R. for a bursary and the University of Natal 
for employment, during the time taken in the preparation of this work. 
I must thank my ex-colleagues in the Physics Department of the University 
of Natal in Durban for the ma ny stimulating (if unresolved) discussions 
and arguments we have had over the years. It is difficult to overestimate 
the role played by my typist, Fiona Fletcher, in bringing this work to 
completion. Lastly, I am indebted to my supervisor, friend and 
partner-in-crime, Don Bedford, for enabling me to transcend the traditional 







One of the most disturbing genera l f eatures which characterizes 
the literature in the field of the found a tions of quantum mechanics 
(Q.M), and more particularly the problem of measurement in Q.M., 
is the existence of several competing theories or interpretations
l 
This seems at first sight, to imply that 'proper' scientific method 
is not being applied in the treatment of these problems, due to 
a popular fallacy that there are uniquely defined and unambiguous 
criteria that all physical theories, including the ir interpretations 
must satisfy. Further, it is assumed that if a tneory satisfies 
these criteria, then no theory which is not consis tent with it will 
also satisfy them. If this were the case, then any controversy of 
this type could be explained only in terms of the incomplete or 
erroneous nature of the competing theories and the insufficiency 
of the understanding of those working in this field. 
That the situation is more complicated and less clearly defined 
than suggested above is illustrated by the reputation of some of the 
physicists involved in the controversy as well as the convincing 
nature of their arguments, some of which we shall review below. 
The historical analysis by Kuhn (1962) of the development of 
science provides useful inSight into the nature of this controversy. 
1. For a comprehensive r eview of thi. s literature 
see Nartonis (1970). 
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1.2 The Forms of Argument 
Briefly, Kuhn contests the idea that science develops as a 
gradual accretion of knowledge, always subject to the same criteria 
and aims. He indicates, by means of historical examples, how 
changes in the aims of science have accompanied major developments 
in the theory. For instance, prior to the introduction of Newtonian 
Mechanics, a theory of the motions of the planets was considered 
sufficient only if reasons were given for the particular planetary 
motions that were observed. By distinguishing between 'laws of 
nature' and 'initial conditions', (a particularly fruitful 
distinction), and embodying only the laws of na ture in the fabric 
of the theory, Newton dispensed with these aims and introduced the 
new aim of discovering and formulating general laws of nature. This 
is a significant and fanJous example, yet changes in the aims of 
science may also be more subtle and less dramatic. 
Kuhn divides scientific research into two classes. Although 
this classification has since been questioned, it is most helpful 
for the understanding of this situation. 
The first, 'normal scientific research', is the activity which 
is pursued under an invariant (or nearly invariant) set of criteria 
which may include a scientific theory (e.g. classical mechanics) , 
which is termed a 'paradigm'. This activity consists of demonstrating 
the applicability of the paradigm to diverse situations, both 
experimentally and theoretically. The paradigm is used to explain 
or describe as many distinc t situations and events as possible. 
The second class of scientific activity, 'revolutionary science' 
or 'paradigm change' occurs when a sufficient number of situations 
which cannot be explained in terms of the paradigm, or which 
contradict the predictions of the paradigm, have been encountered 
for the 'validity' of the paradigm to be called into question. 
Kuhn shows that a single counterexample (such as the advance in the 
perihelion of Mercury with respect to non-relativistic classical mechanics) 
need not be sufficient for this to occur. 
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Nevertheless, when the scientific community concerned with a 
particular discipline or field becomes dissatisfied with the 
effectiveness of their existing paradigm, they start 'casting about' 
for a new paradigm which renders some or all of the difficulties 
in the old paradigm understandable, and which provides the basis 
for fruitful normal scientific exploration. 
An example of this activity may be seen in the development of 
the theory of blackbody radiation leading to the quantization of 
the electromagnetic field (in a sense) by Planck in 1900. On a 
broader scale, we may consider the events and discoveries leading 
to the introduction of Q.M. 
Kuhn characterizes 'revolutionary science' by, among other 
things, the emergence of competing theories or candidate s for the 
new paradigm, as well as a concern with the fundamentals and 
philosophical background of science. This latter characteristic 
is noted also by Korner (1957) as follows: 
"When the task in hand is not the solution of problems 
within some conceptual framework, but rather the construction 
of the framework, physicists tend to use philosophical arguments" 
(p.97) . 
We note that even a superficial survey of the literature on 
the problem of measurement in Q.M.will reveal that these characteristics 
are present. See in this regard Nartonis~1970). 
In order to understand how controversy can arise under these 
conditions we must recall that, not only theories, but also the 
criteria for a satisfactory theory may change in a scientific 
'revolution'. As an example of this we consider the following 
passage due to Wigner (1967). 
L 
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" They would have .. the absurd proper t y that two 
situations which are comp l e t e ly equiva l ent wou l d develop, i n 
the course of time, into t wo di stinguishable s i t ua tions " p . 23 . 
This is an expression of the neces s ity of determinism 
(in classical me chanics) . Neve r t he l ess, the same author does 
not subscribe to hidden vari ables inter p r e t ations of Q.M. 
thereby rejecting the notion of det erminism in g .M.l . 
If the criteria for a physical t heory cha nge a s a r esult 
of a scientific 'revolution', the choice of new criteria i s 
not a well-defined procedure . I f , for ins tance, one or other 
of the criteria from the old parad igm must be modified or 
abandoned, they must be ranked in ter ms of importa nce, and the 
least important criteria dis carded in favour of those consider ed 
to be more important. Howeve r, the importance of a particular 
criterion is subject to the particular outlook of each 
individual or group working in the fie ld. As a result of this, 
several incompatible theories may be advanced, each subject to 
and satisfying different c r iteria. The arguments favouring any 
one theory or interpretation must be persuasive in nature, 
relating to the subjective ordering of importance of the cr iteria. 
"When paradigms enter, as they must, into a debate about 
paradigm choice, their role is necessarily circular. Each 
group uses its own paradigm to argue in that paradigm's 
defence. The resulting circular ity does not, of course , make 
the arguments wrong or eve n ineffectua l .... Yet , whatever the 
force, the status of the c ircular argument i s only that of 
persuasion. It cannot be made l ogica lly or even probabilist ically 
compelling for those who r e fus e t o s tep into the c ircle." Kuhn 
(1962) p.94, 
1. See Chapters 3 and 4 . 
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This is not to say, however , that there can never be 
unambiguous distinctions between such competing paradigms. In 
some cases, there may be experimental tests which favour one 
paradigm over another. Where possible , we turn to these 
experimental tests to provide the answer to any problems of 
choice between paradigms. In situations where there is no 
experimental basis for preferring a particular paradigm, the 
procedure we follow is t o analyse the different paradigms 
in terms of some of their criteria and construct persuasive 
arguments for the retention of some 'traditional criteria and 
the rejection or modification of others . In this way we may 
hope to formulate an acceptable interpretation of Q.M. subject 
to a consistent conceptual basis. 
1.3 The Present Status of Quantum Mechanics 
Since its introduction during the first three decad es of this 
century, Q.M. has been successfully applied to a wide range of 
physical situations. The predictions of Q.M. in situations 
inconsistent with classical theories (e.g. the photoelectric 
effect) and those consistent with classical theories (e.g. the 
interference of light) have, in every case, proved consistent 
with experimental results. 
Quantum mechanical arguments are used in research work in 
many diverse fields of physics (e.g. solid state physics, optics, 
atomic theory) as well as in chemistry. Further, the results 
of Q.M. are often used without specific reference to their 
derivation or their origin. 
Finally, this theory is now the subject of many text books, 
and is presented to students at an undergraduate level. 
These factors are the hallmark of a thoroughly accepted theory. 
The absence of alternative theories (other than those which are 
equivalent to quantum mechanics) at least so far as the general 
user of Q.M. is concerned, together with the above considerations 
indicate that this theory provides the current general paradigm 
for dealing with the behaviour of microsystems (at least). 
it possible, then, that at thi s stage , ma ny of the signs of 
How is 
paradigm change or scientific revolution are to be found in the 
area of the foundations of Q.M.? How can a theory be established 
and accepted when, at the same time, the so-called 'foundations ' 
of that theory are being subject to par adigm change? 
We shall consider two related answers to the above que stions. 
The first concerns the 'loose' nature of the application of quantum 
mechanics in many explanations while the second is concerned with 
the fact that the aims of science can be divided into two classes. 
We show that one class is unambiguous ly satisfied by Q.M., while 
the other may not be. (See §l.A). 
1.4 The 'loose' application of quantum mechanics 
At their most formal, Q.M. arguments do not provide an 
explanation for the behaviour of microsystems at all. They are 
used only to provide a description of the development of the 
quantum states of the system and hence to predict or account 
for the results of specific experiments. As we shall see, 
as long as we do not consider the quantum states to refer to some 
actual microphysical situation, no difficulty can occur. Hence, 
by omitting this assumption, we can avol.d the problems associated 
with the interpretation of Q.M., and so present Q.M. arguments 
without controversy. The reasons for not relating Q.M. to a 
microphysical reality vary from the pra~natic desire on the part 
of text book authors to avoid controversy to the insistence by 
positivistic scientists (e.g. Bohr) that the concept of 
'microphysical reality' is meaningless since it is not available to 
'direct' observation. 
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Where attempts are made at expl anation or interpretation of 
the structure and results of Q.M. on the basis of microphysical 
reality (as opposed to the ma croscopic l evel of preparation and 
measurement systems) they must necessarily be suspect, since the 
fundamental interpretive principles on which they are based are not 
universally agreed upon. 
We agree with Bohr to the extent that the interpretive principles 
of classical physics are closely akin to those of 'common- sense'. 
Indeed, we live on a scale at which our environment can, very nearly, 
be adequately described and explained using the formalism and 
principles of classical physics. Also, the common-sense notion of 
reality and that which appea r s in classical physics can scarce ly be 
reckoned to be independent; each has profoundly influenced the other. 
For these reasons, it has seldom, if ever, been necessary for 
physicists to formulate explicitly the principles on which their 
explanations and interpretations have been based: they are agreed 
upon by an appeal to 'reason' or 'common-sense'. While such 
formulations may have been of interest to philosophers, philosophers 
of science in particular, they had no place in physics per se. 
The controversies and paradoxes that they lead to (see e.g. Ayer (1956» 
were of no direct concern to physicists. In their more philosophical 
moments, classical physicists could be empiricists, naive realists 
or even solipsists without this having any radical bearing on the 
physics they taught and researched. 
Many physicists believe that this should be the situation 
today, especially with respect to Q.M. The introduction of the 
.theories of relativity led to some changes in the classical notions 
of reality (especially the relativity of simultaneit0 
but did not give rise to any lasting controversy on a large scale. 
(Some controversy does, however, still exist. See e.g. ~ings ley 
(1975». The notion of absolute simultaneity was recognised as a 
mistake, which, once corrected, allowed everything to go on as before. 
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When this program is applied to Q.M., it entails using classical 
concepts and interpreting the formalism in a classical manner until 
difficulties are encountered. At such points, a comment on the 
difference between classical and quantum notions is cormnonly made. 
Alternatively, we are assured that an explanation of microphysical 
processes is impossible! 
counterexample! 
We hope that this thesis will provide a 
This unconsidered extrapolat ion of classical notions into the 
field of Q.M., we call the loose application of Q.M. In some 
cases these 'explanations' can be made to app~, r quite r easonable 
since they appeal to classical concepts which in turn, are embedded 
in our 'common-sense'. Nevertheless, as we show in the rest of the 
present work, these are insufficient or inconsistent, and they cannot 
withstand systematic analysis. 
As an interesting, if trivial, example we consider below 
the relation between atomism, the notion tha't macroscopic systems 
are made up of interacting microsystems whose properties and interactions 
determine the properties of macroscopic systems, and the Q.M. formalism. 
The notion of atomism is fundamental to the development of the physics 
leading up to Q.M. and is widely believed. Nevertheless, there are 
indications that atomism in its present form is not supported by the 
Q.M. formalism. The (implicit) use of 'classical' atomism in Q.M. 
is an example of the loose application of Q.M. in explanations. 
1.5 Non-separability and a tomism 
The problem of non-separabi l ity in quantum mechanics may be presented 
as follows, following dlEspagnat (1971); 
Consider two physical systems, U and V, which are initially 
non-interacting, and described by quantum sta te vectors I~ > and I~ > 
n 0 
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-11/ (U) 1~ (v) . 
in Hilbert spaces QO and TI respect~vely. Let the systems 
interact for a finite time whereafter they become spacially separated, 
and no longer interact. Now, if the initial state of the composite 
system (U + V) is given by l1)Jn> I ~ 0> in 11 (U) x if (V) , where x denotes 
'outer product'. Suppose that the final states of the systems are 
Il/J' > and I ~ > respectively. Then the time development of the state 
n n 
of the composite system over the time interval during which the in-
teraction occurs is 
Il/J >I~ > ~ Il/J' > I ~ > non n 
(1.1) 
This time development may be described by the action of a unitary 
time development operator, U, as follows: 
u(ll/J >I~ » = Il/J'>I~ > non n 
(1. 2) 
Now suppose that the initial state of the system U is given by 
I a Il/J > where the a are (complex) coefficients. This is a permissible 
n n n n 
state for system U by the superposition principle. (We ignore the 
possiblity of supers election rules in this case). Then, if we suppose 
that equation (1.1) holds for each value of n, the interaction in this 
case is 
2: a Il/J >I~ > n n 0 
n 
~ I a Il/J'>I~ > n n n 
n 
(1. 3) 
This equation follows from equation (1.1) and the linearity of 
the time development operator u. 
Now the left-hand side of equation (1.3) is the product of a vector 
inJf (U) with a vector inn (V) • This is not true, in general, of the 
right-hand side of the equation. Unless 11)J~> = Il/J~> or I~.> = I~.> 
~ ) ~ J 
for all i and j, ~t is not possible to express the right-hand side of 
equation (1.3) as a product of vectors Il/J>I~> where I 1)J>£if (U) and 
I ~>£H(V) • 
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Hence, after interaction, we cannot give the state of system 
U on its ow~or the state of system V on its own. We say that the 
two systems are nonseparable. 
Quantum mechanics does not give, independently, the states of 
systems that have interacted in the past. . It only gives the state 
of the composite system. 
Suppose now that a third system interacts with the composite 
system (U + V). After the interaction, the state of this system, 
too, is incorporated into the non-s eparable state of a composite system 
consisting of three interacting sUbsystems. By induction, then, 
any number of systems, all of which have interacted with one or more 
of the other systems in the past (so that there is an unbroken 
'network' of past interaction linking all of the systems) can only be 
described by a single non-separable quantum state, prior to any 
detailed measurements on these systems. 
Suppose, now, that we consider the structure of a macroscopic 
object. Subject to the usual ideas of atomism, any macroscopic 
object consists of a large number of interacting microsystems (atoms 
or molecules) . However, according to the above argument, in the 
absence of any microscopic measurement on the macroscopic system, or 
any part of it, the states of the component atoms of the system 
(or each macroscopically distinguishable part of the system) must be 
non-separable. That is, we should only deal quantum mechanically 
with the whoLe system. This, in turn, implies that the notion of 
atomism is, in some sense, incompatible with quantum mechanics. 
Nevertheless, this notion of atomism is (implicitly) employed in 
many of the examples used to illustrate the success of quantum mechanics. 
For instance, to explain the absorption spectrum of a bottle of 





alternatively , to draw conclusions about the properties of individual 
hydrogen atoms from experiments on a bottle of gas, postulates the 
validity of the concept of atomism. 
Such deductions are, <therefore, inconsistent with quantum mechanics. 
Of course, it is possible to show that the non-separable state describing 
the bottle of hydrogen gas would embody the same properties as regards 
absorption of electromagnetic radiation as that for an individual 
atom . However, it is precisely the fact that such considerations 
are not entered into in the course of normal quantum mechanical 
arguments that indicates how 'conceptually loose' the usual 
application of quantum mechanical concepts is: 
Quantum Mechanics leans heavily upon classical theories for a 
conceptual backing, thereby avoiding the controversy associated with 
its own fundamental concepts. 
1.6 On Physical Formalisms and Regulative Principles 
Korner (1957 ) defines what he calls a physical formalism as 
follows : 
"A physical formalism consists on the one hand of a mathematical 
part or calculus. It gives rules for the formation of formulae from 
given signs, and for turning well-formed formulae into new ones which 
are again well-formed; and it selects some well-formed formulae as 
postulates . On the other hand, it consists of an interpretation, 
i.e. rules of reference which relate the signs and formulae to possible 
observations, in such a manner that some of the interpreted formulae 
express empirical laws of nature. These latter are either causal or 
statistical correspondences between empirical predicates. Once the 
general structure of physical formali.sms is exhibited, their function 
in the ach~evp~entof conceptual economy, in prediction, and in the 
technical control of events is easily seen." 
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Belinfante (1973) voices the opinion of many sci'entists, including 
most text-book authors, when he gives the following criteria for 
the acceptablity of a scie ntific theory : "Physicists call a theory 
satisfactory if 1). it agrees with the experimental facts, 2). it is 
logically consistent, and 3). it is simple as compared to other 
explanations. liThe first two criteria are just those which Korner 
gives as criteria for a physical formalism. The third is given 
to provide the theorist with a weapon for ending controversies between 
the adherents of competing theories: the notorious and ambiguous 
I Occam I s Razor I • 
Many physicists would be prepared to stop here in their requirements 
for a physical theory. Indeed, some would even insist on stopping 
here. i.e. They would say that a physical theory is sufficient and 
acceptable, provided it is an acceptable physical formalism. One 
reason for this insistence is the adoption of a positivist or 
empiricist viewpoint, which we consider in §l.7 -+ §1.9 b e low. 
Traditionally, however, the construction of a satisfactory physical 
formalism does not complete the task of constructing a physical theory. 
It is possible to construct a theory which satisfies all three of 
Belinfante's criteria, and yet which is unacceptable. This could 
be for many diverse reasons, e.g. It may deal with phenomena which 
are not traditionally within the domain of physics. It may describe 
all the empirical data correctly and yet embody principles which 
are unacceptable to the majority of physicists. 
In attempting to extend and sharpen the criteria for a physical 
theory, we may go the way of the falsificationists (e.g. Popper(l959» 
and demand that the theory be fal sifiable and unfalsified. (That 
the theory be unfalsified is simply a restatement of Belinfante's first 
cri terion) . While this principle certainly applies, itdoes not do 
so exclusively. 
not unambiguous. 
Also the notion of falsifiability is itself 
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In his disturbingly coherent and well-argued thesis, Feverabend 
(1975) argues that the only method for creating physical theories is 
'no method', or 'anything goes '. His argument is backed up chiefly 
by an analysis of the 'unorthodox' methods which were used so 
successfully and beneficially by Galileo to assist and give credence 
to the 'Copernican Revolution'. However, Feyerabend's stand 
'against method' is deliberately overstated, a s he himself 
acknowledges. 
His formulation disguises the fact that there are indeed criteria 
which must be satisfied by physical theories. 'Anything goes' may 
be a correct description of the methodology of a science, but 
it only goes if it appears acceptable to the current scientific 
establishment. The fact that this 'establishment' is in almost 
universal agreement on Belinfante's three criteria gives these 
criteria their prescriptive nature. As may be expected, however, 
other criteria exist which lack the definitive prescriptive character 
of the criteria for a physical formalism. 
The physics 'establishment', in common with other establishments, 
displays a strong tendency towards conservatism. This attitude may 
be written as a principle: with respect to physical theories, no 
unnecessary changes must be made. This principle is not usually 
enforced prescriptively. A theory which requires too radical a 
departure from existing views will simply not 'catch on' and be 
accepted. 
This has as a desirable result that the development of physics 
follows a continuous or nearly continuous course . Changes do not 
usually happen very quickly. Thus, we ensure that new physical 
theories are intelligable to at leas t some of the physicists 
who understand pre-existant accepted theories. 
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Conservatism has sometimes also retarded the deve l opment of our 
science due to over-zealous or: misp l aced application , and 
sometimes unnecessary suspicion of new ideas. Nevertheless, too 
little regard for it may result in the proliferation of theories. 
The path to our goal of an acceptable physica l theory lies , 
therefore, in establishing general principles which are important in 
making theories intelligable to the scientific community (physics 
establishment) . Korner (1957)calls these criteria for intelligability 
regulative principles. They usually consist of requirements on the 
nature of physical reality, and , as such, cannot be entirely 
prescriptive. In contrast to the explicit criteria for a physical 
formalism given above, the regulative principles embedded in 
acceptable physical theories and the beliefs of important physicists 
are seldom stated explicitly nor are they universal. They may be 
statements of belief about nature (e.g. that nature is deterministic) 
or about theories (that theories must be complete ) or they may be 
induced from pre-existing physical theories. By embodying these 
regulative principles in a new theory , we can make appear 'reasonable'. 
With the introduction of a new physical formalism (such as Q.M.) 
into physics, we are faced with the possibility that all of the 
previously accepted regulative principles may not be consistent with 
each other subject to the new physical formalism. If no physical 
formalism can be found which is consistent with all desirable 
regulative principles, we must conclude that the physical situations 
under consideration are such that they cannot be explained in terms 
of accepted regulative principles. For instance , we show in §2.4 that 
the regulative principles that nature is deterministic and that 
physical theories should be 'complete' are incompatible in the Q.M. 
context. We can conclude that one of them, at least, must be discarded. 
In our decisions whether or not to retain regulative principles, and 
which of two incompatible principles we should reject, we are forced 
to use the persuasive arguments mentioned in §1.2. These arguments 
are greatly facilitated by an expJicit discussion of some of the more 
important regulative principles, a nd the logical relations between them, 
subject to the physical formalism of Q.M. 
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1. 7 Quantum r-iechanics as a Physica l Forma lism 
1 To show that Q.M. provide s a satisfactory physical formalism, 
we must show that it is logica lly consi stent, and that it agrees with 
the experimental facts. It follows immediate ly that it is simple 
as compared with other physical formali sms since no comparable 
physical formalisms exist. 
That Q.M. is logically consistent, in the s ense required for a 
physical formalism, follows from the fact that no contradictory 
assumptions are made in its mathematical exposition. The so-called 
paradoxes relating to Q.M. are not formal mathematical contradictions. 
They demonstrate a discrepancy between an interpretation of Q.l-1. 
and certain ideas we have about the real world. i.e. They show that 
certain regulative principles are incompatible . This is demonstrated 
by example below. 
The Q.M. formalism certainly agrees with the experimental facts 
(restricted to its domain), in as far as it can be compared with them. 
This can be seen by considering the insurmountable difficulties 
experienced by the adherents of some interpretations in formulating 
or finding experiments that would contradict the predictions of Q.H. 
As we shall see (e. g. in our trea tmen"t of hidden variables theories 
in chapter 4) any experimental tests which have thus far been devised 
have either proved to be inconclusive or else they agree with the 
predictions of the Q.M. formalism. 
Thus, Q.M. satisfies the requirements for a physical formalis m. 
As a corollary, we may expect that the problems and paradoxes relating 
1. An axiomatic form of the Q.M. formalism is given in many 
text-books as well as source works. 
See e.g. d'Espagnat (1971) p. 29. 
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to Q.M. are not formal probl ems , but are subject to the adoption of 
certain regulative princip l es . We show that this is the case for 
two such problems: the Schrodinger cat paradox and the measurement 
problem in general. In chapter 2, we also s how that it is the case 
for the Einstein - Podolsky- Rosen paradox which is s ubject to 
regulative principles involving locality and completeness. 
The problem of 'Schrodinger ' s cat' is a specific statement of 
a problem associated with measuremen t that has been much discussed 
in the literature. 
argument briefly. 
The problem is well known, and we present the 
A single photon (or its equivalent) is fired at 
a half-silvered mirror. If it is transmitted, the photon is absorbed 
by a photomultiplier tube , resulting in a signal which is used to 
trigger a device which smashes a phial of hydrogen cyanide . If the 
photon is reflected, it is harmlessly absorbed . Now the quantum 
state for a photon which has encountered a half-silvered mirror can 
be written 
where IR>, IT> are eigenvectors corresponding to finding t he photon 
in the 'reflected path', and the 'transmitted path', respectively. 
If the poisoning device is sealed in a 'black box' together with a 
cat, and if the photon is transmitted, "the cat will be killed. If 
it is reflected, the cat will remain alive. The problem is then, 
if the photon is neither transmitted nor reflected, put proceeds in a 
'superposition of these states', we may causally suppose that the 
cat is 'superposed' alive and dead, at "the end of the experiment. 
On the other hand, all cats that we have ever seen are either alive 
or dead. 
This problem is not a paradox relating to the physical formalism 
of Q.M. and this can be seen as follows: The "time- deve l opment of the 
'cat and trigger' system may be written as follows: 
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where IB>, IB' > are the 'unfired ' and t he 'fired' states of the trigger, 
and IA>, 10> are the states ' alive ' and 'dead' for the cat. 
The final state must be interpreted : "On measurement, the cat will 
be found to be dead and the triggering system 'fired- with a 
probability of ~". This is because the e igenstate corresponding 
to this situation has amplitude 2-~, and is orthogonal to the other 
term. (i.e. no interference terms are expected). 
This is precisely what is found. That is, the empirical 
prediction of the Q.M. formalism in this case is correct. If the 
experiment is performed many times, in approximately half t he cases 
the cat will be found to be dead, and in t he other half of the cases, 
it will be found alive. 
The difficulties alluded to by Schrodinger arise when we assume that, 
corresponding to a given quan'tum state, there is an actual physical 
situation, and that the principle of superposition applies to 
actual physical situations. Further, this only constitutes a 
paradox if we then assume that all cats are either dead or alive at 
all times (i.e. that the states 'dead' and 'alive' for a cat are 
in all ways mutually exclusive) or else that no non-local effects 
occur: the cat cannot change from being, in s ome sense, both dead 
and alive to being either one or t he other whe n, say, a conscious 
observer opens the box. The discussion proceeding from this problem 
is the problem of measurement as it is manifes t in a specific example. 
We curtail this present discussion, having shown that the problems 
relating to Schrodinger' s cat are subject to t he assumption of 
several regulative principles. 
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We move now to a more general discussion of the problem 
of measurement. The problem of measurement in Q.M. relates to the 
fact that the quantum mechanical descrip·tion of the processes of 
measurement cannot, in general , yield a state which corresponds to 
a single, unambiguous measurement result (like 'alive ' or 'dead' 
concerning a cat). This is in contrast to the fact that, at least 
in studied scientific experiments, we always observe unambiguous 
measurement results i.e. we never see cats which are 'both' dead 
and alive or particles which are, in any sense, in more than one 
place at one time. This problem i s subject to the adoption of 
very many regulative principles. They are too numerous (and 
perhaps impossible) to name , since they include the assumptions about 
reality that occur in the 'common- sense ' usage of language. 
However, we name some of them below. 
i). There is a ' physical reality' which exists independently 
of any observation (al·though its mode of existence may 
be changed by observations). 
ii) . 
iii) . 
We can have knowledge of this physica l reality. 
Our perceptions occur as a result of physical (and 
chemical) interactions between world and our bodies 
(which, too, are parts of the real world). 
iv) • All interactions in the real world, including those above, 
are describable by physical theories, and Q.M. in 
particular. 
And so we may go on. 
However, we note that none of the above principles (i) - (iv) is 
analytic. None is logically related to, or necessary for the 
construc·tion of a satisfactory physical formalism. Any or al] of them 
may be rejected as a means of avoiding the problems their acceptance 
poses for Q.M. Heisenberg has frequently been quoted in 
support of the notion that Q.M. is a theory which is concerned with 
describing our knowledge of physic 1 systems and not the physical 
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systems themselves. Indeed, if we "take the empiricist (or 
positivist) viewpoint (i.e. that the purpose of sc i e nce is t o 
order, categorize and correlate our sense impressions, where 
these are considered the prime epistemic objects, and the only 
referents of physical theories) all the above observations become 
either meaningless sentences or else false propositions. From 
this point of view any theory of measurement will be meaningless 
since it will be concerned with the relationship between measurement 
results (either as the actual situation pertaining to measuring devices, 
or as sense impressions) and the actual state of affairs pertaining to a 
real (object) system. A theory of measurement involves the explanation 
of how measurement results are obtained. In a logical development 
this must be done prior to any considerations involving the measurement 
results themselves. From the empiricist viewpoint, the measurement 
results are considered to be primal and hence any theory of measurement 
must be both unnecessary and meaningless. 
If there is no necessity, indeed no possibility, of a theory of 
measurement, then the problems associated with measurement cannot 
occur. i.e. The assumption of an empiricist stance solves the 
problems of measurement in Q.M. (or any other theory) trivially. 
More generally, from the empiricist viewpoint, all the requirements 
of a physical theory, i.e. that it should categorize and correlate 
our experience, are satisfied by a physical formalism. As we 
have shown, Q.M. provides a satisfactory physical formalism. Hence, 
from the empiricist point of view~ Q. M. is an entir'eZy sat'isfactory 
physical theory. The problems of interpretation and of measurement 
in Q.M. are trivially solved, since they do not exist in that their 
formulation is in terms of concepts which are meaningless. 
As a corollary to this result, it is inconsistent to use empiricist 
arguments in order to provide anything other than a trivial solution to 
any of the problems of interpretation of Q.M. For example, to 
provide a 'solution' to the Einstein Podolsky Rosen paradox by invoking 
empiricist attitudes is inconsistent unless the whole problem is assumed 
to be 'meaningless'. 
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If the problems of Q.M. can be rendered trivial in this manner, 
it becomes important and meaningful to ask why the problems exist at 
all. i. e. What is wrong with an empiricist or positivist philosophy 
in relation to physics? Indeed, many physicists and philosophers 
of science have argued, since even before the situation in Q.M. was 
discovered (or created), that the empiricist standpoint provides 
the only possiblity for 'a physics without me taphysics'. In order 
to answer this question, we conside r the account of the aims of 
science by d 'Espagnat. 
1.8 In defence of realism 
The division of the criteria for a satisfactory physical 
theory into those prescript ive criteria for a physical formalism, 
and the inductive criteria for an 'interpretation', is seen by 
d'Espagnat (1971) as a division in the aims of science. 
"If the reader provisionally tolerates oversimplification, 
he will presumably accept the assertion that science has two purposes. 
One is to organize our perceptions and thereby enhance our power. 
The other is to understand the world at large and our relation to 
that world" (Preface). 
He notes further that the first aim mentioned above has been 
emphasised during this century. We might add that this would be 
likely during the initial stages of any period of major upheaval 
in a scientific discipline, since the first aim is limited to the 
provision or construction of a physical formalism only. The 
deeper problems of explanation and interpretation relating to the 
second purpose can be ignored while this primary task, difficult 
in itself, is carried out. Thereafter, it follows in an extremely 
natural fashion from the scientific tradition that we should use the 
~orrelations provided by the physical formalism to investigate and 
explain the nature of the physical systems under consideration. 
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Many scientists (e .g. von Neumann ) do not distinguish between the 
two processes, and, having set up a physical formal ism or part 
thereof, proceed immediately \vi th an interpretation . If the 
suspension of the second purpose is embraced as a positive doctrine 
rather than seen as a temporary oversight in the face of the more 
immediate difficulty of construct ing a forma li sm , we find ourselves 
running against the scientific tradition which requires that we not 
only describe and correlate our observations , but that we explain 
them as well. This explanation is most commonly formula ted in 
terms of the properties of the 'real world ' or physical reality' 
and involves adopting a r eaZist position. A rejection of the second 
purpose of science is tantamount to assuming an empiricist philosophy 
which, as we have seen, and will show below, leads to certain 
physical (and philosophical) problems . 
This is not the place to enter into a deep ph ilosophical 
discourse on the consequences of a n empiricist viewpoint. This 
has been discussed elsewhere by experts. Bunge (1973) has formulated 
convincing arguments as to why this standpoint is unacceptable as a 
philosophy of physics. We simply wish to make some remarks which may 
indicate to the reader that the adoption of empiricism has some 
unsavoury consequences for science. 
Our first objections relate to the common usage of 'realist' 
language and concepts in science. For an empiricist, t erms such as 
force, electric field, particle e tc . are meaningles s except as 
collective names for certain sets of experiences. However, we note 
that in by far the majority of literature on p hysics (i. e . virtually 
all the literature not concerned with problems relating to the 
philosophy of science) these terms are used in t he same manner as the 
terms 'cup' and 'table' are used in everyday life. i.e. They are 
assumed to have meaning because they have referents which exist as 
part of 'physical reality' and not as t he sort of exper iential 
shorthand mentioned above . This shows that, independently of the 
conclusions they may arrive at whilst doing philosophy, most physicists 
are realists whi le they are doing physics. This is born out further 
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by the fact that tpe special theory of relativity is considered 
to be due to Einstein, and not Fitzgerald, Lorentz or Poincare. 
The physical formalism of special relativity had been more or 
less completely developed by the latter scientists . All that 
Einstein, a thorough-going realist, did that was new was to provide 
an interpretation and an explanation for the Lorentz transformation. 
This demonstrates that at least during the early years of this 
century, the fulfilment of the second purpose of science wa s 
considered to be a necessary prerequisite for a physical theory. 
As we have noted, to reject the second aim of science goes 
against the scientific tradition as well as the actual practice 
of physics by most physicists. It also goes against the ideas 
about physics held by many physicists a nd laymen al ike. Explicit 
arguments in defence of reali sm are to be found in the work of 
many scientists, e.g. Born (1956), Lande (1965), d'Espagnat (1971). 
Moreover, certain views which are at variance with empiricist 
physics are held by many physicists jndependently of their 
philosophical persuasion. For example, most pure scientists 
such as physicists would deny hotly that there is, in principle, 
no distinction between the 'pure' sciences and the technological 
disciplines. However, if science is restricted to the first 
purpose by the adoption of empiricism, its only function is to 
organize our perceptions and thereby enhance our power. This, 
surely, is the precise aim of such technologie s as engineering. 
The empiricist can have no reasonable motivation for investigating 
domains which seem unlikely to yield any manipulative advantage 
with respect to our lives. The realist, on the other hand, can 
be motivated in such a case by a desire to understand his/her 
environment. i.e. by the second purpose of science. 
By recognizing that the problems of interpretation of Q.M. 
are indeed non-trivial, many physicists (implicitly) affirm their 
belief in the second purposes. Having done so , as we have pointed 
-23 ·-
out in §1.7, it is thereafter inconsistent to ' solve ' specific 
problems by the temporary adoption of empiricist concepts. 
Thus, for Heisenberg who asser ts ·that q.M . deals with our knowledqe 
of physical systems only, the problems of interpretation of Q.M. 
should not exist. 
Consider also the fact that empi.ric i sm is closely related 
to the extremely subjectivistic doctrine of positivism, since it 
is asserted in both that propositions relating to anything other 
than immediate sense-experi ence are meaningless. A possible 
distinction lies in the fact that for the empiricist such 
propositions are only meaningless with respect to sci ence 
wheareas for the positivist they are more generally so. 
Scientifically at least, there is no direct observation 
of which the proposition "He/She is conscious" can be rendered 
meaningful. Thus, from the point of view of the positivistic 
scientist, the notion of the consciousness of others is meaningless. 
Despite strong assertions to the contrary from the adherents of 
such doctrines, this implies that scientfic positivism is equivalent 
to .s.olipsism. While it is true that physical science does not 
usually deal with consciousness explicitly, it would be disturbing, to 
say the least, if the notion of the consciousness of others were 
meaningless in terms of its underlying philosophy, particularly 
since physics is a social or group activity. 
Finally, we note that in the past, the choice between empiricism 
and some kind of realism has always been possible, if unimportant. 
There have always been realistic int.erpretations of physical theories. 
It is interesting from the philosophical point of view, that the problems 
of interpretation of Q.M. have brought this choice to the fore. The 
problem of knowledge, which gave rise to the doctrines of positivism and 
empiricism in the first place, has traditionally been the sole preserve 
of philosophy, having no place in physics, ~er se. Now this problem 
and the related choice between empiricism and some kind of realism has 
become of vital importance regarding the interpretation of Q.M. and, as 
such, it falls into the domain of physics. (S ee §1.7). 
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In conclusion, it seems to some extent absurd that the 
second purpose of science and the rea lism concomitant with it 
needs to be defended at all. The adoption of emp iricism serves 
only to provide a means of avoiding problems that occur relating to 
scientific concepts as they are actually used. This is done at 
the cost of asserting that scientific propositions , concepts and 
language do not mean what th majority of scientists think t hey 
mean. Nevertheless, the choice between empiricism and realism 
remains, logically, an arbitrary one . We can, if we wish, prescribe 
the empiricist conditions for a phyiscal theory and l eave it at that. 
In doing so, we would not only be changing the traditional purpose 
of science. We would also discard as meaningless some of the 
most interesting epistemological and ontological problems that have 
occurred in physics for many years; viz. those involved in answering 
the question: "What is the nature of microphysical reality, as 
revealed to us by the physical formalism of Q.M?" 
1.9 Summary and Conclusion 
To summarise, the existence of competing interpretations is not 
necessarily the result of a misapplication of 'proper' scientific method, 
but may occur during periods of p a radigm change or scienti f ic 
revolution. While Q.M. appears, a t one level, to be a fully 
accepted theory, paradigm change can still be going on. 
Firstly Q.M. is usually applied to problems in a conceptually 
'loose' way, employing the concepts of classical physics and the 
formalism of Q.M. Secondly, while the Q.M. formal i sm provides a 
satisfactory 'physical formalism ' it does not provide an interpretation 
subject to generally accepted regulative principles . In 
this sense, it does not satisfy the second aim of scientific theories. 
The problems of interpretation of Q.M. are trivially solved if we 
neglect this second aim, but this also involve., adopting an empiricist 
standpoint, or at least rejecting realism. 
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The preceding analys i s sh eds s ome light on t he wav ahead: we have 
seen that the problems in the interpret a tion of Q . ~1. are ' physical' 
and not 'formal' in conten t . Hence , we cannot exp ect to solve 
these problems by a formal ana lysis. A physical or interpretive 
problem must be dealt with in a physi cal or conceptual way. 
Although, as we have seen, the choice of regulative principles 
is subject to persuasive arguments only, we may establish conclusive 
results by finding out which regulative principles are consistent and 
which are inconsistent, subject to the Q.M. f orma lism. The main 
motivation for the first part of this thesis i s tha t such an analysis 
is, as yet, lacking in the existing treatments of the problem. This 
has had the unfortunate result that in some cases, attempts have been 
made to satisfy simultaneously regulative principles which are 
inconsistent, given the Q.M. formalism. In other cases, the persuasive 
arguments in favour of a certain interpretation have b een facilitated 
by neglecting to mention tha t some particularly cherished regulative 
principle must be dispensed with. (e.g. the principle that interactions 
must be local, in the interpretati.on due to Ballenti ne (1970) and to 
Lande (1965)).1 
It has been possible for this situation to come about because it 
is acceptable for the authors of scientific papers not to state 
explicitly their choice of regulative principles. Where these 
choices have been made explicitly, they are often simple statements 
of belief. 
While we do not claim t hat the specification of regulat ive 
principles is necessary (after a ll, this is physics and not semanti.cs) 
or even possible, it will b e s een th a t, by cons idering a limited nlwIDer 
of such principles when they appear to b e important, we can achieve 
results which exclude some of the currently viable interpretations, as 
well as making it easier to choose from those which remain. 




COMPLETENESS, LOCALITY AND THE E.P.R. 'PARADOX' 
2.1 Introduction 
The first regulative principle which we consider in detail is 
that a physical theory should be 'complete '. This iss ue was raised 
initially in 1935 by Einstein , Podolsky and Rosen (E.P.R.), but is 
. 2 
still receiving attention in recent contemporary llterature. The 
work of E.P.R. is well known, and in §2 .2 we present only a brief 
summary of their argument, mainly to introduce a particular example 
first presented by Bohm (1951 ). The conclusion of the E.P.R. 
argument is modified from "Q . M. is not complete" to read "either Q.M. 
is not complete, or else non-local effects must exist". E.P.R. simply 
assume that non-local effects cannot exist under any circumstances whereas 
we shall see (in §5.2, 5.3) that this may not be the case. 
, 
In §2.3, by an analysis in terms of classical concepts , we extend 
the concept of completeness to give a definition of the term (as opposed 
to the condition given by E.P.R.). This will facilitate the explicit 
analysis of the relationsh ips between the concepts of completeness, 
locality and determinism that follows (§2.4 et seq). We consider that 
our definition of completeness is in accordance with the intuitive ideas 
3 
implicit in the work of E.P.R. and others. In any event we show in 
§2.5 that the same conclusion (i.e. that Q.M. is complete or else non-
local effects occur) holds also for our definition. Moreover, in §2.4 
we show that the regulative principles of completeness and determinism 
are inconsistent with respect to any stochastic theory (particularly Q.M.). 
This important result, although it is virtually self-evident, indicates 
a possible motivation why Einstein, a staunch determinist, should be 
concerned with completeness. 
1. We take this opportunity to remind the reader that, as in the 
'paradox' of Schrodinger's cat, the E.P.R. argument is not a paradox 
resulting from any logical inconsistency in the physical formalism 
of Q.M. alone. 
2. See e.g. Mirman (1973), Capri (1975), Moldauer (1974) Faraci et al 
(1974). For more comprehensive t reatments, see d'Espngnat (1 971) 
and Scheibe (1973). 
3. See in this regard, Scheibe (1973) 
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The notion of non-locality is( as we shall see , fundamental to a 
discussion involving the E.P.R. argument. However, it is also 
important in the analysis of hidden variables theories. For this 
reason, we apply the concept in much the same intuitive way as do 
most authors. We postpone an explicit discussion of the concept until 
§ 5.2. 
In §2.6 we deal with some of the more recent criticisms of the 
E.P.R. argument. 
2.2. The Formal Argument 
E.P.R. consider that "every element of reality must have a counter-
part in the physical theory" if that t heory is to be complete. They 
note that this necessary condition may not be sufficient for completeness. 
An element of reality is outlined as follows: 
"If without in any way disturbing a system, we can predict with 
certainty (i.e. with probability equal to unity) t he value of a physical 
quantity, then there exists an element of physical reality corresponding 
to this quantity."l 
They then show that if there is an element of physical reality 
corresponding to a quantity represented by Hermitian operator A, then 
there is no element of physical reality correspondi ng to the quantity 
associated with Hermitian operator B, if A and B do not commute (or else 
Q.M. is not complete) . 
1. Moldauer (.1974·) has pointed out that the notion of physical 
reality can be eliminated between these two conditions. However, 
this renders the meani ng of the term 'completeness ' even more 
obscure. 
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To illustrate thisl, cons ider a microsystem S , which is 
prepaLed in a quantum state described by the normalized state 
vector I~ > in the Hilbert space ~ associatect wit~ th e system . 
Suppose further that I~> is an eigenvector of a Hermitian operator 
A. 
i.e 2.1 
where a is a real number, and A is associated with a property 
(observable) of the system S. 
We interpret this as follows, according to the physical formalism 
of Q.M.: we can predict the result of a measurement of the property 
(observable) associated with A with certainty (i.e. the value of the 
property is given by a) . Hence, there is an element of physical 
reality associated with the property associated with A (bearing in 
mind that the associations represen"t one-to-one correspondences). 
Suppose now that B is a Hermitian operator 
does not commute with A. Now, by a well known 
in H such that B 
theorem of q.t-1., I ~ > 
is not an eigenvector of B. i.e. there is no real number b such 
that 
2.2 
In general, I~> is a linear combinaLion of (normalized) 
eigenvectors I~ > of B in 
n 
i.e. LC I~ > 
n n 2.3 
1. E.P.R. provide illustrations of the formalism in terms of 
in the argument leading to momentum and position operators 
propositions (1) and (2) below. 
to show that there are physically 
with non-commuting operators, 
This example serves only 
meaningful quantities associated 
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where the {e } are (complex) coefficients with e ~ 0 for at leas t two 
n n 
values of nand 
BI ¢ > = b I¢ > 
n n n 
where b is a real number. 
n 
2.4 
It follows from the immediate interpretive rules of the Q.M. 
formalism that 
with B will be 
the result of a measurement of the quantity associated 
b with probabi lity Ie 12. Hence there is no element 
n n 
of physical reality corresponding to the property associated with B. 
From these considerations E.P.R. conclude that either 
"(1) the quantum mechanical description of reality given by the wave 
function is not complete or 
(2) when the operators corresponding to two physical quanti ties do not 
commute, the quantities cannot have simultaneous physical reality." 
Since, in general, the information obtainable with certainty 
from a quantum state corresponds exactly to what can be oredicted without 
changing the state of the system, i.e. when the system is prepared to 
have a suitable eigenstate, we might suppose that the quantum mechanical 
description of reality may be complete. However, following E.P.R. and 
Bohm (1951), we shall describe a counter-example, subject to the assumption 
that non-local effects do not exist. 
We consider the specific case of a spin-zero particle which decays 
into two electrically neutral particles, each with spin ~ , by a spin-
conserving decay. By a system of shutters, we se l ect only those particles 
which travel in opposite senses along a certain direction. (If the 
experiment is performed in the center-of-mass rest frame of t he initial 
particle, the decay products must move in opposite senses in order to 
conserve momentum) . 
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Suppose that the two subsystems corre sponding to the 
If (u) decay products are U and V, associated with Hilbert spaces 
andjJ (v) respectively. Suppose also tha t I uz+"> , I Uz_ > and I Vz+ > 
Ivz-> are the eigenvectors of the (Pauli spin) operators associated 
with the components of spin in a direction transverse to the motion 
of the particles (the z direction) for systems U a nd V respectively. 
The state vector for t he s ystem at any time a fter the decay (at 
least) and prior to any mea surement on e ither system must be given 
by the anti-symmetric single t state 
1 
IljJ> = 2 -~ ( I uz+ > I Vz_ > - I uz_ > I vz'- > ) 2.5 
where I~>£~ (U) x ~ (V), the oute r product Hilbert spacel . 
Now suppose that an ideal measurement of the spin component in 
this direction is made on system U, and the result "spin up", 
the 'eigenvalue' corresponding to the eigenvector luz+>' is found. 
By the conservation of angular momentum (or else by using the 
'Proj ection Postulate' of von Neumann (1932) as part of the physical 
formalism) we can predict with certainty that a measurement of 
the component of spin in the z direction on system V would yield 
"spin-down". According to the projection postulate, we assert that 
the state of system V is independently given as Iv>. 
z-
Suppose that, instead, we measure the spin components in 
the x direction, which is normal to both the z direction and the 
direction of motion of the particles. Suppose that the eigenvectors 
of the operator associated with this measurement are In > and IV x± 
1. Note that this state-vector is 'nonseparable ' (d'Espagnat (1971» 
or 'of the second kind'. 
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It is a well known r es ult, f orma lly embodied in the pr operti e s 
of the Pauli spin matrices tha t the ope r a t or s correspond iJl~J to 
spin component measurements in d i s tinct direc tions do no t commute . 
The following relationships hold betwe en the e igenvectors of these 
two to non-commuting opera tors . 
lu > z+ 
lu > z-
Iv > z+ 
Iv > 
z" 
+ I u » x_ 
lu » x_ 
+ I v » x_ 
I V » x-
Now, substituting from 2.6 into 2.5, we get 
Iw> = 2-~ (Iu >Iv > - lu >Iv » x+ x- x- x+ 
2.6 
2.7 
If we measure spin in the x direction on U and obtain the result 
'spin left' corresponding to the state lu > we can predict with x+ 
certainty that a measurement in the same direction on system V will 
give the result 'spin right'. (According to the projection postulate, 
in the case of ideal measurement, system V should be described by the 
state vector Iv». x-
Thus, if we perform a measurement (of spin component) in the 
x-direction on U, we can predict, with certainty, the outcome of such 
a measurement on V. Alternatively, if we perform a measurement on U 
in the z-direction, we can predict with certainty, the result of a 
measurement in the z-direction on V. Now, although measurements of 
spin component in the x and z directions cannot b e performed 
simultanteously, E.P.R. argue that the actual physical situation 
pertaining to system and hence the results obtained by measurement on V, 
cannot be affected by the direction in which we choose to measure the 
spin component on system U. This is because these measurements 
(on systems U and V) can take place as far apart spacially , and as 
close together temporally as we like. Any such interaction 
(involving events separated by a space-like interval, in the terminology 
of special relativity) must be non-local, (see §5.2) and the possibility 
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of non-local interactions is deni d by E . P .R. 
Thus, the res ults of two measureme nts of observables 
corresponding to two non-commuting operators can be predicted 
with certainty on the same system in the same actua l physical 
si tuation and so e ach of these quantities h a v e simultaneous 
physical reality.l This is in contradiction with proposition 
(2) above. Hence proposition (1) must follow i.e. the Q.M. 
description of reality is not complete. 
2.3 Towards a Wider Definition of Compl e teness 
E.P.R. provide only a condition for the completeness of a 
physical theory. However well-suited this condition maybe 
to the particular argument presented by E.P.R., it does not 
situate the concept within a wider semantic context , except by 
intuitive implication. Now, a s Hooke r (1973 ) has pointed out, 
and as we showed in Chapter 1, the problems of interpretation of 
Q.M., specifically the E.P.R. paradox , are not formaL but 
physicaL. That is, the difficulties raised b y E.P.R. are not 
apparent as a contradiction in the for malism of Q.M. (i.e. as 
a paradox). They only occur subject to certain assumptions about 
the nature of physical reality (e.g. that physica l interactions are 
local) and the nature of the description of that reality by a 
theory (i.e. that it must be complete). An argument couched in 
purely formal terms cannot be useful in this instance since there is 
no problem or paradox on a purely formal level. For this reason we 
attempt an analysis of the ' physical ' concepts involved in the 
argument. 
1. Some authors (e.g . Moldau e r (1974 » have observed that the results 
of spin component meas urements in different directions cannot be 
predicted sUDultaneously. See §2.6. 
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This is another example of the fact, referred to in §1.6, 
that problems associated with Q. M. only arise subj ect to some s ort 
of realist point of view, and are non- ex i s tent or trivial from 
an empiricist (operationalist, idealist , positivist) viewpoint. 
If we accept the realist s econd purpose of science, the following 
questions become legitimate and meaningful. 
What is the nature of the reality which Q. M. has been 
constructed to describe or explain? To what extent is Q. M. a 
successful description of this reality? 
We note that the problems posed by these quest ions are by no 
means trivial, particularly in the case of microsystems, which 
are not accessible to simple observation a nd h ence not part of our 
'common-sense reality'. Even in the case of macrosystems, their 
description in terms of class ical mechanics is not simply determined 
by our common-sense notion of their objective properties. There is, 
rather, a dialectical interdependence between the two concepts. 
Our common-s~nse notion of 't he reality of microsystems is even 
more dependent on the descriptive theory in the case of Q.M. 
'Empirical data' can only be interpreted in terms of a theory of 
measurement. Hence, it becomes non-trivial matter to decide 
whether or not a theory provides a sufficient account of reality 
at the microscopic level. Nevertheless, this 'completeness' of a 
theory may be investigated with the assistance of some regulative 
principles concerning the nature of the relationship petween a theory 
and the 'reality' which it describes. 
Finally, before we begin our investigation, we draw attention 
to the fact that the choice of the adjective ' complete' to describe 
a satisfactory relationship between a theory and the reality with 
which it deals, is not particularly apt. Since the failure of the 
19th Century scientific optimism, scientists have become justifiably 
wary of claiming that science is able to provide a complete (in 
an unrestricted, general context) description of physical r eality. 
-34-
Also, in the sense that Q.M. is likely to be superceded, at some 
future time, by a new theory which will treat, among other things, 
the same aspects of reality, it would be presumptuous to call it 
'complete', no matter how suitable a description we may find it to 
be at present. The term • complete' should be viewed in the 
limited sense of describing a theory in which the relationship 
between that theory and physical reality is satisfactory according 
to certain specific criteria, or regulative principles. 
In attempting to discover whether or not 0..M. gives a sufficient 
account of the systems with which it deals, it is instructive to consider 
whether a state vector in a Hilbert space is suffic ient to characterize 
a single actual physical situation or whether it necessarily describes 
anyone of an ensemble of essentiaUy different actual situations. 
In the former case we will s ay 0..M. i s complete, and in the latter that 
it is not. More generally, we may define compZeteness as follows: 
If a 'state' in a physical theory is sufficient to identify 
exactly one physical situation (or identical copies of it) 
as opposed to anyone of an ensemble of essentiaZZy different 
situations, that physical theory is comp lete. Otherwise, 
it is not complete. 
This definition of completeness seems to be in agreement with the 
implicit ideas of E.P.R., as well as the expressed view of Einstein 
who states, for example, that the aim of physical theories is "the 
complete description of any (individual) real situation (as it 
supposedly exists irrespective of any act of observation or substantiation)" 
(Einstein (1949) p667). Here the word ' i ndividual' i,ndicates that 
Einstein would support our formulation. We show, in any event, that 
the same conclusions as those of E.P.R. follow from our formulation. 
Scheibe (1973) notes (on p ' 17 4) that "incompleteness is to be demonstrated 
on the foundation of classical realism". We assume that, under 
optimum conditions (Le. with respect to phenomena wi 'thin its 
domain) classical mechanics provides a, model for completeness. 
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By an analysis of classical mechanics with r espect t o our definition 
of completeness, we come to a precis e f ormulation of what is meant 
by "essentially differen~'in our de finiti on. 
Classical mechanics, as it is used in the explanation of i t s 
problems,comprehends ensembles of actua l physica l systems which are 
not identical. For instance , in t he description of planetary motion, 
an ensemble of solar systems i s dea lt with, since the deta iled 
composition of the sun and the planets is not usually cons idered. 
The classical description of plane tary motion appl i es to an 
ensemble of solar systems, each similar to our particular one, but 
differing with respect to the de tailed compos ition (e.g , colour 
density, population, whethe r I am sitting or standing etc.). The 
elements of such an ensemble are considered essentially identical 
since these factors have no influence on the gross motions of the 
planets about the sun. 
It may be argued that, in princip le, it is possible to specify 
all of these properties in terms of classical mechanics, and although 
this would complicate the prob lem far beyond the limited purpose of 
explaining the gross motions of the planets, it would ensure that 
the description thus given would correspond to exactly one solar 
system or identical copies of i "t. However, we note that point 
particle classical mechanics deals, formally, only with mass points 
which have neither size nor internal structure. This can be 
generalized to a theory which deals with extrinsic properties 
(including size) and not intrinsic properties (the internal structure). 
Such a theory cannot be used to treat electromagnetic radiation, as 
indicated by the failure to detect an 'aether' in, for instance, the 
Michelson-Morley experiment. Nevertheless, in a universe without 
electromagnetic radiation, for an exhaustive description in terms 
of classical mechanics to be meaningful, we require that matter consist, 
ultimately, of point particles with no internal structure. It is 
doubtful whether suchan assumption could be considered as reasonable, 







To postulate the existence of f undame ntal ontic atoms, which have no 
internal structure whether or not it is observable , is no less 
presumptuous than the postulate that atoms (in the s ense of Da lton's 
atomic theory, say) should be indivisible. 
Hence, in every application of classical mechan ic s , we assume 
that the internal structure of some of the constituents of the 
system under consideration has no eff ect on the 9roperties in which we 
a re interested. The classica l description therefore treats a n 
ensemble of systems, the elements of which differ by the internal 
structure of the ontic atoms , s ince the only requirement we p lace 
on that internal structure is that it be negligabl e . 
If, however, the internal s tructure of the atoms is negligable , 
from the point of view of the desc r iption, the elements of the ensemble, 
though not identical 'in fact', are essentially identical. 
2.4 Completeness and Determinism 
The next question to be consiclered is how we are to test for 
the essential equivalence of the elements of an ensemble. In deter-
ministic theories (such as class i cal mechanics ) if the elements 
of an ensemble are initially equivalent subjec·t to a certain 
description, they will remain so throughout any time interval under 
consideration. This follows immediately from the requirement that 
the properties which distinguish different equivalent elements of an 
ensemble have a negligable effect on those properties of the system 
which are under consideration. Therefore, if the properties of 
the system under consideration are found to be different for 
different elements of the ensemble during the time interval for 
which a description is required, we must conclude that these 
elements were not initially essentially equivalent, and hence that 
this description of the situation is not complete. We can r emedy 
this by including more properties (relating to the ' internal structure' 
in the first, incomplete description) so as to specify an ensemble of 
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essentially identical systems. This process of rendering the 
description complete corresponds to the art of i solating the 
1 
dependent variables in a given situat i o n The criterion that the 
ensemble of systems comprehended by a particular description in 
terms of classical mechanics c onsists of essentially identical 
elements (i.e. tha t the description is complete) is t hat the 
time development of each element of the e ns emble be essentially 
identical. Hence, we may t es t for the comple teness of a particular 
classica l description by considering a (real ) sequence of actual 
physical situations which have the s ame description and observing 
whether their behaviour remains the same (in as far as the 
properties under consideration are concerned) in each case. 
We note that this procedure applies only to the description of 
systems the behaviour of which is inhe rently deterministic. In 
a system which is non-deterministic , lJe expect situations which are 
initially identical (or essentially identical) to d evelop into 
different situations (on different occasions) . See §3.4. 
Now, with respect to microsystems (in the domain of 0.M.), 
systems which are initially described the same quantum state 
develop, in general, into non~identical situations, at least after 
measurement has occurred. This is illustrated by the statistical 
distribution of (mutually exclusive) results obtained from similarly 
prepared microsystems, as enmodied in the stat istical predictions 
of the quantum mechanical formalism. Thus, if we assume that the 
behaviour of actual physical systems is necessarily de"terministic, 
the description of this behaviour in terms of Q.M. must be incomplete, 
according to our d efinition of completeness. Clearly, this result 
can be generalised to apply to any stochastic t heory : 
1. In the context of the next chapter, this process corresponds also 
to 'splitting the cause '. Se e §3.4. 
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with respect to stochastic t heor i es (e . g . Q.M . ., c l assical 
statistical mechanics) the r egulative pr'inciples t hat a phys ical 
theory should be complete., and t hat actual physical sys tems (isolated 
if necessary) develop detel'ministicaUu in time are incompatible . 
This result is in accord with c lass ical notions whe re classical 
statistical mechanics (a stochastic th eory) is regarded as incomplete 
since, classically, reality is considered to be deterministic (as is 
shown, for example, in Newton's laws of motion) . 
This provides a possible reason why Einstein, whose basic 
1 
prejudice in favour of determinism is well known , should concern 
himself with matters relating to completeness. viz If the behaviour 
of 'reality' is regarded as fundamenta lly de t e rminis tic, then Q.M., 
a stochastic theory, cannot be regarded as complete. Alternatively, 
if Q.M. is shown to be incomplete, then a deterministic theory of the 
behaviour of microsystems may be possible. 
A study of the so-called 'hidden variables theories' (H.V. theories) 
will be particularly useful since it will reveal the conditions under 
which we may regard the behaviour of microsystems as being deterministic. 
Further, if we conclude that microsystems do indeed behave 
deterministically, then H.V. theories will also provide a mean~ of 
distinguishing the non-equivalent e16nents of the ensemble described 
by an incomplete quantum mechanical state (~.e. by means of the 'hidden' 
variables themselves). By specifying the quantum state as well as the 
values of these 'hidden' variables, we would be able to specify an 
essentially unique actual situation, and the theory dealing with these 
new 'states' would be both comp lete and d eterministic. 
see Chapters 4 and 5. 
In this regard 
1. This is clear from many statements made by Einstejn throughout 
his career. See especially Einste in (1949). His most famous 
comment in this regard was that he did not believe that God plays 
dice with the Universe ~ 
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2.5 The Conceptual Argument 
To show that the concept of completeness which we have defined 
and discussed above is at l east consistent with the (implicit) no"tions 
of E.P.R., we show that the same r esult , i.e. t ha t Q.M. is not complete 
or non-local interactions exist, follows from our definition. Consider 
again the example of the decay of ' spin-zero' particle into two 
'spin-half' particles. The quantum state of this system is given by 
11jJ> = 2 -l:i ( \ u > \ V > z+ z- 2.5 
The eigenstates corresponding to the results 'up' and 'down' for 
systems U and V occur ~ymmetrically' in the ~tate \0/>. i.e. No 
information which singles out a result 'up' or 'down' for each particle 
occurs explicitly in the notation. 
as follows: 
In addition, 11jJ> can also be expressed 
2-~ (u >\V > - \u >Iv » 
x+ x- x- x+ 
2.6 
where x is any direction. i.e. The quantum state \1jJ> is symmetrical 
with respect to any change in t .he direction in which spin component:s 
are measured. 
Thus, no particular direction or sense for the spin component 
of either particle is singled OU"t by this quantum state. Hence, 
if Q.M. is complete in the sense discussed above , the systems (particles?) 
described by this quantum state must 'have' unpolarized spins, in s ome 
sense, if they 'have' spins at all. 
Suppose now, that, whe n the decay products are well separated 
spaciallyl, a measurement is performed on one of them, and its spin 
component is found to be 'spin up' (dO\vn) in the z direction. 
1. That this can occur h as been con"tested. See §2.6. 
,> 
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Any spin component measurement performed hereafter on the other system 
will yield results compatible with the assumption that this particle 
'has' 'spin down' (up) in the z direcLion. That is, after a 
measurement has been performed on the system, the symmetry with 
respect to sense and direction of spin component for tl e other particle 
is immediately broken. Since we have assumed that Q.M. is complete, 
information as to the spin polarization of the second particle is 
not simply unknoum prior to any spin measurement, it does no t exist . 
Hence, this information must be generated by the measur ement on the 
first system. Since it is immediat.elv apparent f or the second particle, 
no matter what the separation , we may conclude that the interaction 
whereby t his informat i on is transmitted must be non-local
l
. 
This concludes our demonstration: i f Q.M. is assumed to be 
complete, non-local interactions must exis ·t. 
By rejecting the possibility of non-local interactions, E.P.R. 
conclude that Q.M. is not complete. Before doing this, we should 
consider some of the further implications of such a conclusion. If 
we decide that Q.M. is not comp lete, then we should consider the 
means whereby this description could be made complete. i.e. We 
should specify more variables until the quantum state, together with 
such additional variables as may be necessary, is sufficient to 
characterize an essentially unique actual physical situation. We 
shall see in Chapter 4 that, if we require further that this theory 
be deterministic (which it may be since Q.M. is not complete) we run 
into non-localities of an even less acceptable variety. 
The process of completing an incomplete Q.M. to give a deterministic 
theory is just the development of a H.V. theory, where the hidden 
variables are the additional variables suggested above. If Q.M. is 
complete, such a program would be useless sinc e , with the Q.M. 
state corresponding to an essentially unique situation, each of the 
elements of the ensemble of actual situations pertaining to the system 
under discussion would be indistinguishable from any other. 
1. For a detailed discussion of the concept of non- ~ocality, see §5.2. 
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The hidden variables would either be superfluous or e l se they would 
have to have the same value for every e lement of the ensemble . 
Before we move on to a discussion of H. V. theories , we 
consider, in detail, the notion of determinism , which plays an 
important (implicit) part in the E.P.R. argument, a nd a more 
explicit role in the development of H. V. theories. 
2.6 Some Recent Criticisms 
As we have mentioned (§ 2.l) , the E.P.R. argument has been subject 
to criticism in some recent publications. Some of these criticisms 
have bearing on the argument presented so far, and others relate to 
our later development (§5.3, §5.4). 
Hooker (1970) criticizes the conclusion by Jauch (1968) that the 
E.P.R, result represents a logical inconsistency in the Q.M. formalism 
by poin'ting out, as we have, that the argument depends on the assumption 
that no non-local interactions exist, Hooker also notes that Jauoh's 
answer to the E.P.R. argument consists simply of reiterating the Q.M. 
features which E.P.R. find unacceptable from a classical standpoint, 
and stating that they are acceptable from his (Jauch' s ) point of view. 
This, argues Hooker, disguises the very source of the 'unhappiness' of 
E.P.R. with Q.M. by implicitly reinterpreting their notion of physical 
reality. In this matter, we agree with Hooker , but hasten to add that, 
in the light of arguments relating to the alternatives (§ 5.3) we may have 
to turn to a conclusion something like 'that of Jauch. 
Moldauer (1974) makes much of the fact that the measurement of 
observables which correspond to non-commuting Hermitian operators cannot 
be made simultaneously; i.e. it is impossible, in a single situation, 
actually to predict with certainty the results of spin-component 
measurements in the x and z - directions on the second particle, since 
it is impossible to perform these Dleasurements on the first particle without 
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the occurrence of uncontrolled di s turbances. Hence, he 
distinguishes between 'predictability' (which is the case in the 
E.P.R. argument) and 'predictedness' (which would be the case if 
the results could actually be simultaneously predicted) . He has 
certainly hit upon one of th e weakest po ints in the E.P.R. 
argument. However, from the point of view of realis~, his 
criticism amounts to asserting that the actual physical situation 
of the second system (or particle) depends on what measurement we 
actually perform on the first system. This implies some kind 
of non-local interaction between the two systems, and if we reject 
this, Moldauer's criticism falls away. 'Predictablilit y' and 
'predictedness' are clearly distinguishable with respect to the 
formalism of Q.M. and, indeed, this may prove to be an important 
distinction. However, if we further assume that i). ~.M. describes 
an independently existing microphysical reality and ii). no non-local 
forces exist, the distinction faJls away. 
The criticism due to Mirman (1973) seems to contain several 
strains, not all of which are compatible or simultaneously necessary. 
On the one hand he asserts that "no matter how far apart the two 
atoms are, they will interact, and this interaction will inform the 
second atom of the results of the measurement of the first atom". 
This is like the argument of Capri (1975) in some ways. The point 
made by E.P.R. is that such an interaction (relating events separated 
by a space-like interval) must be non-local. Mirman's additional 
explanation that "the first particle interacts with the first magnet 
which interacts with the second magnet which interacts with the 
second particle" does not avoid this difficulty. The non-locality is 
merely shifted to the interaction between the magnets. He points 
out that the magnets must be correlated before or after the experiment 
in order for the results rela ting to the E.P.R. argument to be obtained, 
and writes "Actually, of course, the interaction is produced by the 
experimenter aligning them". From a realist viewpoint, this means 
that the actual physical situation pertaining to the second system (or 
the microsystem as a whole) must depend on the measqring apparata 
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before it has interacted with i t . Mirman ha s identified a source 
of correlation between the two systems , but if a dynamical description 
of physical reality as it evolves with time is to be found, his 
explanation must be excluded on the groun ds of non-loca lity, 
On the other hand, .Mirman explains the results of E.P.R. type 
correlations in the following paragraph of the same paper. 
"In other words, the state is a superposition of states, and there 
is equal probability that the system is in either of these two states. 
What a measurement on the first particle does is de termine which of these 
states it is in. Once having made this determination, the measurement 
on the second particle is superfluous; it merely gives back the same 
information". (My italics). This paragraph, together with the fact 
that Mirman goes on to give a class ical analogue of the Bohm experiment 
indicates that he is begging the question by assuming that Q. M. is not 
complete: if the measurement on the first particle reveals more about the 
initial physical situation tha n is spec ified by the initial quantum state, 
Q.M. must be incomplete. We show in 0 3 .5) t!.h a t in any case , this viewpoint 
is subject to the assumption that non-local interactions exist. 
The most powerful criticism of the E.P.R. argument comes from 
Capri (1975) who argues that the condition of E.P.R. that the two 
systems cease interacting is not fulfilled. From the E.P.R. point 
of view, this is tantamount to assuming that non-local interactions 
exist. Capri argues that, since Q.M. is non-relativistic, information 
can travel at any speed and so interaction between the two systems at the 
time of measurement on the first system cannot b e excluded. This 
argument is formally correct, but still physically somewhat uncomfortable: 
it indicates ' for instance that, on the basis of an E.P.R. type experiment, 
we may be able to show that the special theory of relativity is 
empirically invalid. However, in view of the difficulty in defining 
under what circumstances an interaction must be non-local (see §5.2) 
and other considerations (§5.3) we find that we can extend this 






In the following chapter we shall deal with the attempts a t 
'completing' q.M. or, alternatively, the attempts at providing a 
supertheory which conta ins Q.M. and provides a deterministic basis 
for it, which are known as the Hidden Varirtbl es (H.V.) interpretations 
of Q.M . In our development, we have indicated that the assumption 
Q.M. is not complete provides a motivation for the construction of a 
H.V. interpretation of Q.M. However, we cons ider the prime 
sociological motivation for these at tempts to be a certain 'unhappiness' 
amongst physicists with the statis'tical or stochastic nature of the 
predictions of Q.M. i.e. In general, Q.M. does not predict the outcome 
of a measurement on a single particle wi t h certainty, but gives a 
distribution of possible r esults with a def inite probability for each 
outcome. 
Now, in the past, whenever measurements on a system have yielded 
stochastic results, physicists have taken pains to provide a deterministic 
description of the behaviour of the system at another level. This 
occurred, for instance, with respect to Brownian motion. In fact, as 
long as the behaviour of the system is to be described classically, we 
require that a deterministic description be possible at some level; at 
least at the level at which we can apply the deterministic relations 
of point particle mechanics. We must assert that the seemingly 
stochastic behaviour of a classical sy s tem appears as a result of our 
lack of knowledge (i.e. empirical results) at the deterministic leve l. 
In the case of Q.M., however, the basic physical formalism involves 
a stochastic description. This is not a ltogethe r surprising since 
systems subject to Q.M. description behave stochastically. Measurements 
on these systems yield statistical distributions of randomly fluctuating 
results whenever the system is not such that it can be described by 
an eigenstate of the operator corresponding to the observable being 
measured. Hence, there is no necessity , as in the classical case, that 
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a deterministic description should be possible. We can only 
argue on the basis of past experience that such a description 
shouLd be possible That systems which are clearly non-classical 
should behave deterministically and therefore be s ubject to a 
deterministic description is an expression of beLief , a regulative 
principle. 
For instance Einstein (1949 ) has written the following. 
"If it is possible to move forward to a complete description, it is 
likely that the laws would represent relations among all the cODceptual 
elements of this description which, per se, have nothing to do with 
'statistics' ".(p. 673.) 
Such a description would, of necessity, be deterministic. Indeed, 
we have shown (in §2.4) that the regulative principles i). that a 
physical theory should provide a complete description of physical 
reality, and ii). that processes in physical reality are deterministic 
are incompatible, given the stochastic nature of the Q.M. predictions. 
Hence, we suggested that Einstein's motivation for showing Q.M. to be 
incomplete stems from his prejudice in favour of deterministic 
theories. 
Other authors (e.g. Bohm (1957)) have also motivated their researches 
into H.V. theories by a statement of their belief in the deterministic 
nature of the behaviour of real systems. Bohm is less definite than 
Einstein when he asserts that physical descriptions occur at different 
levels, alternately stochastic and deterministic. 
Belinfante (1973) notes many diverse 'polemical ' rea sons as to 
why people should be prejudiced one way or the other with respect to 
determinism. We note here that aLL reasons relating to the acceptance 
or rejection of regulative princjples must be polemical since, as we saw 
in §1.2, arguments relating to them cannot have a logical imperative. 
However, we note also that there may be deeper reasons than simple 
dogmatic prejudice or conservativism for scientists' wishing to retain 
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the notion of determinism. Deeply embedded in the world picture 
which first spawned, and l ater grew up vri th classica l physics is the 
idea that physica l systems (recogn i zable parts of phys i ca] 
reality) have properties or characteristics which change wi th time in 
a continuous or nearly cont i nuous manner. Subj ect to such a world 
picture, it is difficult to imagine how a ny r egula rity or 
'recognizability' could be maintained if t he behaviour of reali"ty were 
non-deterministic. If we were to set. up exactly the same s ituation, 
with all of the properties or characteri s tics repeated, on two occasions, 
it is very difficult to imagine how these systems could evo lve 
differently, and yet still behave s ubject to some easily recognizable and 
describable rules. The (unconscious) adherence to this classical 
world picture leads very naturally to the conclusion tha t fundamentally 
extant indeterminism in nature is absurd. However , to maintain 
such a world-picture is neither necessary nor, as we shall see, possible, 
no matter how comfortable it may s eem. As we shall see in §3.5 and 
Chapter 4, the notion of continuously existing, continuously varying 
properties or characteristics, in the c lassica l sense, is incompatible 
with the physical formalism of Q.M. together with some fundamental 
beliefs about causality. 
In any event, we should recognise that det ermi nism is an important 
regulative principle and, a s such, should be retained if possible (by 
the 'Principle of Conservatism', see §1.6). We discuss the notion of 
determinism explicitly by distinguishing between it and causality (§3.2) 
and by treating the similarity between the deterministic relationship and 
the function in the fundamental algebraic sense (§3.3). By considering 
,the various ways in which a seemingly non-deterministic s ituation can be 
subjected to a deterministic description, we are able, in §3.4, to reveal 
some of the conceptual devices employed in arriving a t SOIne of the 
interpretations of Q.M. In §3.5, we consider the most obvious of these 
(from the classical viewpoint) i n order to indi cate some of the 
difficulties which are likely to be encountered in any program intending 
to provide a deterministic description of microphys ical reality. In 
this discussion of Ballentine's Statistica l Interpretation, we show also 
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that the classical world picture described above is untenable with 
respect to Q.M. This theory is a specia l case of a H.V. theory 
and a discussion of these theories follows quite naturally in 
Chapter 4. We return ·to cons idera t i on explic j tl y invo ] v i n~1 
determinism in §5.4. 
3.2 Determinism and Causality 
In the literature concerning these problems (e .g. Zeh (1975), 
von Neumann (193 2 ))the t erms 'causality' nd 'det erminism' are 
frequently used as interchangeable and synonymous. We have a 
criticism of this usage in that the t erms are indeed d istinguishable 
1 
in meaning. By stating that the behaviour of an isolated system 
is deterministic, we mean that the situation of that system at any 
time is completely determined by knowledge of the situation of the 
system at some earlier time. A deterministic theory would be one 
in which the state of a system at some time and the relations governing 
the time development of the system de termine, unambiguously, the state 
of the system at any later time. (In time reversal invariant theories, 
the state of the system at some time and the relations governing time 
development give the state of the system at any time). 
The notion of causality is not nearly as simple to define. However, 
we see the notion of causality as a statement of the belief that the 
actual physical situation of a system at some time is related to the 
actual situation of that system at an earlier time, and relates, also, 
to the future situations of the system. It is difficult to imagine 
a system that is not causal, in this general s ense, and it is doubtful 
whether a scientific description and analysis of an acausal system 
1. For convenience, we conside r only isolated systems in this 
discussion. This condition could be relaxed to 'significant 
isolation'. See §5.2. 
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could be constructed . A further specification of causality relates 
to a time ordering that may be logically necessary and is certainly 
conceptually important. i.e. In a ll causal relationships causes 
precede effects. 
Whether the behaviour of a system is stochastic or deterministic, 
it is still possible, and maybe necessary for a scientific analysis, 
that the situation of a physical system at a certain time be somehow 
related to its situation at earlier times. This can be seen in 
statis~ical theories where we would agree that a certain distribution 
of single results follows (causally) f rom a certain prepara'tion 
procedure, or that the obtaining of some single result in the distribution 
is related to the situation pertaining to the system previously. In 
this sense, we could say that the spinning of a coin causes the result 
'heads or tails'. 
Hence, a theory by means of which the l ater states of an isolated 
system can be completely determined by considering i ts state at some 
former time will be termed causal and deterministic. If, however, 
it is only possible, by means of a theory, to make statisitcal predictions 
of the future behaviour of a system, this theory will be termed causal 
and non-deterministic. 
Subject to this formulation, it is difficult to imagine an acausal 
theory. Unless it is one which, in some cases at least, effects precede 
causes, such a theory would have to describe an acausal system in which, 
for example, no perceptible relationship between the behaviour of the 







3.3 Determinism and the Function 
The defining characteristic of deterministic behaviour is tha·t 
different mutually exclusive events (or sets of behaviour) follow 
1 from different causes. (Here ' cause' is used in the sense of 
'complete cause' or possibly ' essentially complete cause'). 
Given the occurrence of the cause, it would not be possible to 
1 
determine precisely which effect to expect if two or more 
mutually exclusive effects could follow that cause. We can see 
that a deterministic relation between events (or situations ) is 
asymmetrical as follows; although the same effect may proceed 
from different mutually exclusive causes, in a deterministic si·tuation, 
different exclusive effects may not follow the same cause . This 
asymmetry we call the single-valuedness of a deterministic relationship. 
In constrast to the assertion to the contrary by Simon (1965), 
the deterministic relationship and its properties are indeed 
embedded in pure mathematics. Precisely this property of single -valued ness 
is a requirement on a relation between two sets if that relation is to be 
a function or mapping, in the fundamental algebraic sense of the term. 
The analogy between functional relationships and deterministic relation-
ships is therefore obvious. 
Now, in classical theories
2
, the equations of motion together with 
the state of the system at some time (the initial conditions) determine 
the state of the system at any other time. It follows conceptually (as 
well as from a suitable mathematical formulation) that the equations of 
motion provide a function mapping the set of possible initial conditions 
onto the set of possible states of a system at some later time. (Since 
the function is one-one, it will also map onto states at earlier times). 
1. In this discussion 'cause ' and ' effect ' can be read as shorthand for 
'state' at an earlier ' time' and 'state at a later time'. In this 
case, the restriction to complete causes is equivalent ·to a restriction 
to isolated systems. 
2. Arguments (due e.g. to Feynman (196~) that classical theories are 
not deterministic in practice, due to experimental error or insufficient 
isolation of the system under consideration, cannot alter the fact that 
the mathematical formalism and concomitant interpretation as well as 
the underlying philosophy of classical physics is deterministic. 
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This is only possible because the r e l ationship be tween successive 
states of an isolated sys·tem described by classical mechanics is 
deterministic. Indeed, any of the properties of a system can be 
determined using a function which maps the initial conditions onto 
the values of that property at a la·ter (earlier) time. This is how 
the world picture discussed in §3.l i s embedded in the mathematical 
formalism: the behaviour of a class ica l property is described by a 
single-valued (well-behaved) function; the obvious interpretation being 
that each classical property has a value at every moment, and this value 
usually varies in a simple and well-def ined way (i.e. we usually 
consider only continuous, or even smoothly continuous functions in 
classical physics.) 
Conversely, if the behavi our of a physical sys tem is inherently 
non-deterministic, it is impossi ble to describe the time development 
of that system completely in t erms of any mathemat i cal entity (e.g. 
a functional) which has the properties of a funct ion (i. e . single-
valuedness). 
This result proves to be singularly important with respect to 
the interpretation of Q.M. See the last part of §3.4 and §S.6. 
3.4 Dealing with Indeterminism 
It is useful to consider the case of a highly schematized seemingly 
non-deterministic phenomenon in order to examine the possible ways of 
describing the situation, either by in·troducing determinism, or by 
other means. Consider the situation shown in Figure 3.1 where A 
represents the initial state of an isolated system, and Band C represent 
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two mutually exclusivel states of the sys·tem which may occur at s ome 
later time. 
Figure 3.1 
The relation R, r e l ating the poss i b l e states at different times 
cannot be single-valued if it is to describe the tilOe development of 
a system prepared with initial state A. Hence, on the face of it, 
it seems that the process under con sideration is necessarily non-deterministic , 
and further, R cannot be a function. If this is the case, any theory 
describing such a phenomenon must be non-deterministic and functions cannot 
be used for the description of the complete time development of the system. 
However, situations like this occur often in the domain of classical 
physics, where they are rendered deterministic by a conceptual device which 
we call 'splitting the cause '. We will consider also a second method 
whereby this situation can be made to appear deterministic. This 
second method, which we call 'identifying the effects' does not occur 
in classical theories. 
i). Splitting the cause 
A situation much like that shown in Figure 3.1, though often more 
complicated in that more than two mutually exclusive situations result, 
if often to be found in classical statistical mechanics. For simplicity, 
we consider an experiment consisting of the flipping of a coin. 
'rhis is somewhat artificial i.n that the state 'having been flipped ' is 
not usually considered as a viable state or a coin. Nevertheless, it 
makes up for this in simplicity and in the fact that it can be generalized 
1. If B occurs then C does not, and vice versa. 
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to more complicated situations as are to be found , for instance, in 
statistical thermal physics. Following on from the initial state 
'having been flipped' (i. e. when the coin is still in the air ) we have 
the two mutually exclusive results, ' h eads' and 'tails'. (We neglect 
any other possible outcomes) . If the state specification 'having 
been flipped' were to be regarded as complete (in the sense of 
Chapter 2), this would represent a non-d terministic phenomenon. 
However, the process is regarded as determInistic since the specification 
of the initial state is not considered to be complete, and is seen 
as a blanket specification covering several mutually exclusive initial 
states. Le. The initial sta"te 'having been flipped' corresponds to an 
ensemble of essentially different actual physical situations. The 
elements of this ensemble may be divideq into two classes: those from 
which the result 'heads' follows deterministically, and those which 
lead necessarily to the result 'tails'. The use of the initial state 
'having been flipped' is justified on the grounds that we do not know 
which element of the ensemble actually occurs in any single case, 
although we assert that, in any such case, exactly one of the e lements 
of the ensemble actually occurs. If we knew which one it was (or which 
of the two classes it belonged to), either by means of measurement or 
else by using a more refined preparation system we would be able to 
predict the result (i.e. heads or tails) with certainty, In classical 
physics, we commonly assert that this is the case, even when such 
measurements or preparation procedures are impossible, as is the case 
in the statistical description of a box of gas, or Brownian motion, for 
example. This procedure for rendering the description of the phenomenon 








The 'cause' A, is cons idered to represent at least two mutually 
exclusive actual situations which can be divided into two classes, Al 
and A
2
. The 'effects', Band C, then follow deterministically from 
any actual situation which falls in Al and A2 , r e spectively. It is 
clear here that the relation R' (as shown i.n Figure 3.2) can be u sed 
to define a function mapping {A
l
, AL} onto {B, C}. 
It is, at first, difficult to see how there could be a ny 
objection to applying the smne procedure to situations described by 
Q.M. Consider, for instance, the case of a beam of spin-~ particles 
prepared with spin component orientated in a given direction, (spin 
'left') which is incident on a Sterno-Ger lach (spin component measuring) 
device orientated at right angles to the polarization direction. The 
beam is split into two parts, each one indicating opposite spin 
polarization, ('up' and 'down'), in the direction defined by the 
orientation of the measurement device. According to the procedure 
discussed above, we should assert that the beam of particles prepared 
with spin 'left' can be divided into two classes: those particles 
which will give the result 'Up' on measurement, and those which will 
give the result 1 down I. 
In the simplest version of this procedure, we would say that each 
particle (prepared with spin 'left') has a spin component 'up' or 'down' 
prior to measurement, which simply separates the two classes. 
in §3.5 that this program, applied to Q.M. systems, implies the 
We show 
existence of non-local forces. A more sophisticated alternative would 
be to assert that each Q.M. state (spin 'left' in our example) corresponds 
to an ensemble of essentially different actual situations, half of which 
Zead deterministically to the result 'Up' and half of which Zead to the 
result 'down', without asserting that the particles have spin 'up' or 
'down' prior to measurement in the same way as classical systems have 








The former interpretation is equivalent to the ' Statistical ' 
Interpretation' of Ballent ine (1970) and the interpretation of 
Q.M. due to Land' (1955, 1965, 1975) and Duane (19 23 ). The latt er 
procedure is the basis of t he H.V. interpretations of Q.M. in their 
more sophisticated forms. It is clear from this discussion that 
the interpretations of Ballentine and Lande are special cases of 
hidden variables theories in which the values which different 
properties have (in the classical sense) prior to measurement are the 
'hidden' variables. We show in §4.4 that the same result as for 
Ballentine's and Lande's interpretations holds for all H.V. theories 
which have predictions consistent with Q.M. 
(ii) Identifying the effects 
The only alternative means by which the phenomenon depicted in 
Figure 3.1 can be made to appear deterministic is to assert that the 
two effects, Band C, are not mutua lly exclusive at all. They are 
seen as perfectly compatible effects of a common cause, A. In this 
case, good reasons must be given as to why, at first s i ght , the effects 
Band C appear to be mutually exclusive. There is no simple 
classical analogue of this procedure, but it gives rise to two 
different interpretations of Q.M. 
as follows: 




Note that R- is a single-valued relation so t hat the time development 
of the system can be represented by a function. 
This device is used in the 'Many Universes ' interpretation of 
Q.M. (See § 7.7 ) in which it is asserted that the different possibilities 
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compatible with a statistical prediction from a given quantum state 
all actually occur, even when the system is a ' s ingle system' con s isting 
of a single particle. The seeming inconsistency of the results 
'finding the particle at point (x l ' Yl) on the screen ' and 'finding the 
particle at point (x2 'Y2) on the screen', where (Xl'Yl) f (x2 'Y2)' is 
explained by the assumption tha t they occur in doifferent universes 
whereas we are only conscious of one universe
l
. Thus, in one 
universe, exactly one result occurs for each single system. However, 
all the other possibilities do occur without being available for 
simultaneous observation. Accordi ng to this interpretation, the 
evolution of such a system (any quantum system which is not in an 
eigenstate of the operator corresponding °to the measured observable) 
for anyone observer (or anyone consciousness of an observer!) 
appears to be non-deterministic. However, the evolution of the 
universe (or universes!) as a whole is considered to be deterministic. 
The function R" is provided in this case, by the Schrodinger equation 
or its equivalent. 
A second interpretation in which q .M. can be rendered deterministic 
in this way is achieved by asserting that the theory does not deal 
with 'single systems' or systems consisting of 'single particles'. 
It is restricted, according to this definition, to dealing with systems 
which consist of many particles. A supportive argument is constructed 
on the basis of the 'relative frequency' theory of probability i.e. 
It is assumed th&t the concept of probability, and hence the predictions 
of Q.M., is only meaningful when applied to large (actual) ensembles. 
In this case, the quantum state can be used to predict deterministically a 
single, unambiguous distribution of results. This is an example of 
the 'statistical determinism' of d'Espagnat (1971 ). 
Thus according to this interpretation, Q,M. does not deal with 
measurement results like 'the particle was found at (x,y) on the screen.' 
It only deals with results obtained on whole (actual) ensembles of 
single systems, of the kind : 'the particles were found on the 
screen in such-and-such a distribut i on. ' In this case too, the single-
1. Strictly, we would be reproduced in many universes, but each 
consciousness would be unaware of the others. 
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valued relation (function) reJating the initial state (of a many-
particle system) with the final outcome, a distribution of results 
with specified relative densities, is provided by the Schr6dinger 
equation or its equivalent. 
This interpretation occurs explLcitly in the work of Belinfante 
(1975) . It also occurs implicitly in some other interpretations 
(e.g. that due to Daneri, Loinger and Prosperi (1966)). We deal with 
it in more detail in § 7.4 . Howev r, we note briefly that this 
interpretation has some extremely unattractive features. It involves 
the assertion that there are experiments , performed on systems usually 
considered to be within the quantum mechanical domain, which cannot 
be described by Q.M. i.e. Those experiments in which few enough 
particles are involved for statistical fluctuations to be evident. 
This restriction is motivated, in the case of Belinfante, at least, 
by an adherence to a particular theory of probability as well as, 
probably, a desire to avoid some of the more puzzling problems in 
the interpretation of Q.M. Neverthe less, the re are theories of 
probability which, no matter how shaky their philosophical basis, 
encompass the use of probability in the description of single-events. 
The statement that a die has associated with it a probability of 
~ for each face landing upwards can be made on the basis of the measurement 
of the properties of that die and the throwing device, without 
even throwing the dice once , never mind hundreds of times. 
Further, this adherence ·to the "relative frenuency " interpretation 
of probability, and the concomitant assertion that Q.M. deal s only 
with real ensembles, prevents us from using Q.M. to induce what 
'microphysical reality' i5 like. As with all other regulative 
principles, whether we choose to make this assumption or not is 
arbitrary, from a logical point of view. However, for the reasons 
mentioned and by invoking the 'principle of conservatism' we shall 
consider that Q.M. applies to single systems as well as many-particle 
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systems. This involves t he a ssumption of some a lternative theory 
of probability (like, perhaps, the 'betting' theory , since we can 
bet accurately!). We dea l wi th thi s que s tion aga in in §5 .5. 
iii), h 1det erminism 
Should we find that the postulate tha t micr ophysica l processe s are 
inherently deterministic cannot b e r easonably ma intained, there are 
still at least two ways in which a ph enome non like that depicted in 
Figure 3.1 can be described. Firs tly, we can throw up our hands and 
abandon all hope of achieving a dynamical descrip tion of the evolution 
of microphysical processes with time, and simp ly r e late the initia l 
situation, A, and the final results, Band C, by R as in Figure 3.1. 
In the case of Q.M., this is already achieved by the physical 
formalism. Here we assert that, if a system has quantum state 
I tjJ> = I c Il/J > at the time of measurement of the observable associated 
n n 




Ic I . n 
will be as if the system were in the state Iljin> with probability 
The evolution of quantum states with time is simply regarded 
as an algorithm for calculating the possible me asurement results, and 
is not interpreted as representing, in any way, the time development of 
any actual microphysical situation. From this point of view, we 
must either look to theories other than Q.M. in our attempts to 
discover the nature of microphysical reality, or else regard such 
attempts as impossible. The other theories required for the first 
alternative do not exist
l 
and the second alternative involves the 
assumption of an empiricist or positivist stance which we discussed 
and rej ected in § 1. 8. 
1. It is difficult to see how the basic feature s of such an alternative 
could differ from Q.M., on the b asis of the empirical evidence on 
microsystems which exists at present. 
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A second alternative is to assume that the time development of 
the quantum mechanical state , as occurs in the physical formalism 
of Q.M. l , gives some information as to the actual dyn mical d evelopment 
of the microphysical system which it represents. Here, we are faced 
with the difficulty that whereas, as we have shown, a non-deterministic 
time development cannot be represented by a function, in Q.M. time 
evolution is always described deterministically, either by means of 
the Schrodinger equation or by the action of a time development 
operator. i.e. Knowledge of the initial quantum state of a system 
allows us to determine the exact, undnmiguous state of the system 
for all future times, by means of the physical formalism. There 
is one powerful condition on this procedure: it is possible 
provided no measurements take place. On the other hand, it is 
only in the interpretation of the quantum state on measurement that 
statistical considerations enter into Q.M. As we shall see in 
Chapters 6 and 7, it is only when we attempt to describe all the 
physical processes involved in measurement by means of Q.M. that 
difficulties occur. Thus we can consider the following schema 
for the non-deterministic evolution of a microphysical system: the 
system is prepared in a certain way (corresponding to a quantum 
state) and, thereafter, it develops deterministically until certain 
criteria are fulfilled. When these criteria are satisfied, a non-
deterministic change in the actual situat ion pertaining to the 
microphysical system occurs. Thereafter the evolution may again 
be deterministic (as described by the Schrodinger equation). 
These criteria, which must be satisfied at some stage in all measurements, 
will be investigated further in Chapter 9. 




1. Here, we consider the 'Schrodinger Picture' as opposed to the 
mathematically equivalent 'Heisenberg Picture' in which the 
operators change with time. 
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Here A' represents a situation which satisfies the criteria 
for non-deterministic chang e . The single-valued relation R'" is 
as defined by, say, the Schrodinger equation. The non-deterministic 
change will be called 'state r eduction' and will be dealt with in 
§ 5. 6. It will also be introduced after different considerations, in 
Chapter 7 and discussed in the following chapters. 
3.5 The 'Statistical' Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics 
Before we treat those interpretations which are usually considered 
to be H.V. theories, we will analyse the 'statistical' interpretation 
described by Ballentine (1970). Many different interpretations have 
gone under the name 'statistical', but the theory which we consider 
here is similar to that due to Lande (1955, 1965, 1975): We agree 
with many of Lande's criticisms of the conventional or 'orthodox,l 
interpretations of Q.M. as well as his aim to "explain the quantum 
principles themselves, that is to show them to be consequences of 
still more elementary principles known from pre-quantal physics" 
(Lande (1965) p21. Still we find that this interpretation violates a 
fundamental regulative principle: that no 'non-local' interactions 
exist. Since this interpretation is a type of H.V. theory, that 
it involves the admission of non-local interactions follows from the 
proof, presented in §4.4, that this result holds for all H.V. theories 
with the same predictions as the Q.M. formalism. Nevertheless, it 
is useful to deal specifically with this interpretation, firstly as 
an indication of some of the difficulties which arise when attacking 
the problems of interpretation of Q.M. from a naive classical position, 
and secondly, to provide an illustration of the general proof which may 
render it more reasonable and intelligable. Finally, the analysis of 
1. The term • orthodox' has been applied as ambiguously as the term 
• statistical' in relation to interpretations of Q.M. 
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this interpretation gives rise to some restrictions on the 
nature of microphysical reality, and he nce, the possible forms 
of a H.V. theory. Still, we stress thal this interpretation is 
a H.V. theory, where systems are assumed to 'have' properties (such as 
spin, momentum, position, etc.) in the same way as do classical 
systems. The values that these properties 'have' in a particular 
case, information which is not generally given in the Q.t-1. state, 
would determine the values of the hidden variables in this i nter-
pretation. Q.M. is certainly seen as incompl ete (in the sense used 
in Chapter 2) since the quantum state 
" (pure or otherwise ) represents an ensemble of similarly 
prepared systems. For example, the system may be a single electron. 
Then the ensemble will be the conceptual (infinite) set of all single 
electrons which have been subjected to some state preparation technique 
(to be specified for each state), generally by interaction with a 
suitable apparatus. Thus a momentum eigenstate (plane waves in 
configuration space) represents the ensemble whose members are 
single electrons each having the same momentum, but distributed 
uniformly over all positions. Physical systems which have been 
subjected to the same state preparation will be similar in some of 
their properties, but not all of them (similar in momentum but not 
in position in the ••.. example). Indeed the physical implication 
of the uncertainty principle is that no state preparation procedure 
is possible which would yield an ensemble of systems identical in 
all of their observable properties. Thus it is most natural to 
assert that a quantum state represents a n ensemble of similarly 
prepared systems, but does not provide a complete description of an 
individual system. "Ballentine (1970). 
Let us consider ·these 'most natural' assertions in the light 
of two experiments; two-slit interference between electrons, and 
the spin-component measurements on decay products of a spin-zero 
particle considered in §2.2. 
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Suppose a mono-energ e tic e l e ctron b e am of l o w inte nsit.v (o ne 
electron at a time ) from a narrow source passes through two slits 
of suitable width and spacing in an opaque screen to fallon 
a detecting system (we could equally we ll consider the sourc e to be 
a monochromatic light source). If the detector i s placed close to 
the slits, we find that each electron is eithe r d e tected behind one 
slit or the other. i.e. In an actual experiment (suc h as that 
performed by J a nossy and Naray (l96~ ) no significant number of 
coincidence counts occur. Hence, according to this interpretation, 
the ensemble corresponding to the quantum state d e fined by t he preparation 
procedure can be divided into two classes : those electrons which 
pass through one slit and those which pass through the other. i.e. 
Electrons either pass through one slit or the other l Now, 
when the detector is moved further away from the slits , we find that 
the detection events are distributed in a characteristic manner, the 
'two slit interference pattern'. 
Suppose now than an ' electron absorber ' or s lit cover is placed 




source slits screen 
cover 
Figure 3.5 
1. This result follows directly from the naive classical s tandpoi.nt 
implied by thi.s interpretation . 
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exist, those electrons which pass through the other slit will not 
interact with the slit cover , and t hey will be detected in the positions 
in which they would have been found hau no slit cover b e en present. 
The electrons which pass t:hrough the covered s lit are absorbed by the 
slit cover and so do not affect the detection apparatus. A s imilar 
situation holds if t h e slit cover i s moved to op e n the s lit previously 
covered and close the other . By ad justing the d e tection time in 
each case, we should, according to this interpretation, be able to 
recreate the same ensemble of detection e vents as if no sli"t cover 
had been present: those electrons which are dete cted will not have 
interacted with it at all, in the absence of non- l ocal forces. 
Hence, in this case we expect to find the same distribution o f 
detection events (the 'two slit int e rfer ence pattern ') as in the 
case where the slit cover is absen t . This is, of cours e , not the 
case. Instead a distributio n characted s tic of two overlapping 
'single slit interfere nce patterns' is observed. 
Thus, our assumptions are at fault. Le. Eit h er the electrons 
do not pass through one slit or the other, or else there must be some 
non-loca l interaction between the electrons passing through the uncovered 
slit and the slit cover. The first alternative is incons istent with 
the postulates of the interpretation under cons ideration. Thus, if the 
' statistical' interpretation of Q.M. i s to be logically consistent and 
empirically correct, it must involve non- local inte ractions. 
We note that the method proposed by Balle ntine and Lande to account 
for such interference phenome na (i.e. Duane's r ules) doe s not avoid 
the difficulties described above. Dua ne (1923 ) devised an algorithm to 
account for interference phenomena wi t hout involving waves. Interference 
effects can be calculated by assuming t h a t there are cha racteristic 
1 
transfers of momentum associated with a ny periodic microscopic system 
1 This require s that the macrosocpic body b e rigid or else in 
'instant communication ' with al l of its parts . This in itself 
implies the existence o f non-loca l force s . 
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If we place the slit cover behind the slits, as in Figure 3.5, then 
each electron must interact with the slits prior to interac ting with 
the slit coverl. 
~n the absence of non-loca l forces, the e lectrons receive 
their characteristic momenta upon interaction with the double slit. 
Thel'eaftel', those which pass through the closed slit will be 
~bsorbed, whereas those which arrive at the screen will have received 
incr~ents of momentum suitable for the formation of a double slit 
p~ttern, By superimposing the de"tection events obtained from each 
slit as before, we reproduce the same result as when no slit cover 
is present. i.e. We still expect a double-slit pattern, in the 
absence of non-local forces, either between the slit cover and the 
electrons which pass through the open slit or else between the slit cover 
and the screen forming the slits, which would change the predictions of 
Duane's rules for the slits. 
The unacceptability of this interpretation can be further illustrated 
by considering measurements of spin components for two spin-half decay 
products of a spin-zero particle. The details of this experiment are 
presented in §2.2 above. Recall that the problem was to account for 
the fact that the spin components of the two decay products are 
correlated (in opposite senses) despite the fact that the measurements 
on the particles are performed at spacially separated positions. In 
this interpretation, the problem appears, at first sight, to be trivial: 
After the decay, each particle 'has' a spin which is oriented in a given (if 
unknown) direction. These spins are in opposite senses immediately 
after the decay, and measurement simply reveals this fact. Let us 
suppose, therefore, that each particle 'has' spin component 'up' and 
1. In an extreme case, the slit cover could be inserted o nly after 
each electron had interacted with the slits. In this experiment 
(which would take so long to perform as to be impossible ) we may 
expect different result s ! 
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'down' respectively. 
We know that a beam of particles prepared with spin 'up ' 
(or 'down'),gives ·the results 'left ' and 'right ' with probability 
~ when the spin component is measured in a horizontal direction. 
In terms of the statistical interpretat.ion , we conclude that , 
of a beam of par ticles prepared with ",pin 'up' one half of t he 
particles has spin left and the other half has spin right . 
Thus, in our two-particle experiment , the partic l e with 
spin 'up' may have spin 'left ' or ' right ' with probabl.lity ~ , 
while the same is true fo r a particle \"ith spin ' down'. Hence, 
if we measure the spin-components of these particles in a 
horizontal direction, we expect, according to t he laws for 
combining probabilities, to find with probability l:! that the particles 
have spin components in opposite senses (left/ righ t or right/left) 
or, with probability ~ that they have spin components in the same 
sense (left/left or right/right). This is in contradiction with 
Q'.M. which predicts that t he spin components will be anti-correlated, 
irrespec·tive of the direction i n which spin components are measured. 
Another genera l difficulty wi t h this interpretation,closely 
related to that just considered , is that it is difficult to s ee how 
it is possible to distinguish between a beam of particles, all of 
which are in a superposition of two quantum states, and one in which 
each particle is in one of t he two quantum states. i.e. It is 
difficul t to distinguish be·tween a 'superposition' and a 'mixture'. 
Consider , for instance, the differences between a beam of spin ~ 
particles described by the superposition of spin states . 
3.1 
and a beam of particles each of which is described by IL> or IR> 
with probability ~ in each case. Here IL> and IR> are eigenstates 
corresponding to spin components in opposite senses , in the same 
horizontal direction. 
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If we measure the spin compone nts of first b e wn in this 
horizontal direction, we find that h l£ of t h e bea m b e ha ves as 
though it had spin 'left' while the o t .h e r h a l f qives the r e sult 
'spin right'. Thus, according to the s tatistical interpre tation, 
the first beam consists of particle s one half of which 'have' 
spin 'left' and the other half of which 'have ' spin 'right'. This 
does not distinguish it from the s econd beam. However, if these 
beams are passed through a Ste rn-Gerlach ma chin e 0ri8nted in the 
'up-down' or vertical direction, the firs t b eam wjll b e deflected 
in one direction only, whereas the s e cond will b e split into two 
parts. The statistical inte rpretatio n canno t account for this 
difference between a superposition and a 'mixture ' of two quantum 
states, although it has observable effects. 
The unacceptability of thi s statistical int e rpretation 
indicates a certain limitation on the nature of H.V. theories: the 
hidden variables cannot indicate the values that properties of 
the system 'have', in the sense of classical theories. They can, 
at most, indicate what values l,)ill be found upon meast:!rement. Here, 
already, we have a hint that something interesting must occur 
during measurement on microphysical systems: properties change 
from propensities, in some general sense, . to the actualities 
of classical properties. We will take up this hint in Chapter 5. 
First, we consider some of the more sophisticated and complicated 
attempts at 'splitting the cause' to achieve a deterministic 
nescription of microphysical reality. 
We note finally, that, in r e j e c t ing thi s s t a ti s tica l inte rpretation, 
we are also rejecting the cla ssical wo rld picture in which all 
properties of a system 'have' continuously, or nearly continuously 
varying values, which we mentioned in §3.l. Possible alternatives 
will be considered in Chapter 5. 
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Chapter 4 
HIDDEN VARIABLES THEORIES 
4.1 Introduction 
The procedure of 'splitt i ng t h e cau se ' outlined in §3 .4 is well 
known and much used in class i cal physics. For this reason, 
physicists who find the fundamenta l s tatistica l nat ure of t he predictions 
of Q.M. unsettling, have attempt ed to apply t h i s procedure to the 
apparently non-deterministic behaviour to b e found i n mos t 
experiments l involving microsystems. As we have indica t ed , thi s 
gives rise to the so called 'Hidden Variables' interpretat i ons of 
Q.M. which may be defined as follows: 
Hidden Variables Interpretat ions of Q.M. are t hose in 
which it is assumed that, by augmenting the specification 
of a microphysical system provided by the quantum state 
with additional (hidden) va riables or parameters, we can 
determine the result of any measurement on the system 
with certainty. 
From this point of view, Q.M. is clearly 'incomplete' in that 
the ensemble of actual situations specified by the quantum state 
must contain elements which are not essentially identical i.e. those 
which give rise to different measurement results. This assertion 
follows from the assumption that the behaviour of microphysical systems 
is inherently deterministic. 
Indeed, the preservation of the notion that the behaviour of 
physical systems is determinis t i c provides the main motivat ion for 
attempting to construct H. V. theories. This stemmed, initially, 
from a desire to situate microphys ical systems and their t r eatment 
1. Those in which the system is no t described by an eigenstate of 
the operator corresponding to the measur ed observable. 
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within the Iclassical world picture' described in §3 ,1, with 
its concomitant determinism. As we have shown in §3.5 by 
considering the interpretations due to Ballentine (1970) and Lande 
(1955, 1965, 1975) this latter aim cannot be realised if we are to 
exclude non-local interactions. 
One of the interesting features of the d evelopment of H.V. 
theories is that they did not appear in any coherent form until some 
thirty years after the formulation of the Q.M . formalism . Be linfa nte 
(1973) lays the blame for this tardy development squarely at 
the feet of von Neumann and his 'proof' of the impossibility of 
H.V. theories (von Neumann (1932». Bell (1966) showed that this 
'proof' rests on postulates which are not necessary for a H.V. theory. 
Nevertheless, we believe that there are more complicated reasons 
for neglecting the possibility of H.V. theories. The realization 
(implicit or explicit) that such theories cannot be used to 
interpret Q.M. in the context of a classical world picture removes 
the most powerful motivation for their construction. Also, according 
to wignerl, one of Von Neumann's strongest criticisms of H.V. theories 
was that they must be enormously complicated. This follows from 
the fact that the results of even an ideal measurement
2 
cannot, 
in general be reproduced in a sequence of measurements: If operators 
A and B do not commute, then two measurements of the observable 
corresponding to A, separated by a measurement of the observable 
corresponding to B will not necessarily give the same result. Finally, 
there is (as yet) no experimental evidence favouring a H.V. approach 
over ordinary Q.M. We deal with this point in the next section. 
1. See Wigner (1970l, Footnote 1. 
2. For more detail concerning' ideal or 'non-disturbing' measurements 
see § 7.5. 
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4.2 The Logical Status of H.V. Theories 
Bell's (1966) analysis of von Neumann's 'impossibility proof' 
shows that, as we would expect, measurements on system prepared in 
a given quantum ' state together with specified hidden variables would 
not reproduce the predictions of Q.M. The additional specification 
of the hidden variables would ensure that the same determined 
result would occur every time the experiment was performed, whereas 
the results of measurement on a system prepared with a given 
quantum state only are, in general, randomly distributed over different 
mutually exclusive possibilities. Hence, in situations where the 
results agree with the predictions of Q.M., we must conclude that 
the values of the hidden variables must be distributed randomly. 
Indeed, nobody has so far been able to prepare microphysical systems 
in such a way that the hidden variables have anything other than a 
random distribution. Papaliolios (1967) attempted to detect 
deviations from Q.M. predictions which would indicate some disturbance 
in the distribution of the hidden variables. He assumed that an 
ideal measurement would select a non-random distribution of the 
hidden variables, and performed a second measurement immediately 
after an ideal measurement. In each case, the predictions of 
Q.M. were fulfilled. Thus, either the 'relaxation time' for 
the hidden variables to return to a random distribution was shorter 
13 
than the time between Papaliolios' measurements (10- s) or else 
experimental confirmation of H.V. theories cannot be obtained in 
this way. In any event, no direct experimental evidence for 
hidden variables theories exists. By invoking the principle of 
economy of postulates (i.e. Occam's Razor) it is therefore possible 
to exclude H.V. theories without further ado. If the hidden 
variables are doomed to remain 'hidden' in this way, we could, 
logically, get on just as well without them. Nevertheless, in 
our quest to understand the nature of microphysical reality, it 
is important to know the conditions under which a deterministic 
description of th~ behaviour of microsystems is possible. We 
shall see (in §4.3 et seq) that there are much stronger reasons 
for abandoning H.V. theories. 
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4 , 3 Non-locality in Hidden Variables Theories 
We do not consider in detail any of the ingenious attempts (e .g. 
by Bohm (1951), Bohm and Vigier (1954 ), Jauch and Piron (1963), 
Jauch (1968), Pearle (1976)1) at constructing a H.V . theory which is 
2 
compatible with the predictions of Q. M.. Instead, we show that 
all such theories involve non-local effects which are at least 
'artificial and unpleasant~ Belinfante (1973) traces the proof upon 
which this result depends back to the work of Gleason (1957). 
A similar proof appears in the work of Kochen and Specker (1967). 
(Belinfante (1973), provides an alternative proof of their result) 
where they show that the outcome of any particular measurement cannot 
be determined by specifying the quantum state and the value(s) of 
the hidden variable(s) only; the spe ctrum of possible results (i.e. 
the eigenvalues or, equivalently, the eigenvectors of the operator 
corresponding to the obse rvable to be measured) must also be 
s pecified if the result is to be determined with certainty. 
Bell (1964) was the first to relate this sort of result to 
non-locality, in his proof and discussion of 'Bell's inequality'. 
Subsequent reformulations of Bell's proof have been made (e.g. 
by Belinfante (1973) and Wigner (1970». Wigner's proof has the 
advantage of being couched in conceptual, as opposed to formal, 
terms as well as being relatively simple and intelligable. It 
is therefore well-matched with the methods of analysis employed 
1. Pearle himself does not consider his theory to be a H.V. theory 
in that 'no new variables are introduced into quantum theory'. 
We regar~ it as such since the values of some variables (the 
Q.M . phases) determine the outcome of any measurement with 
certainty and the result shown in §4.3 certainly applies to it. 
2. The interested reader should consult Belinfante (1973) for a 
comprehensive review of H.V. theories. 
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elsewhere in the present work. Further, it is clearly not 
subject to the criticism of Bell's proof by Lochak (1976) where 
it is claimed that Bell's argument applies only to a special 
kind of H.V. theory i.e. that Bell assumes properties which are 
not necessary for a H.V. theory. 
Following Wigner (1970) we consider the experiment which 
we used in §2.2 and §2.5 to illustrate the E.P.R. argument; viz 
that involving the decay of a spin-zero particle into two 
oppositely directed spin-half particles (fermions). We suppose 
that the spin component of each particle is to be measured in 
one of three possible directions, w
l
' w2 and w3 . For simplicity, 
and to make the discussion more realistic
l
, we consider only those 
directions which lie in a plane normal to the direction of propagation 
of the particles. 
Now let us suppose that a hidden variables theory exists. It 
follows that Q.M. is not complete. Thus the singlet state 
(Equation 2.5) specifies an ensemble of actual situations which 
are not essentially identical. Then, by a further specification 
of hidden variables, we suppose that we can d~termine with 
certainty, the results of each of nine possible measurements, should 
it be performed. (The nine measurements are of spin component of 
particle 1 in the w
l 
- direction and of particle 2 in the w
l 
- direction; 
that of particle 1 in the w
l 
- direction and of particle 2 in the w
2 
-
direction; that of particle 1 in the w
l 
- direction and of particle 
2 in the w3 - direction; etc.) 
1. The Stern-Gerlach machine, employing an inhomogenous 
magnetic field, is a measurement device which 
measures spin-component 'directly'. - It can only be used 
to measure spin components in a direction normal to the 
direction of propagation of the beam. 
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Now, for each measurement, there are four possible results. 
Denoti.ng the result "spin component of particle 1 in the +wi - direction 
and that of particle 2 in the -w, - direction" by (+, -), these are 
J 
(+, +), (+, -), (-, +) and (-, -) . 
9 This means that there are 4 
possible results for the nine measurements. Hence, we may divide 
the ensemble specified by the quantum state into 49 subensembles 
(which are not necessarily disjoint) such that the result of each 
measurement can be determined by specifying (or finding out) in 
which of the 49 domains the actual situation happens to be in each 
case. 
We can simplify matters considerably by making the assumption 
that no non-local interactions exist. More specifically, we 
assume that the result of a measurement on particle 2 cannot be 
affected by the orientation of the measurement apparatus at the 
site of the measurement on particle 1. This is equivalent to 
excluding a non-local interaction since, if it were not so, the 
events 'orientating measurement apparatus l' and 'registering a 
measurement result for particle 2' would be causally related, 
despite the fact that they may occur as far apart spacially, and 
as close together in time as we like. (For more detail see §5.2, 
§ 5.3) . Bell (1964) calls this the 'locality assumption'. It 
requires, in effect, that the result of a measurement on one of 
the particles be independent of the direction in which the measurement 
on the other particle is performed. With this assumption, we can 
reduce the number of subensembles which we must consider from 49 to 26. 






where, if the actual situation occurs in ' this subsensemble, we 
h h 
4.1 
would expect the results 0i '2 and T
j 
'2 for a measurement of the spin 
component of paricle 1 in the w. direction and particle 2 in the w]. 
. 1. 
direction respectively, should these measurements be performed. 
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h 2 for a measurement of the For example, we expect the result + 
spin component of particle 1 in the wl 
and w
2 
directions and particle 
2 in the w
2 
and w3 directions for all systems which occur in the 
6 
subensemble . (+1, +1, -1, -1, +1, +1). There are clearly 2 such 
subensembles which must be disjoint since they are mutually exclusive. 













) which characterizes a subensemble, 
and the probability that the actual situation will be in that subensemble, 
1 
for a given quantum state . Henceforth, the symbol will stand for 
this probability. 
In order to compare the predictions of local hidden variables 
theories with those of the Q.M. formalism, we must calculate the 
probabilities of finding certain results in one measurement, 
irrespective of what the results are in other directions. For 
example, the probability that a measurement in particle 1 in the w
l 
h 
direction will give a result + 2 and one on particle 2 in direction 
w3 will give a result - ~, is given by 
(+ 1,', ' ; • ,-1) 4.2 
where we have simply added the separate, independent probabilities. 
Here we introduce a new notation where the symbols ai' Tj that are 
unspecified (and summed over) are replaced by dots. 
1. d'Espagna~, (197~, in his presentation of Wigner's proof, 
assumes implicitly that each element of the ensemble of 
actual situations corresponding to a given quantum state occurs 
with equal a priori probability. This assumption is not 
necessary, and it weakens the proof which, in the form presented 
here, is valid for any probability distribution. 
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So far, we have constructed a gene ral framework to represent 
a local hidden variables theory, without requiring that it 
reproduce the results of Q.M. 
we have that 
By introducing this requirement, 
(±l,·, ,; ±l, .,.) (., ±l, ., ± 1, .) ( . , ±l; -±-l) = 0 
4.3 
This follows from the quantum mechanical result that the spin 
components of the two particles in anyone direction are anti-correllated: 
i.e. if particle 1 has spin component in the + w. - direction, the 
~ 
probability for finding particle 2 with spin component also in the + w. 
~ 
direction is zero. 
NOw, in particular, 
(+ 1, +1, .,.) o 
1. e. o 4.4 
All the terms in the sum on the r.h.s. of 4.4 are positive or 
zero, being probabilities. Therefore, 4.4 implies that they are 
all zero. By applying a similar argument for a 1 = T 1 = - 1 and i = 2, 3, 
we obtain the result that 
o if cr. 
1 
1, 2, 3 4.5 
Now, if the angles between directions wand w , wand w 
121 3 
are given by 812 , 8 23 and 813 
(0 ~ 8
ij 
<IT) it follows from 
formalism of Q. M. that 
and w2 and w3 
the physical 
-7 4-
. ) ~ sin 2 
8 12 
(+1, • . ; +1, --2 
+1) ~ sin 
2 613 4.6 (+1, . ; 2 
+1, . ) ~ sin 2 
623 
(. , +1; . , 
2 
Now, using 4.5 to eliminate terms equal to zero, 
(+1, +1, .) (+1, -1, ' ; -1, +1, .) 
(+1, -1, -1; - 1, +1, +1) 
+ (+1, -1, +1; -1, +1, -1) 4.7 
However, the first term in this expansion occurs also in the expansion 
of (+1, ., '; ., " +1) and, since all the terms are greater than or 
equal to zer0, 
(+1, -1, -1; - 1, +1, +1) ~ (+1, . ; +1) 4.8 
Similarly, the second term in the r.h.s. of 4.7 occurs also in the 
expansion of (', ., +1; " +1, .) and so 
(+1, -1, +1; -1, +1, -1) ~ (., +1; 
Substituting from 4.8 and 4.9 into 4.7 we get 
(+1,',', ; +1, .) ~ (+1, , ; 
+ (., +1 
Substituting from 4.6 into this inequality we get 
. 2 812 
Sl.n -- ~ 
2 
. 2 8 23 1 
+ Sl.n -2-
+ 1, .) 4.9 
+1) 
., + 1, .) 4 . 10 
4.11 
1. It has been pointed out by Shimony (See Wigner (1970» that 'Bell's 
inequality' follows easily from this result. 
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Now, we can choose the label s wl ' w2 a nd w3 and their positive 
senses such that, for any three coplanear directions, 812 = 813 + 823 
8 
In this case, sin
2 (~) 2 











































sin - - + 2 
s i n 2 
+ 2 sin 
2 
sin 
Hence, 4.11 becomes 
2 sin sin cos o 
8, , 11 
NOW for distinct directions w., 0 < 8, . < 11 hence 0 < 1
2
J < 
J 1J 2 






and 4.13 must be false i.e. the condition 4.11 cannot hold for any choice 
Thus, we have shown that a hidden variables theory, as we have 
outlined it, cannot reproduce the results of Q.M. in this case. 
The result also holds in general, of course, since a single counter-
example is sufficient. It may be that the predictions of a hidden 
variables theory are correct, and those of Q.M. incorrect in this case. 
However unlikely tnis possibility may seem, in the face of the general 
successes of the Q.M. algorithm, this is a matter t hat should be 
decided by experiment (see §4.5) . 
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Alternatively, we may r equire that the hidden variables theory 
reproduce the predictions of Q.M. In this case, we must relax at 
least one of the assumptions made at the outset o f the above argument. 
We cannot relax the assumption that the theory is a hidden variables 
theory in the sense of our definition in §4.1. without changing the 
subject of our discussionl This means that the only basis on which 
we can construct a H.V. theory which reproduces the results of Q.M. 
when the hidden variables are randomly distributed, is to relax the 
'locality assumption'. i.e. We must assume that the result of a 
spin-component measurement in a given direction on particle 2 is 
affected by the direction in which the spin-component of particle 
1 is measured in each case. i.e. If we suppose that the quantum 
state, as well as all relevant hidden variables are specified for 
a particular system like that considered above, we would still be 
unable to determine the result of a measurement on particle 2 by 
means of such a theory without knowing the direction in which the 
measurement on particle 1 was to be made, no matter how far away 
the latter may be. 
This is equivalent to the result of Kochen and Specker (1967) 
who showed that the result in a particular measurement cannot be 
a function of the quantum state and the hidden variables only: it 
is also necessary to specify ~he spectrum of possible results. 
In our case this implies that the orientation of both measurement 
systems must also be specified. As we have indicated, this implies 
the existence of non-local interactions. In §5.2, 5.3 we consider 
in detail the concept of non-locality in general, and how it applies 
1, We anticipate that some readers will object to our condition for 
a H.V. theory . However, in view of the generality of this 
condition, and the fact that H.V. theorie~ thus far presented 
(as well as some other interpretations not usually called H.V. 
theories) fulfill it, it is difficult to imagine an interpretation 
which could be called a H.V. theory on intuitive grounds, and 
which does not fulfill our condition. 
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in th~s case, in particular. 
4.4 The Classification of H. V. theories 
Belinfante (1973) divides H.V. theories into three kinds. 
Those of the !zeroth kind' are those which are self-inconsistent. 
Belinfante notes that self-inconsistent theori es can always be 
formulated, and cites as an example the theories which von Neumann 
refers to in his 'proof' of the imposs ibility of H.V. theories. 
H.V, theories of the first kind are those which are not self-
inconsistent, and which reproduce the predictions of Q.M. exactly, 
when the hidden variables are randomly distributed . The results of 
our proof above indicate that, if we take the exclusion of non-
local interactions as a necessary axiom for physical theories, this 
class of H,V . theories is empty. We take this opportunity to note 
once more that the requirements on a physical theory are not purely 
logical. Certainly, where deductive arguments occur, they must 
satisfy the requirements of logic. However, these requirements 
do not apply to our choice of axioms or regulative principles. From 
this point of view, Belinfante's classification of H.V. theories as 
of the zeroth kind is a ploy to make refutations of H.V. theories 
seem less acceptable. Any refutation of a H.V. theory of the first 
kind cannot be on empirical grounds without simultaneously being a 
refutation of Q.M., and a H.V. theory which is refuted on the grounds 
of logical inconsistency must be of the zeroth kind! The failure 
of von Neumann's 'proof' is not that it ~eals with H.V. theories of 
the 1st kind; it lies in the fact that his postulates for a H.V. theory 
are unnecessarily restrictive. 
Finally, H.V. theories which are classified as of the second kind 
by Belinfante have predictions which are different from those of Q.M., 
particularly in cases like the experiment considered in §2.2 in the 
treatment of the E.P.R. paradox and in §4.3 above. If such theories a re 
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feasable, Q.M. must be empirically incorrect. This means that 
experimental evidence favouring either Q.M. or H.V. theories of the 
second kind should, in principle, be obtainable. We consider 
attempts at obtaining this evidence in §4.S below. We can 
write the results of our proof in §4.3 in terms of this classification 
in two different ways, depending on whether or not we consider the 
exclusion of non-local effects to be a necessary axiom for a physical 
theory. 
If we accept this exclusion, our result is equivalent to the 
statement that no H.V. theory of the first kind exists. H.V. 
theories must either be of the zeroth kind (and therefore unacceptable) 
or of the second kind, in which case they are empirically testable. 
Alternatively, we can say that all H.V. Theories of the first 
kind must include non-local effects. 
In a recent paper Lochak (1976) has criticised Bell's (1964) 
proof of our results on the grounds that the H.V. theories which 
he considers are of the first kind i.e. that Bell's concept of a 
H.V. theory is unnecessarily restrictive. Whether or not this 
criticism applies to Bell's proof is beside the point, since it 
clearly does not apply to Wigner's derivation of the same result 
as we present it here. Lochak also mentions a criticism due to 
de Broglie of the use of the 'singlet state' in describing the 
experiment considered here and in §2.2. In using this formulation, 
however, we have simply followed the dictates of the physical 
formalism of Q.M. Further, the usage of this formalism can be 
independently confirmed by the experimental test of H.V. theories 
of the 2nd kind (§4,S). 
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4.5 Hidden Variables Theories of the 2nd kind 
The proof presented in §4.3 that H.V. theories must be non~local 
rests, partly, on the assumption that the predictions of such theories 
must agree with those of the physical formalism of Q.M. This is 
not unreasonable in the face of the general success of Q.M., but the 
correct requirement on a physical theory is that it agree with 
the 'facts' i.e. the experimental results. Thus, in order to avoid 
the consequences of the above proof, it has been postulated that Q.M. 
is empirically incorrect in cases like the experiment considered in 
§4.3. This postulate is, of course, experimentally testable, 
although such tests prove to be much more difficult than is suggested 
by the simpliticity of the gedanken-experiment' which we considered. 
The first experiments attempted involved the measurement of 
correlations between the polarizations of spacially separated photon 
pairs, and the comparison of the results obtained with those predicted 
by ordinary Q,M. and those necessary for a local H.V. theory. We 
do not propose to treat these experiments in detail, since, for 
our purposes, the results will suffice. Details can be found in 
the original papers as well as in reviews such as those presented 
by Belinfante (1973) and Shimony (1971). 
The first to attempt this kind of experiment were Kocher and 
Commins (1967). Their experiment proved to be inconclusive, due 
to technical difficulties, but an improvement suggested independently 
by Clauser, andHorne and Shimony (See Clauser et al (1969» and carried out 
by Freedman and Clauser (1972) gave conclusive results in favour of 
Q.M. However, a similar experiment performed by Holt (see Belinfante 
(1973» yielded tentative results in favour of a local H.V. theory 
(L.H.V.) Kasday, together withWu and Ullmann, devised another 
photon-correlation experiment (Kasday (1971» which gave results in 
favour of Q.M. However, Bell devised a counterexample of a L.H.V. 
theory which would agree with their results. Kasday notes that his 
results are in agreement with those ofWu and Shaknov (1950) 
Bertolini et al (19551 and Langhoff (1 960). 
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In 1976, a conference was organised by J.S. Bell and 
B. dlEspagnat ("Workshop on Experimental Q.M., 19 ~ 23 April, 1976 
at Erice, Sicilyl) to bring together physicists working in this 
field and to try and settle the question for once and for all. 
E.S. Fry (1976), presented results of an experiment similar to 
that of Clauser and Freedman, ond the same as that of Holt. 
the 1 1 0 transitions in mercury) which unequivocably favour 
(Using 
Q.M. Clauser and Horne presented the ir result which favours Q.M. 
being ~ 6 standard deviations away from the predictions of a L.H.V. 
theory. F.M. Pipkin et al performed a similar experiment which 
favoured a L.H.V. theory. However, he pointed out that every 
source of error moved the result away from the Q.M. predictions and 
towards those of a L.H.V. theory. He had twelve such sources 
of error! 
J ~ Ullmann measured correlations on y~radiation using 
Compton scattering to determine polarizations, and obtained results 
supporting Q.M. S. Notarrigo performed a similar experiment which 
gave poor agreement with a L.H.V. theory. 
R. Ringo proposed an experiment involving low-energy proton-
proton scattering, which yields a 98% singlet-state. This experiment 
is nearest to the gedanken-experiment presented in §4.3 and so 
proivdes a possible 'direct' test of the use of Q.M. in this case. A 
similar experiment has been performed by M. Lamehi-Rachti who 
obtained results in agreement with Q.M., two standard-deviations away 
from the predictions of a L.H.V. theory. 
Thus, we can see that, although there is some disagreement 
and this result cannot be taken as totally conclusive, available 
research indicates that the predictions of Q.M. in this case are 
correct, and that a L.H.V. theory is not possible. This was 
1. Details from D. Bedford, priva"te communication. 
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the general feeling of those attending the conference (especially 
Bell). . In order to come to conclusive results and to check all 
possibilities exhaustively, it was agreed that experiments should 
be performed in which polarization correlations in random directions 
are measured. A. Aspect suggested a method using Kerr-ce lls whereby this 
1 
could be done. D. Bedford expressed his belief that this had, in 
essence, already been done in the experiment due to Ullmann. 
Because our ultimate aim is not that of d'Espagnat (1971) (ours 
is to understand microphysical processes, his was to interpet non-
relativistic Q.M.) we cannot use his ploy and disregard the possibility 
of a L.H.V. theory as outside the subject under discussion. Therefore, 
we eagerly await a decisive r e sult, one way or the other. However, 
it certainly seems as though the majority of experiments indicate 
that Q.M. is correct and that any L.H.V. must be incorrect. ~..;re make 
this assumption in the rest of the present work, but re-emphasize the 
fact that, if a L.H.V. theory is found to be correct on empricial 
grounds, Q.M. and many of our interpretations on the basis of Q.M. will 
be empirically false. 
1. This method has already been suggested by Clauser. 
See Shimony (1971}. 
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Chapter 5 
LOCALITY, COMPLETENESS AND DETERMINISM GENERAL CONCLUSIONS 
5.1 Introduction 
It seems, on the face of it, that instead of clarifying the 
possibilities for a realist interpretation of Q.M., the analysis of 
the last three chapters has led us to a dilemma . The result of 
Chapter 2 is that if we assume that Q.M. provides a complete 
description of (microphysical) reality (which must therefore be 
non-deterministic), non-local effects must exist. In order to 
escape the 'artificial and unpleasant' features of such interactions, 
we might suppose that Q.M. is not complete. If we then attempt to 
'complete' the description provided by Q.M. by constructing a H.V. 
theory (on the assumption that microphysical processes are 
deterministic) we find once again that we are forced to assume the 
existence of non-local effects! If we maintain strictly the regulative 
principle that non-local effects do not exist, we are left with only 
one possibility: Q.M. must be incomplete (to avoid the non-locality 
implied by the arguments of Chapter 2) and the behaviour of 
microphysical systems must be non-deterministic (to avoid the non-
locality implied by the existence of a H.V. theory). This unfortunate 
conclusion, while it may avoid non-local interactions, certainly 
complicates our aim of using Q.M. to induce and explain the properties 
of microphysical reality. Even if this reality were not completely 
described by Q.M., we could still find out something about it by 
assuming its behaviour to be deterministic
l 
If this latter assumption 
is also excluded, it is difficult to see how we could go about 
constructing a complete theory on the basis of Q.M. It is not even 
certain that such a theory would not also include non-local interactions. 
In view of our unfamiliarity in dealing with non-deterministic situations, 
too, it would seem advisable to r econsider such a drastic step. 
1. We could augment Q.M. to form a (complete) H.V. theory, and 
then investigate microphysical reality using this theory. 
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For these reasons, we should re-examine our insistence that 
non-local interactions are unacceptable . It is no longer possible 
to delay a detailed analysis of the concept of non-locality, 
which plays such an important part in this context. It is 
surprising that an analysis such as that which is presented in 
§5.2 below has not appeared in the literature concerning the E.P.R. 
paradox, H.V. theories, and related topics. In §5.3, we compare 
the non-local effects as they occur in a complete Q.M. and in H.V. 
theories. As a result of this comparision, we d ecide in favour 
of the assumption that Q.M. is complete a nd non-deterministic. In 
the rest of this chapter, we deal with the consequences of this 
decision. 
5.2 Non~Locality: The problem of definition 
As we have seen, the notion that non-local interactions are 
unacceptable has played a crucial role in our analysis so far. 
This regulative principle is widely accepted, and under certain 
circumstances, may even be a criterion for the I analyzability I 
of physical systems: if non-local interactions are present, it may 
not be possible, even in principle, to consider any physical system 
(other than the entire universe) to be isolated. Nevertheless, 
non-local or seemingly non-local interactions have been employed in 
certain physical theories. e.g. The interaction between the distant 
stars and local matter in Mach's hypothesis concerning inertial 
frames (these forces could be local, since they are represented b y 
an essentially ' static ' potential) and in those theories of 
electromagnetism (due to Wheeler and F'eynman (1945, 1949)) employing 
advanced and retarded potentials. Still, we agree with 
d'Espagnat (1971) who finds that these interactions are lat least 
artificial and unpleasant ' . 
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Despite the general intuitive understanding of the concepts 
of locality and non-locality, it is, as is characteristic of regulative 
principles, difficult to describe or define these concepts unambiguously. 
Consider the following frequently quoted statement on the subject by 
Einstein (1949): "On one supposition we should, in my opinion, 
absolutely hold fast : the real factual situation of the system S2 
is independent of what is done with the system Sl' which is spacially 
separated from the former". (p o B5}. 
NOw, in the absence of any further specification of how we are 
to interpret the term 'system' and in particular, its spacial extent, 
it is reasonable to assume, from a common-sense point-of- view, that 
the sun and the earth are spacially separated systems. However, any 
theory in which it was asserted that the real factual situation on 
the earth is independent of what occurs at the sun would be plainly 
unacceptable and absurd. The inte raction between the earth and the 
sun, although they are spacially separated, need not be 'non-local' 
at all! 
The following definition of the locality principle is due to 
d'Espagnat (1971): 
"If a physical system remains, during a certain time, mechanically 
(including electromagnetically, etc) isolated from other systems, then 
the evolution in time of its properties during the whole time inter'val 
cannot be influenced by operations carried out on other systems" (p.114). 
Here, the onus of the definition is placed on the concept of 
'mechanical isolation'. If this concept is made explicit, it should 
mean the absence of any of the four known types of interaction 
(i.e. electromagnetic, gravitational, strong nuclear and weak nuclear) . 
This definition is restrictive in that it excludes the possibility 
that some new local interaction may yet be discovered: any new 
interaction type would be non-local by definition. This presumptious 
restriction is more in keeping with the confidence and faith of 
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nineteenth century physics than with the present scientific climate. 
A second objection arises from the fact that electromagnetic 
and gravitational interactions have an infinite range. The class 
of isolated systems thus defined would be empty, and there would be 
no possibility of checking whether or not a particular interaction 
was local. This latter problem can be avoided by relaxing the 
condition of 'mechanical isolation' to 'significant mechanical 
isolation': the possible effects due to the four known interaction 
types can be calculated, in principle, and compared with any 
alteration in the behaviour of the system of interest. If the 
effect of these interactions is found to be negligable compared with 
the effects to be accounted for, the system could be termed 
'significantly isolated,' and the change in behaviour ascribed to a 
non-local interaction. This leaves us with the former difficulty: 
that new local interactions are excluded. If we strengthen the 
condition on isolation to apply to any interaction, whether of the 
four known types or not, the whole statement reduces to a tautology: 
when a system does not interact (in any way) with other systems, then 
its behaviour is not affected by what is done to other systems. This 
does not exclude the possibility of non-local interactions since, if 
they occurred, the system would not be isolated under this definition 
of mechanical isolation. 
We stress that these problems of definition are non-trivial, even 
though they may appear to be purely pedantic. They do not relate 
merely to a poor choice of terms by the authors considered here, but 
represent real problems in finding a statement which corresponds to 
our intuitive idea of what constitutes a non-local interaction. In 
some ways, a definition like that of d'Espagnat, in terms of 'significant 
mechanical isolation' comes closest to our aim of specifying (even 
a Contrario) a non-local interaction. 
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However, we should not be so presumptious as to exclude the 
possibility of the existence of local interaction types which 
are, as yet, undiscovered. 
It is significant that, in both passages quoted above, 
consideration is given to the intrusion of an 'operator', who 
carries out operations on or does things to the environment of 
the system under consideration. Both formulations can be made 
without explicit mention of or intervention by an operator, as we 
have indicated by our treatment. On the face of it, it is preferable 
to exclude any conscious intervention in the behaviour of physical 
systems since physical theories do not usually deal with conscious 
'systems' or operators
1
• Nevertheless, we feel that these 
authors have been influenced to include this 'non-physical' entity (i.e. 
a system that has 'intent') by the fact that our notions of 
interaction, non-local interaction in particular, are dialectically 
d d o f d 1° 2 Tho b epen ent on our not~ons 0 causes an causa ~ty ~s can e 
illustrated as follows: if system A interacts with system B, then, in 
some sense, either events in A cause events in B to occur, or vice-versa. 
Similarly, if events in A cause events in B to occur, in any direct 
or physical fashion, we may conclude that systems A and B interact. 
Now, although this may be open to criticism, we contend that 
the most certain (and perhaps only) way of ascertaining whether or not 
one event a, causes another, S, is to bring about a in many different 
environments, and see whether or not S subsequently occurs. If we 
can demonstrate the 'transmission of intent' (i.e. ensure that a 
occurs, intending that S should occur), under diverse conditions, we can 
be sure that the relation between a and S is causal, and not one of 
I, A notable exception is the theory of measurement due to ~hgner (1967) 
and London and Bauer (1 9 3q) . See, in this regard, Chapter 8. 
2. We distinguish between causality and determinism. See §3, 2. 
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constant conjunction only (as, say, the common effects of a single 
cause). Likewise, if a occurs in system A and S in system B, we 
can be sure, in this case, that A and B interact. By including an 
operator (i.e. an experimenter) the authors quoted have indicated 
how we can know that an interaction occurs, and simultaneously, if 
unwittingly, provided the key to achieving an unambiguous definition 
of locality. 
The transmission of intent is one type of information transfer 
i.e. the information that a has happened, by design, and hence, that 
S must occur. It is a result of the special theory of relativity 
that information transfer cannot proceed at a speed greater than that 
of light in vacuo i.e. events that are separated by a space-like 
interval (in the sense of special relativity) cannot be causally 
related. This conclusion follows from that fact that, due to the 
relativity of simultaneity, the time ordering of two events which are 
separated by a spacelike interval is not absolute, but depends on the 
state of motion of the observer. i.e. Two events, a and S, which are 
separated by a space-like interval will appear to occur in the order 
a first and then S from some rest frames, whereas from others, S 
will appear to occur first. If we assume that a and S are causally 
related in that a causes ~, say, then when a is seen to precede S, all 
is well. On the other hand, if S precedes a, one of the fundamental 
conditions on causal relationships, that causes precede effects, is 
violated. Since we can always view a and S from a rest frame from 
which S is seen to precede a, this represents a serious difficulty. 
In the special theory, this difficulty is dealt with by assuming that 
events separated by a space-like interval cannot be causally related. 
The prohibition on effects preceding causes stems, in turn, from 
several sources. Firstly, there is the empirical consideration that, 
no matter what procedures have been tried, nobody has been known to 
influence events that have already occurred! (It is difficult to 
to conceive of how a claim to have done this could be checked). 
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Secondly, if effects could precede causes, a logical impasse of 
the kind where a hard-hearted (and foolish) logician kills his 
1 
mother prior to his birth would be possible! Finally, we 
would be able to see a sequence of events of the following kind: 
a bomb explodes, and thereafter a man says "I think I will detonate 
the bomb, after all" and then presses the detonator. Such a chain 
of events casts serious doubts on our subjective belief in free-will; 
once the effect has occurred, the cause must occur, whether the man 
(the transmitter of intent) has made up his mind at that moment (in 
the observer's rest frame) or not! 
All these considerations give rise to a most stringent prohibition 
on the occurrence of effects prior to their causes. Note, however, 
that this does not, in itself, imply "that no interactions over a space-
like interval can occur. The difficulties mentioned above are only 
to be found in the case where interactions by means of which inten t can 
be transmitted occur over a space-like interval. If an interaction 
were of such a kind that it was impossible to transfer information (in 
the sense of a message) there would be no reason, a priori, for 
excluding it. This is the case, for example, in theories involving 
advanced and retarded electromagnetic potentials. These act in such 
a way that any attempts at the transmission of intent are doomed to 
failure. For details see e.g. Davies (1974) Chapter 5. 
We note that th·e cases of non-local interaction which we have 
encountered thus far share the property that they relate events which are 
as far apart spacially, and as close in time as we like i.e" they are 
separated by a space-like interval. A causal relation between such 
events is prohibited in special relativity. Using these concepts, 
we can construct a definition of non-locality which is both precise 
and unambiguous. 
1. This would take at least two non-local steps since the events are 
on the same world line. 
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If events a and 8 are separated by a space-Like 
intervaL (in the sense of speciaL r eLativity) then 
any interaction r eLating them must be non-Local. 
The problem with this definition is, a s was r a ised by Capri (1975) 
(see §2.6), that no acceptable relativistic generalization of Q.M. 
exists. (Our discussion is specifically restricted to non-relativistic 
Q.M.). However, in view of the difficulties associated with 
alternative definitions, this definition can be useful for the following 
reasons: 
i). If an interaction between systems described by Q.M. di d occur 
over a space-like interval, we could 'amplify' these effects to a 
macroscopic scale by a process such as measurement. Indeed, if 
Q.M. is to provide a universal description of microscopic phenomena, 
and the basic tenets of the theory of atomism are to remain valid, 
all macroscopic events should be r elat ed to each other, in some way, 
by interactions in the domain of Q.M. We could therefore expect 
to find macroscopic events which are causally related, but separated 
by a space-like interval. This would represent an empirical 
falsification of the special theory of relativity, a theory which 
has been found to apply universally to macros copic events, and is 
believed by many physicists to provide an adequate description of 
reality at this level. Nevertheless, we cannot e s cape the fact 
that it is formally inconsistent to use the theory of special 
relativity in discussions r e lating t o non- relativi s tic Q.M. 
ii). The non-local interactions d escribed in Chapter 2 and 4 are 
indeed between systems separ ated by a space-like interval l when 
viewed from the perspective of specia l relativity. We believe 
1. Technically, we should write " .. . . between events separa ted 
by a space-like interval occurr ing in ea ch system" but we 
feel that our usage is clear. 
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that all events thought, on intuitive grounds, to be related by 
non-local interactions are separated by space-like intervals. 
Hence, without considering the specia l theory of relativity to 
apply formally to the situations we consider, which are subject 
to Q.M., we can use the concepts of this theory as an indicator, 
to point out situations which are non- local, (and hence unacceptable) 
from an intuitive point of view. 
iii) .Finally, we note that, in a choice between alternative 
interpretations, each subject to regulative principles which 
are mutually inconsistent, we are restricted to the use of 
persuasive arguments only. If one interpretation satisfies this 
requirement of special relativity whereas an alternative does not, 
this simply adds weight to the case against the second interpretation. 
Since, as we mentioned in §1.2, we cannot hope for a logically 
rigourous distinction between two such interpretations, this 
informal usage of the concepts of special relativity cannot destroy 
the logical rigour of the argument. As we have repeatedly pointed 
out, the problems of interpretation of a phyiscal formalism are 
physical and not formal. This applica tion of special relativity 
can be seen as a formal indicator of a physical objection 
(the existence of (intuitively) non-local interactions). 
5.3 The Case Against Hidden Variables 'rheories 
In order to avoid the conclusion that Q.M. is an incomplete 
description of a non-deterministic reality, we must reconsider the 
exclusion of non-local interactions. If we accept such interactions 
unreservedly, we cannot conclude from the E.P.R. argument (§2.2 and 2.4) 
that Q.M. is not complete. Neither can we use the results of §4.3 
to exclude the possibility that hidden variables theories exist. 
However, there is an essential difference between the non-localities 
involved in either case that, together with other considerations, 
allows us to exclude the possibility of H.V. theories and assume that 
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Q.M. provides a complete description of microphysic 1 reality 
(which behaves non-deterministically). 
We showed in §4.3 that, in the expe riment considered there, the 
resuLt of a measurement of spin component on one particle depends 
on the direction in which the spin component of the other particle 
is measured , and concluded that the interaction whereby the 
direction of the measurement on the first particle is transmitted 
to the site of the measurement on the second must be non-local. 
From our analysis in §S.2 above, i 't follows that, provided the 
'transmission of intent' can take place via this interaction, we 
should be able to show that some extremely unacceptable phenomena, 
including a violation of causality and our notions of 'free-will' 
can occur. It remains to be demonstrated that this interaction 
can be used to transmit intent. 
This can most easily be done by considering a 'gedanken' 
experiment. Consider, as in the previous arguments, the case 
of a spin-zero particle which decays into two oppositely-directed 
spin-~ particles via a spin-conserving decay. The state of the 
combined system (consisting of both decay products) after the decay 
is the singlet state 
I1/!> = 2 -~ ( I u > I V > - I u > I V » z+ z- z- z+ 5.1 
where z is any direction in the plane norma l to the direction of 
propagation, and all symbols have the same meaninq as in Equation 2.5. 
Suppose, further, that Q.M. is incomplete, and that the actual 
physical situation is further specified by the value(s) of hidden 
variable(s) in each case. It is impossible (at the present time) 
to measure the value(s) of the hidden variable(s) in a particular case, 
or to prepare a system repeatedly with the same value(s) for the hidden 
variable(s)1. If an acceptable H. V. theory exists, however, there is 
1. This would give rise to results in conflict with those of Q.M. 
(i.e. dispersion-free states). 
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no reason, in principle, why one of these procedures should not become 
possible in the future, due to refinements in preparation and measurement 
techniques. i.e. The problem with specifying the values of the hidden 
variables in each case is a technical one. If this were not so, and 
we found ourselves unable, in principle
l 
to specify the values of 
hidden variables as part of state preparation, H.V. theories would 
become even less acceptable from the point-of-view of the principle 
of economy of postulates (Occam's razor) and completely unacceptable 
to the fasificationists.2 
Thus, we assume that, for the limited purpose of a 'gedanken' 
experiment (which deals only with matters of principle), the 
value(s) of the hidden variable(s) can be known or specified at 
the outset of the experiment. Now the specification of the 
quantum state and the hidden variables cannot be sufficient to 
determine the outcome of any spin component measurements on the 
second particle. We must also specify the direction in which the 
spin component of the first particle is measured. This, in turn, 
depends on the orientation of the magnets of the Stern-Gerlach (S.G.) 
apparatus (spin component measuring device) at the site of the 
measurement on the first particle. Hence, by influencing the 
orientation of these magnets (by means of a lever, say) an 
experimenter can influence the outcome of a measurement on the second 
particle even if the two events (aligning the S.G. magnets at the 
site of measurement on particle one, and performing the measurement 
on the second particle) are separated by a space-like interval 
(i.e. the time between them is less than the distance between them 
divided by the speed of light in vacuo) . Hence, if H.V. theories 
which are consistent with Q.M. exist, then we can 'transmit intent' 
over a space-like interval. 
1. 
2. 
As we mentioned in §4,2, this is already impossible in practice. 
This argument indicates our rejection of any H.V. theory involving 
a 'conspiracy' to produce the particular r esults obtained in a 
given measurement. 
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In order to make explicit the unacceptable consequences 
of this conclusion, and in honour of Schrodinger, we consider 
a situation where the orientation of the S.G. magnets used in 
measurement on the second particle is fixed in, say , the 
"up/down" direction. If the particle is detected in the upper 
path (i.e. with spin 'up'), a sequence of events takes place 
which results in the death of a cat (in much the same manner 
as in Schrodinger's inhumane experiment). If it is detected 
in the lower path, the cat will remain alive. The S.G. appar a tus 
used in measurement on the first particle is mounted so that it can 
be turned about an axis along the 'path' of the particle. For 
given values of the hidden variables, the possible orientations 
of this apparatus can be divided into two: those which give 
rise to the result 'up' and those which give rise to the result 
'down' in the measurement on the second particle. By aligning 
the S.G. magnets in one or other of these directions an 
experimenter can kill or not kill the cat. 
Suppose, initially, that the measurement apparati are 
1 
equidistant from the site of decay Then the experiment 
could proceed as follows: an assistant at the site of the decay 
informs the experimenter that a decay has occurred (and, if 
necessary, the values of the hidden variables) by means of some 
signal which travels faster than do the particles (e.g. radio). 
Having calculated, previously, the maximum time at his disposal 
before the first particle reaches his apparatus, the experimenter 
waits as long as possible and then makes up his mind and aligns 
the S.G. magnets intending, say, that the cat shall die. If 
the magnets are sufficiently far apart, his decision and the 
cat's death (which will only be certain if H.V. theories are 
correct) will be separated by a space-like interva l. Thus, an 
1. For simplicitly, we assume that both decay products travel 
at the same velocity. 
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observer moving by at a suitable velocity will see the cat die 
before the experimenter aligns the magnets to cause its death, 
and even before the experimenter had ma d e up his mind! It is not 
even necessary to view the experiment from a different rest frame 
to observe these absurd phenomena. If we suppose that the 
S.G. apparatus and the cat are much closer to the site of decay 
on one side than is the experimenter and his S.G. apparatus on 
the other, the measurement on the second (cat' s ) particle 
will take place before the measurement on the fir st particle in the 
laboratory reference frame. In this case , there is no reason to 
suppose the resul t of measurement o n the second particl e 
suddenly becomes independent of the direction of the measurement 
of the first. In our proof (§4.3) we did not consider the time-
ordering of the measurements at all. In this case, from the 
laboratory frame of reference, we would see the following sequence of 
events: the decay occurs and the experimenter is informed; 
the cat dies (survives); the experimenter decides to kill (reprieve) 
the cat; he aligns his S.G. accordingly. Sequences like this, 
if they are not logically unacceptabl e , at least cast serious 
doubts on our belief in our own capability of making decisions 
(free-will); once the cat has died, the experimenter must decide 
to kill it! If the cat survives, he cannot thereafter decide to 
kill it. 
If the time interval between the two events 'cat dies/survives' 
and 'experimenter decides' can be made long enough (by ensuring 
that the decay products h ave low vel ocities) there will b e time 
to inform the experimenter of his choice before he had made it! 
What would happen, then, if he decided to be contrary and choose 
the other alternative? If the experimenter and his assistant 
had decided to do this (contrary choice) beforehand, then either 
the H.V. theory would be shown to be empirically incorrect (if 
the experimenter succeeded) or else the a s sistant would see his 
colleague consistently breaking their decision and conclude that 
the latter had gone insane (or unscientific, to say the least)! 
-95-
Clearly these results are absurd, and must be avoided. i.e. 
We cannot accept the type of non-locality concomitant with H.V. 
theories as an actual physical phenomenon. In contrast, we 
consider the non-locality implied, in terms of the E.P.R. argument, 
by assuming that Q.M. is complete. Here, it becomes possible, 
on the basis of a measurement of the spin component of the first 
particle in a given direction, to predict the result of a spin 
component measurement on the second particle in the same direction. 
Since the measurements on the two particles can occur over a space-like 
interval, the interaction whereby this prediction for the second 
particle becomes possible must be non-local. However, we note 
that, in this case, there are no operations which an experimenter 
at the site of measurement on the first particle can perform which 
can affect the result of measurement on the second particle directly. 
The occurrence of non-local effects can only be shown by comparing 
results after the experiment. For example, if the assistant finds 
a result 'down' for particle two, he can make no inference about 
any activity of the experimenter at the site of measurement on the 
first particle. He cannot tell whether or not measurement on 
the first particle has occurred. Neither can he infer in which 
di~ection such a measurement, if any, was made. The only 
criterion we have as to which measurement (i.e. on particle one 
or two) caused the spin of the other particle to be predictable 
with certainty (in a given direction) is the time-ordering of the 
measurements. If, on subsequent comparison of results, it is 
found that the measurement on the first particle occurred prior 
to that on the second, then we say that the measurement on the first 
particle caused the result of a measurement on particle two ' in a 
given direction to be predictable with certainty. If the 
measurement on the second particle occurred first (in the laboratory 
reference frame) then we say that it is the cause of the polarization 
of the spin of the first particle. Since no 'transmission of intent' 
is possible via this interaction, there is no other means of making 
the choice between 'cause' and 'effect'. 
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Suppose that, in a given instance, the following sequence 
of events occurs (in the laboratory reference frame): the decay 
occurs; a measurement is made on particle one and the result 
'down' is obtained; a measurement is made on particle two and the 
result 'up' is obtained. The last two events may be sufficiently 
far apart, spacially, and close together in time to be separated 
by a space-like interval. In this case, an observer moving 
by at a suitable velocity could, if we accept the postulates 
of special relativity, see the order of these events as reversed. 
i.e. He would see the following sequence: the decay occurs; 
a measurement is made on parti.cle two and the result 'up is 
obtained; a measurement is made on particle one and the 
result 'down' is obtained. 
In both of these cases , the observer sees a perfectly 
acceptable sequence of events (i.e. no observer sees a cat die 
and then someone saying "I suppose I will kill the cat, after al l," 
and taking the requisite steps). The observer in the first case 
will say that the measurement on particle one caused the result 
for measurement on particle two to be determined whereas, in 
the second case (i.e. from a moving r eference frame) the measurement 
on the second particle will be the 'cause ' and the result of 
measurement on the first particle the 'effect'. The two observers 
will disagree in exactly the same way a s they disagree about the 
time ordering of the two measurements. This must be so since this 
time ordering is the only criterion for applying the names 'cause' 
and 'effect'. We call the causal ity in this case 'relative causality' 
to distinguish it from the causality involved in the transmission of 
intent, where cause and effect are distinguishable independently of 
time-ordering; the cause is that event which occurs via 'direct 
contact' with the system which possesses intent (the experimenter) and 
the 'effect' is the event that is intended. We also call the 
information transferred by means of relative causality 'virtua l 
information'. This distinguishes it from the 'real information' 
which carries a 'message' or which transmits intent. 
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As we saw in §5.2 f there is no a priori reason to exclude 
the transmission of virtual jnformation ove r a space-like 
interval, since causality and logic are not violated. 
If any further evidence against H.V. theories is required, 
in the face of the impossible consequences outlined above, we 
need only recall that they not only need to be enormously 
complicated, but they are also empirically untestable. Thus, 
the only advantage of this complication is the retention of 
the classical notion of determinism, without any basis in experiment. 
As we noted in §4.1, we may therefore dismiss H.V. theories on the 
basis of the principle of economy of postulates. 
We conclude that a deterministic supertheory containing 
Q.M. (i.e. a H.V. theoryl) is untenable. Note that this does not 
imply that H.V. theories are impossible : anybody prepared to accept 
the concomitant non-locality (e.g. Lande) can construct H.V. theories 
to his/her hearts' content. This would involve a rejection of the 
notion of free-will in favour of some sort of fatalism 2 or else the 
development of a rationale as to the impossibility of measurement 
or preparation of systems to predetermine the values of the hidden 
variables, 
1. Here we use the term H.V. theory as defined in §4.1. This 
includes some theories which are not usually considered to be 
H.V. theories (see §4.3) and excludes any 'non-deterministic 
H.V. theories'. 
2. We consider that a 'conspiracy' theory of hidden variables involves 
the rejection of the notion of free-will. 
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5.4 A Complete Quantum Mechanics 
Since we have rejected t he notion tha t the behaviour of 
microsystems is determinist ic
l
, Q.M. may provide a complete 
description of such systems. As we have pointed out, a strict 
ban on non-local interactions of a ny kind would exclude this 
possibility, leading to the conclusion t ha t Q.M. can, at most, 
provide an incomplet e description of t h i s non-det e rm i ni s tic 
behaviour. 
However, we have seen t hat the non- l ocali ty i nvolved i n the 
assumption that Q.M. is complete doe s no t violate t he r equirements 
of causality or special rela tivity . Also , by a ssuming that Q.M. 
is complete, we will be able to examine t he phe nomenon of non-
deterministic behaviour. Without t his assumption, we would b e 
unable to use Q.M. as a basis f or under s tanding the deta iled 
behaviour of microphysical reality, which remains out of the reach 
of an incomplete description. While we c an easily see how to 
'complete' Q.M. on a deterministic basis (i.e. by f ormula ting 
H.V. theories), this is not so simple t o imagine, now that we have 
shown that the behaviour of microsystems is non-deterministic. 
For these reasons, then, we assume that Q.M. provides a 
complete description of microphysical r eality, and leave the 
alternative as a possible sta rting point for further research. 
This means, first of all, that we must a ccept the non-local transfer 
of virtual information as a new phenomenon. 
1. This applies only to the determinism achieved by 
'splitting the cause'. i.e. The situation as s een 
by an observer in a single universe (w.r.t. the 
Many Universes Interpretation) de a l ing with a ' s inqle 
system' . 
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Although it has a certain artificiality about it, we may expect 
something like this to be necessary in the description of non-
deterministic phenomena: if a description of the non-deterministic 
time-development of a system is to encompas s all of the possible 
outcomes we should expect something strange to happen when one 
possibility is fulfilled and the others vanish. Nevertheless, 
we note that, by extending our notion of 'system', we can 
achieve a description of the transfer of virtua l information in 
which non-locality need play no part. Consider, again, the 
singlet state given in Equation 2.5 and 5.1. The re is no way 
in which this state can be written as a product of a vector in 
11. (u) . h . 1.1 (v) 1 h h th t t . . Hilbert spacerl Wlt one lnO! ,a t oug e s a e lS In 
the outer product space. This means that Q.M. does not give 
the states of systems U and V separately in this c a se. Since 
we have assumed that the Q.M. de scription is complete, we can 
interpret this to mean that U and V do not have s eparate states: 
there is no actuaZ physicaZ situation pertaining to system U aZone~ 
nor to system V aZone. The only system which we can consider is 
the combined system (U + V) . This means that, in talking about 
'particle l' and 'particle 2' or 'system U' and 'system V' 
separately, we have been making a mistake. These systems do not 
exist independently. Instead of two one-particle systems, we must 
consider one irreducible two-particle sys'tem! From this point of 
view, the 'two systems' between which a non-local transfer of 
virtual information was shown (in §2.2 . and §2.5) to occur, are, 
in fact, one system only. This involves an extension of the 
classical notion of a system, as well as that of atomism (see §l.5) 
Clearly, if Q.M. is complete, we must accept the existence of 
'fundamental systems', the components of which do not have independent 
existence. In this case, one measurement on the system can be 
Expected to affect the result of anothe r (independent of their relative 
situations in space). Formally, this amounts to questionina the 
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assertion of E.P.R. (1935) that two systems can cease to interact: 
although we have no classical basis for an interaction between 
U and V in this case, their behaviour cannot be independent because 
they are both non-separable components of the same system. Here, 
we are faced with a novel (non-classical) aspect of Q.M. which 
gives rise to difficulties in that there is no well-known way to 
describe it in our language. This means that it is no simple 
matter to ensure that our interpretation is consistently applied. 
5.5 Non-determinism and vrobablity 




n 11/i > n 
where, for some hermitian operator A, 
a 11/i > 
n n 
for each n. 
then the probability that measurement of ·the observable 






result of a given measurement on a classical (deterministic) system 
was predicted as a with probabili-ty 1 c 12, we would assert that, 
n n 
in anyone case, ·the result would be d e termined, but a stochastic 
description arises from our lack of knowledge of the exact state 
of the system. For this reason, we consider an ensemble of 
systems, each subject to the same 'blanket' preparation, and 
determine the relative number of elements of the ensemble which 
would give the result a. This, we assert, is the probability 
2 n 
Ie 1 that a will be found. Fundamental to this treatment is that, n n 
in each instance, exactly one element of the ensemble occurs, but 
we don't know which it is. i.e. We assume that each element in 
the ensemble is independent. The probability is an expression 
of the 'relative likelihood' that a given situation should occur. 
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In the case of a non-deterministic microphysical system, 
completely described by the quantum state Iw~( only one situation 
is possible at the outset of the experiment. The fact that 
probability enters into the description of the possible outcomes 
of measurement is not a result of our lack of knowledge. If 
we know the quantum state exactly, we know all that there is to 
be known about the system. This is a consequence of our 
assumption that Q.M. is complete. Probabilities occur, in this 
case, because the evolution of the system is non-deterministic. If 
we attempt to set up an ensemble of systems, as in the classical 
case, we find that the different elements of the ensemble 
must interact. 
For instance, in §3.5, we saw that a system prepared with 
'IL> or IR> with probability ~ ' (i.e. an ensemble with non-
interacting elements) behaves differently, in some experiments from 
a system prepared with 2-~(IL> + IR» (where the different elements 
interact). 
Alternatively, each element of the ensemble must be the same 
(i.e. the situation which is 'completely' described by Iw» and 
must include all possible outcomes. Here, probability plays a 
different role from that in classical theories. The probabilities 
Ie 12 are a 'property' of the state . lw> in that they are determined n 
by it. Since Q.M. is complete, they are a 'property' of the 
system. Now, we have seen (e.g. in §3.5) that microphysical 
systems cannot be thought of as 'having' classical properties. 
Nevertheless, in that the probabilities Ie 21 are uniquely 
n 
determined by the state Iw>, we can say that the system described 
by Iw> 'has' these probabilities as properties. Here, these 
probabilities, a 'property' of the microphysical system, may be 
described as the ' propensity ' that the system has , for 
yielding a given result upon measurement. 
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In contrast to the classical case where the probabilities are 
a property of our incomplete description of a physical system, 
the probabilities {Ic 12} (or, more accurately, the amplitudes {c }) n n 
can be regarded as a property of the physical system, in the same 
sense as the mass of a classical system is considered to be a 
property of the system itself. In cons trast to the classical case 
where the probabilities can be changed, in principle, by obtaining 
more information, quantum mechanical amplitudes and probabilities 
are absolute properties determined by the quantum state. Once 
the Q.M. state has been specified, ther e is no more information to 
be gained. 
The absolute character of the probabilities occurring in Q.M. 
means that some of the philosophical problems relating to classical 
probability do not occur. In evaluating a 'betting theory' of 
probability, Ayer (1957) notes that, in dealing with the probability 
that a given horse will win a race, different people may arrive, 
quite justifiably at different results: 
" .... It makes judgements of probability at least partly 
subjective. If the stable guards its secrets well, the totality 
of the evidence that is available to me will fall short of the 
totality of the evidence that is available to the horse's trainer:. 
Let us make the implausable assumption that both he and I are in 
fact possessed of all the relevant evidence that is respectively 
available to us, and that we correctly calculate the degree of 
confirmation of the hypothesis that Eclipse [the horse] "'ill win, 
arriving naturally at different results. Both results will be valid, 
but the one that is valid for him will not be valid for me 
It follows also, on this view, that there is no such thing as the 
probability of a hypothesis: there are as many probabilities as 
there are persons who have access to different quantities of evidence." 
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He also points out that , if, in order to avoid t his difficulty , 
we assume that: 
" everyone has access, in principle, to al l the evidence 
that there is" we, run into the "fatal disadvantage that the 
probability of every hypothesis become s eithe r 0 or 1". 
This analysis does not only apply to horse-racing! Consider, 
for instance, the spinning of a coin: the assumption that each 
result (heads or tails, neglecting other possibilities) has a 
probability of ~ of occurring depends upon an implicit assumption 
that the coin is spun in a sufficiently complicated way to 
reduce the evidence available to all concerned to the same level. 
However, somebody with a high-speed video-recorder coul d obtain 
sufficient evidence to make the probability of one outcome 1 and 
the other O! 
However, the relative nature of this probability, which can 
be reduced to 0 or increased to 1 without limit by obtaining 
more evidence (prior to the occurrence of the outcome ) depends on 
the fact that the behaviour of classica l systems (such as a coin) 
is deterministic. It is on the basis of determinism that Ayer 
assumes that sufficient evidence exists, pr ior to the occurrence 
of the outcome. In a non-determinis t i c situation there is an 
absolute limit on the amount of evidence available. For micro-
systems this is the information contained in the complete quantum 
state. The probabilities that a system has a given , but unknown, 
quantum state have exactly the same properties as classical 
probabilities. However, once the state of the system is specified, 
the probability that a given measurement result, a say, will 
n 
occur is absolutely determined for a ll interested parties as Ic 12. 
n 
The subjective quality of this sort of probability disappears 
because there is no more evidence to be had. 
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. 
This removes the obj ection against ·the probabilities which 
occur in quantum mechanical predictions being objective quantities. 
rililler (1974) has come to the same conclusion by means of a 
different argument. Although it may be argued that the predictions 
of Q.M. can only be tested by a sequence of measurements (i . e. 
measurements on many-particle systems) this does not necessarily 
imply that we must employ a 'relative- frequency' theory of 
probability. Although there are some difficultie s associated 
with determining the probabilities for different outcomes by 
examining a classical system such as a die , without measuring 
the relative frequency of different outcomes or spe cifying the 
amount of evidence relating to the throwing process which i s 
available, these difficulties do not occur for quantum mechanical 
probabilities. The latter are absolutely specified by determining 
the quantum state of the system. This may be done by considering 
the preparation procedure, and without recourse to the measurement 
of relative frequencies. 
As a result of these considera tions, we can dismiss the claim 
of Belinfante (1975) and others that probability concepts are 
only meaningful with respect to sequences of events (on which 
relative frequencies can be measured) and hence, that Q.M. can 
only deal with many-particle systems (See § 3.4). We can 
therefore use the physical formali sm of Q.M. to investigate the 
1 behaviour of 'single systems'. 
5.6 Non-determinism and State Reduction 
In §5.3, we. come to the conclusion that the behaviour of 
microsystems (as described by Q.M.) cannot be deterministic. 
From this and the result of §3.3, we must conclude that the 
full time-development of such systems cannot be described by a 
function. i.e. The relationship betwe en the actual situation at 
1. In this regard, see also §7.4. 
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one time and at later times must be many~valued and hence cannot 
be described by a single-valued function. Since Q.M. is 
complete, whatever is true for the actual situation pertaining 
to a system must be true also for the quantum state describing 
that situation. From different measurement results obtained, 
in general, on systems prepared with the same quantum state, 
we infer that the actual situation of the system after 
measurement (if it still exists) is different in each case. 
It follows from the completeness of Q.M. that thes e different 
situations must be described by different quantum states. 
i.e. A single quantum state must evolve, in genera l, into one 
of several different quantum states. Not only the actual 
situations, but the quantum states, too, mus t evolve non-
deterministically. 
How is it, then, that the time deve lopment of Q.M. states 
is described by a functional relationship as defined by the 
Schrodinger equation or the action of a unitary operator? 
The relationship thus defined is single-valued and deterministic. 
To answer this question, we refer to paragraph (iii) of §3.4. 
Here we considered two ways of dealing with an inherently non-
deterministic situation. In assuming that Q.M. is complete, 
we reject the first alternative; that the relationship between 
earlier and later states of a system must at best be described by a 
many-valued relation, as defined by the physical formalism 
of Q.M. This leaves us with the second alternative; the 
development of a quantum state (and hence a microphysical system) 
can be described deterministically, i . e. by the Schr5dinger equation, 
provided no measurement takes pl ace on the system. However, wh en 
measurement takes place, or when c ertain conditio ns on the 
quantum state are fulfilled , a non- de terminist i c t r ansition occurs . 
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Since Q.M. is complete, this transition must apply not only 
to our description in terms of quantum states, but also 
to the physical system itself. This transition cannot be 
described in terms of a function, since it is many-valued. 
Thereafter, the development of the system may, once more, 
be deterministic. This transition, which we call state 
reduction 2 was postulated by Von Neumann (19 32 ) who recognized 
two fundamentally different ways in which quantum states change 
with time l • The first, which is equivalent to our state 
reduction, is irreversible and occurs during measurement to 
account for non-deterministic changes. (This is 'intervention 
l' in Chapter V). The other is just the ordinary deterministic 
development of quantum states as defined by the Schrodinger 
equation ('intervention 2' in Chapter V). 
Many physicists will no doubt question the necessity of 
introducing the concept of state-reduction to account for 
non-determinism, especially since it only seems to be needed 
upon measurement. Surely the indeterminism could be introduced 
by the interaction of the system of interest with the measurement 
apparatus! In the following chapters, we shall show that this 
1. It is ironic that, in assuming that Q.M. is complete, we 
are driven tQ the conclusion that an additional process 
must be postulated to describe the time development of 
quantum systems. This is another indication that the 
choice of the term 'complete' to describe the relationship 
between a theory and the reality which it describes is not 
particularly apt. 
2. Other names referring to this, or a similar process are 
'wave packet collapse' and 'reduction of the wave packet'. 
-107-
is not possible, by describing the development of the measurement 
apparatus and the object system together. 
Also, we note that , as we saw in §3 .4, it is difficult 
to imagine how else non-de terministic behaviour could be 
described dynamically. Certainly, the non-de t erministic 
transition (state reduction) cannot occur immediately after 
the preparation of a state since, in this case, it would make 
no difference to assume that the different outcomes of the 
non-deterministic transition were already present when the 
system was first prepared. It would therefore b e possible 
to construct a H.V. theorY-in contradiction to the conclusion 
of §5.3. It is equally certain that state r eduction must 
occur prior to our perceiving the measurement results, 
otherwise we would not experience the behaviour of micro systems 
as non-deterministic at all. The fundamental problem in 
the interpretation of Q.M. which remains is firstly , to show 
that state reduction must occur, a nd secondly, to 
establish the conditions under which it occurs , in a conceptually 
and logically consistent fashion. 
It is possible to link state reducti on and the transfer 
of virtual information. Consider a system prepared with 
ini tial·· state Ilji (0) > which develops deterministically, with time, 
into the state Ilji(t» = LC Ilji > for where Allji > a Ilji > 
n n n n n 
for A a hermitian operato~ and {a } real. Suppose that, at time t, 
n 
an ideal measurement of the observable corresponding to A is made , 
and the result a
k 
is obtained . Then, after measurement, t he 
system is described by Iljik> or, as time goes by , the state Iljik(t) > 
where Iljik(t» follows deterministically from Iljik> by the 
1. The only difference is that it would be impossible to measure 
the hidden variables or prepare them with given values . This 
may provide the rationale mentioned in §5.3. 
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action of a time development operator , (If the measurement is 
non-ideal, the st 
given by I~k> and 
te of the system after measurement may be 
I~' (t» respectively). 
k 
The transition \' c I ~ (t) > -)- I ~ > is non-deterministic and 
L n k 
n 
represents the phenomenon of state reduction. Suppose A 
corresponds to position, and the {a } signify different positions. 
n 
In this case, the information that the system has been 'found' 
at a
k 
must be transmitted instantaneously to all the other 
positions, in order to ensure that the system is not found 
there also. (A single system can only have one position, 
on measurement) • This is an example of the transfer of virtual 
information, over a space-like interval. In the decay of a 
spin-zero particle into two spin ~ partic les considered in the 
E.P.R. argument (Chapter 2) we would say that a measurement 
of spin component in the z - direction on one particle (U) 
giving a result 'spin component in the + z -direction', would 
cause the following state reduction: 
+ lu >Iv » + lu >Iv > z- z+ z+ z-
From this, it is clear that a measurement on the other 
particle (V) must give the anti-correlated result 'spin 
5.4 
component in the -z direction'. The information that state 
reduction has occurred must be transmitted instantaneously to 
the site of the second measurement to ensure that the results 
are anti-correlated. From this point of view, the virtual 
information which is transmitted over a space-like interval 
(involving relative causality) is always that 'state reduction 
to such-and-such a state has occurred. ' 
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5.7 Conclusion 
In the first part of our analysis (Chapters 2, 3 1 4 and 5) 
we have shown the following, without, as far as we can see, 
making any choice in favour of or against any contentious 
regulative principle. i.e. We hold the following to be valid, 
independently of the persuasive arguments in favour of or against 
1 1 · . , 1 1 a particu ar regu at1ve pr1nc1p e . 
1). Either Q.M, is not a complete description of (microphysical) 
reality or else non-local interactions must exist (§2.2, §2,4). 
However, we showed in §5.2 and §5.3 that this type of 
non-locality, which cannot be used to transmit intent, is 
not incompatible with the theory of special relativity, nor 
our notions of causality. 
our belief in 'free- will'. 
It does not bring into question 
2). If Q.M. (or any other stochastic theory) is complete, then 
the behaviour of the reality which it describes cannot be 
inherently deterministic. Conversely, if the behaviour 
of this reality is deterministic, Q.M. cannot be complete 
(§2.4) . 
3) . If the behaviour of reality (in 'the domain of ~.M.) is 
deterministic, (i.e. H.V. theories exist) and the predictions 
of Q.M. in certain instances (e.g. the decay of a spin-zero 
particle into two spin~~ particles, with spin-component 
measurements thereon) are empirically correct, then non-
local interactions must exist (§4 .3 ). In §5.2 and 5.3 we 
1. These conclusions are, however, meaningless unless we reject 
the positivist or empiricist position and adopt some sort of 
realist stance. This could be seen as the adoption of a 
(primal) contentious regulative principle. 
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showed that this type of non-locality is incompatible with 
special relativity. Even without the a s sumptions of 
sp~cial relativity, expe riments are possible, in principle, 
which viola t e our no tion s of cau sa lity a nd f ree-will. 
4. The time-development of a non-deterministic phenomenon 
cannot be fully described by a function (or any mathematical 
relation with the property of singJ e-valuedne ss) (§3.3). 
Using these results, we have come to certain conclusions, 
by choosing some regulative principles in favour of others: 
1. As a consequence of r e sult 3 and the conclusions of §4.5 
that the predictions of Q.M. are correct, we conclude that 
the behaviour of microphysical systems cannot be inherently 
deterministic
l
,2. This conclusion is partly on the grounds 
of our belief in the existence of 'free-will' and in the nature 
of the causal relationship: causes must pre cede effects. 
Also, experiments such as that outlined in §5.3 must be 
considered to be a refutation o f the theory of specia l 
relativity. If this is not so, certain logically 
impossible phenomena, like the killing of one's parents 
before one is born, would be possible. Finally, on 
empirical grounds, we never see the past being influenced 
1. Here we are dealing, specifically, with determinism relating 
to a single system viewed from the point of view of a single 
consciousness. This excludes the 'statistical determinism' 
exhibited by large ensembles and the 'determinism' for the 
whole universe(s) in the Many-Universes Interpretation of Q.M. 
2. One trivial form of d e t e rminism r emains possible, the kind 
adopted by fatalists in the fa~e of any argument: what 
will occur is exactly and unambiguously what will occur, 
therefore nothing else can occur, therefore what will occur 
is determined! The determinism involved in a 'conspiracy' 
theory seems to be of this type. 
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by activit~es in the present. H.V. theories may be dismissed 
on the grounds that they are empirically untestable (§4.2). 
Result 3 provides a stronger reason for rejecting the 
possibility of their existence. This result applies also 
to interpretations of Q.M. which are deterministic, but 
which are not usually considered to be H.V. theories (e.g. 
those due to Ballentine (1970), Lande (1955, 1965, 1975) 
and Pearle (1976)1. In particular, the refutation 
of the interpretations of Ballentine and Lande implies 
that the 'classical world-picture', in which systems have 
continuously or nearly continuous ly varying properties 
with unambiguous values at all times, cannot be maintained. 
2. From the above and result 2, we conclude that Q.M. may be 
complete. Because of the difficulti es in treating an 
incomplete description of the non-deterministi c behaviour, 
as well as the fact that the non- locality implied by 
result 1 is not nearly as serious as that implied by result 
3, we assume that Q.M. is complete (§5.4). Further, 
since H,V. theories have been shown to be untenable, the 
motivation for assuming that Q.M. is not complete has been 
removed. We use the completeness of Q.M. and the result 
that the behaviour of microphysical reality i.s not deterministic 
to come to some speci f i cation of the notion of probability 
as it is used in Q.M. (§5 .5). 
3, From result 4, and the fact that Q.M. is complete, we conclude 
that the time~development of quantum states must be non-
deterministic. Since the time-development defined by the 
Schr5dinger equation (or the unitary time development 
operators). of the phys ical formalism of Q.M. i s de t erministic, 
we postulate that an additional way in which quantum 
states change with time must occur. This change, which we 
call state reduction, must be non-deterministic. Since 
Q.M. is complete this change must occur, not only in our 
description of reality, but as an actual physical phenomenon 
(§ 5.6) • 
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The second part o~ this thesis is concerned with the so~~alled 
·problem of measurement' in Q.M. From our point~of~view this 
problem relates to state reduction: whether or not it occurs; 
under what conditions it can occur; whether or not it can be 
accounted for in a way which is both logically and conceptually 
consistent. The concrete result of this first part is that 
H.V. theories have been excluded. However, we consider it most 
important that we have been able to deal with some of the commonly-
raised difficulties and present our fundamental requirements on an 
interpretation prior to embarking on an analysis of the problem 






There are many problems associate d with measurement on both 
classical and quantum mechanical systems. In the case of Q.M. 
these include the following: 
i) • Under what circumstances does a physical system constitute 
a measurement apparatus on a second physical system with 




What limitations do the properties of the measurement 
system give rise to on the types of me asurement that 
are possible? 
To what extent does measureme nt 'revea l' what is ' already 
there ' , and to what extent i s the measurement result a 
function of the properties of the apparatus alone? 
What are the details of the actual interactions that 
take place between the measurement system and the object 
system? 
However, we are ultimately only interested in these questions in 
as far as they relate to a fundamenta l problem of measureme nt which 
bears directly on the interpretation of Q.M. This problem can be 
stated as follows: 
When a system is not in an eigenstate of the operator corresponding 
to the observable to be measured, the quantum state of the system 
consists of a linear combination of such eigenstates. If we consider 
that each eigenstate corresponds to a single measurement result 
(eigenvalue) then such a state corresponds to several (mutually exclusive) 
measurement results. How is it, then, that upon measureme nt, only 
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one measurement result if found , <.i.e v one of the eigenvalues ). If 
Q.M. is not considered to be complete, and a deterministic H,V. 
theory is considered valid, this problem does not occur, at least, 
not so seriously. In thi s case , the probabilities given in Q.M. 
predictions would be an expression of our lack of knowledge as 
to which actual situation (out of an ensemble of possibilities 
specified by the quantum state) was present. Measurement would 
simply reveal, to a greater or lesser extent which possibility 
had existed all along. We would not be disturbed by the fact that 
. the other alternatives disappeared on measnrement since they 
would never have existed (except as our constructs, due to lack of 
knowledge) in the first place. 
In the case of a complete theory, however , the fact that 
all of the possibilities occur in the quantum state means that 
they must, in some way, have simultaneous existence in reality. 
Now the fulfilment of one possibility and the disappearance of 
the others on measurement must correspond to some actual physical 
phenomenon. The problem which interests us is to account for this 
phenomenon in an objective and local fashion. i.e. The account 
must be independent of our abil ities and our intentions. 
For clarity, we illustrate this problem by means of a simple 
example, prior to a detailed analysis. In §3.5 we cons idered 
the double-slit interference of electrons. By assuming i) that 
the electrons either pass through one slit or the other and ii) 
that no non-local interaction between the slit-cover and the 
double-slit assembly or the electrons passing through the uncovered 
slit takes place, we came to an empirically incorrect result: 
that a double-slit interference pattern should be obtained in an 
experiment in which both slits were never open simultaneously. 
Thus, one of our assumptions must be at fault. If we reject 
assumption (ii) we must accept a non-locality of the extremely 
unacceptable type associated with H.V. 'theories (see §5.3 ). \>Je 
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therefore reject the first a ssumption , that each electron e ither 
passes through one slit or the other, Since the quantum state 
describing the electron contains terms involving the passage through 
both slits, this means that Q.M. ma y be complete. Now, however, 
we are faced with a new proble m. Suppose that we move the 
detecting system to just behind the double -sli t assembly. 
Equivalently, we could place a d e t ector b e hind each slit. In 
this case~ each e~ectron is either d e t ec t ed b e hind o ne slit or the 
other, and never behind bot h. Our problem, then, is to account for 
the fact that, in a doubl e -slit inte rference experime nt, the 
electrons must, in some sense , pass through both slits (i,e. they 
do not pass through either one slit or the other) whereas in the 
second experiment, using an identical state preparation system , 
each electron is detected b ehind one s lit or the other . In this 
case the 'existence ' of the e l ectron a t the othe r s lit 'disappears' 
on measurement. 
In order to pose this probl em in a more formal manner, it 
will be necessary to consider the theory of measurement in some 
detail. 
It is by means of a theory of mea s urement that a correspondence 
b t h . 1 f h' 1 e ween t e propert1es 0 a p YS1ca system and the properties 
of a measurement apparatus is achieved. This correspondence, which 
may be used to justify the use of a give n measurement apparatus to 
perform a given measurement, must be constructed theoretically. 
Further related aims of a theory of measurement may be to relate the 
elements of a theory to the e lements of experience a nd thereby to 
relate the elements of physical reality to the e leme nts of experience. 
i.e. Measurement interactions produce sense data in the conscious 
observer as a result of interactions in the doma in of physical reality. 
1. Here, the term 'properties' is use d in the g e n era l sense and 
not specifically as applied to the dynamical properties, of, 
say, a system in classical mechanics. 
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By means of a the o r y of measuremen t we ca n r elate our experienc e 
to what actually occurs, and the r e by f ormula t e o u r i d eas a bo u t 
physical reality. The notion of ' p hysical rea l ity ' - whe the r i t 
is a meaningful t e rm, and wheth er we can h a v e k nowl e dge of it -
is a p r oblem that has occup i e d a c e ntral pos i t i on i n philos op hy 
for centuries. Some of the d iffi c u lties i n formul a ting a t h e ory 
of measurement which accomp li s h es a ll of t h e a b ov e a ims are 
obviously closely related to these probl ems wh ich are t rad i tionally 
exclude d from physics. 
In §6.2, we inve stigate t h e ro l e of a theory of measu reme nt 
in the formulation of phys i cal t heor i es , s ubj ect to t h e 
doctorine s of realism and o f empi r i cism (po s iti vism), and o b tain 
a restriction on the theore t i c a l bas i s o f a measu rement t heory. 
In §6.3, we treat the 'problem of knowl e dge ' with rega rd to its 
relevance to measurement theor i es , a nd ho w it i s d ea lt with in 
classical measurement theor i es . We the n attemp t to apply the 
same procedure to Q.M. and s how t hat it l e ads to c e rtain difficultie s. 
In this manner, we achieve an explicit sta tement o f the 'pro blem 
of measurement' in Q.M. in genera l t e rms. 
6.2 Measurement The ory, Empir i cism and Reali sm 
From an empiricist point o f view, proposi tion s whic h c a nnot 
be verified by 'direct I . observa tion are meaning l ess. In the 
strictest sense, this l e ads t o the c on c lus ion tha t we can t alk 
meaningfully only about s ense-expe r i e n ce . App lied more loo sely, 
this doctrine allows us to t a l k meaningfu lly a bo ut the b eh aviour 
of measuring instruments (or a ny other directly o b servable physical 
system) while they are being observe d. To induce a nythi ng f r om 
the obs e rvations about othe r (unobse rved) systems wh i ch interact 
with the measuring instrume n t s i s h e ld to b e meaning l e s s in e ithe r 
case. In this sense, the emp irici st ma y a rgue t hat phys i ca l 
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theories can deal only with measurement result s (ei ther as directly 
observed on measuring instruments or as sense-data), which are thus 
the prime entities of any theory. Altern a tively h e may insist 
that physical theories deal wi t h our knowledge of p hysical systems, 
and not with physical systems t hemselve s. As we have arg u ed in §l,7, 
and as is obvious from the above considerations, a theory of 
measurement has no place in an empiricist physical theory. The 
question "where do measurement results come from a nd how are they 
perceived?" is meaningless since the a nswer would consi st of a 
meaningless sentence. 
By contrast, from a r eal ist standpoint, a theory of measuremen"t 
serves to answer this questlon. In order for a physical theory 
to be a satisfactory description of ~ rea lity', it is necessary 
that the predictions of the theory be consistent with r ea lity. 
If the theory is to be 'checkable' or 'fa lsif iable ', this 'reality' 
must be accessible to our experience which must be consistent with 
the predictions of the theory. 
In many cases, subject to classical physics, this requireme nt 
presents no problem, since much of the domain of classical theory 
is ~directly,l accessible to experience. 
However, in some cases in classical physics, and virtually all 
cases of quantum physics, experience of the system of interest 
can only be obtained by employing further 'sensitive' physical 
systems which interact with the object system. In order to 
interpret our 'direct' experie nce of these measurement systems, 
and thereby induce properties relating to the object system, we 
must employ the rele vant physical theory and apply it to the 
behaviour of the measurement apparatus. If the choice of measuring 
1. We will come to a more definite usage of the term 'directly' 
below. Here it means that any measurement apparatus used 
is not obstrusive, and is usually neglected. 
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instrument is apt, this analysis should correlate directly observable 
properties of the measurement system with the properties of interest 
of the object system. By observing these properties on the 
measurement system, we may then, on the basis of the theoretical 
correlation, induce information about the object system. In any 
event, but especially if this information is to be used for checking 
a physical theory, it would be logically inconsistent to use any 
theory other than that under scrutiny for the analysis of the 
measurement apparatus. For this reason, classical mechanics 
and theories compatible with it are used in the analysis of 
classical measurement systems. For this reason too, despite 
assertions to the contrary, Q.M. should be used in the analysis 
of measurement on quantum systems. If Q.M. does not apply to 
the measurement system, then some theory which is compatible with 
it should b~ employed. We have shown that classical theories 
are not consistent with Q.M. in that some of the regulative 
principles which apply to the former are inconsistent with the 
latter. Hence , to use classical theories in the analysis of 
measurements on quantum systems is logically inconsistent. Classical 
mechanics and Q.M. , being mutually inconsistent, can be used in 
the description of systems which fall into their respective domains. 
It is only as a result of confusion that they can both be employed 
in the same description of reality. 
This important conclusion, although it seems irrefutable when 
presented in this manner, is neglected in some of the interpretations 
of Q.M . In a popular interpretation (often called 'orthodox ' ), it 
is asserted that measurement systems, being macroscopic, must· be 
described classically. The disturbing features of quantum measurement 
which we describe in the following sections are explained away as 
special phenomena which take place at the ' interface' between 
the classical (macroscopic) and the quantal (microscopic) domains. 
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Bohr (1958), one of the few authors to attempt a full conceptual 
justification of his point of view, goes so far as to state as 
one of his premises that 
"the functioning of the measuring instruments must be 
described within the framework of classical physital ideas" (p89). 
He arrives at this condition on ~he basis that the results of 
scientific enterprise must be communicable, togethe r with the 
implicit assumption that only "classical physical ideas" are 
communicable. However, if, in order to communicate our ideas 
about microphysical reality, we are forced to resort to the concepts 
and terms of a theory which cannot apply to these microsystems, and 
is incompatible with the theory that does apply to them (Q.M.), i 't 
seems that we are attempting the impossible, and we may as well 
give up. While the use of a classical d e scription of the measurement 
apparatus and its function on systems described by Q.M. may be 
justifiable as a 'stop-gap' for pragmatic reasons (our very patterns 
of speech and our 'common-sense' embody the familiar notions of 
classical physics), it is a logical mistake to construct a formal 
theory using incompatible theories. 
Bohr, in order to account for thi s dualism, introduces it as 
a formal property of reality: complementarity. This is a 'blanket 
term' which covers any inconsistencies that may occur in an interpretation; 
the sources of inconsistency are held to be incomparable, because they 
are 'complementary'. As we show in § 7.6, where we treat the 
ideas of Bohr in greater detail, the notion of 'oomplementarity is 
incompatible with our notion that an unambiguous physical reality, 
consisting of actual physical situations, exis t s independently of 
our thoughts and desires, and independently of what will happen to 
the system at a later time. We disagree with Bohr's assertion 
that measurement must be described classically. On the contrary, 
we consider that this is logically inconsistent. Further, we 
believe that the dualism implied by the principle of compl ementarity 
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is an unnecessary departure from traditional ideas about reality, 
provided that a theory of measurement which is consistent with 
Q.M. (or a modification of Q.M . ) can be found , 
The source of the mi sunderstanding that leads scientists of 
Bohr's stature to attempt a description of reality on the basis 
of these two incompatible physical theories (classical mechanics 
and Q.M.) can perhaps be found in the 'Correspondence Principle ' 
of Q.M. which; like the Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle, appears 
to be commonly misunderstood and misapplied. A mistaken view 
is that this principle ensures that, in the limit of large systems, 
Q.M. becomes identical with classical mechanics. This is 
erroneous on several counts. Least important to this discussion 
is that large systems (such as superconducting fluids, or simply 
a piece of hot metal, radiating) exist which cannot be satisfactorily 
described in terms of classical theories. There is also a vast 
differenc·e between the formal structures of the two theories e.g. 
the superposition principle does not apply to classical particle 
states. Regulative principles such as locality a nd determinism 
are compatible with respect to classical physics and yet they 
cannot be so for Q.M. (See §4.3). How can they become compatible 
in the limit of large systems? So we could go on. The 
formal and conceptual differences between classical and quantum 
theories are enormous, and many of these differences are not 
related to the size of the system under discussion. 
A careful statement of the Correspondence Principle which 
would avoid these problems, is that, in the cases where the predictions 
of classical mechanics are empirical ly correct, Q.M. must also provide 
empirically correct predictions. This is no more nor less than 
the requirement that both theories be empirically correct within 
their domains of application, together with the assumption that 
the domains of classical theories and Q.M. overlap. As the Correspondence 
Principle is not a statement about formal correspondences or compatibility 
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between the two theories, it is doubt~ul wheth er it dese rves the 
status of a separate principle, especially since it is likely 
to be misunderstood. 
Now that we have establi s hed the n eed for constructing a . 
theory of measurement for Q.M. in terms of Q.M, itself, we shall 
consider the classical theory of measurement and its treatment 
of certain 'philosophical' problems. This analysis will b e 
useful in that we apply the same procedure s in the case of Q.M. 
This reveals the way in which Q.M. differs from the classical 
case. 
6.3 The 'Problemof · Know~edge' and Classical Measurement Theory 
There are many philosophical problems relating to the 
existence of 'things' (real systems) and their properties, and 
how we can have knowledge of them. (See e.g. Ayer (1956)). Many 
of these difficulties can be solved by the assumption of a realist 
point of view, where the 'real world' (physical reality) exists 
because it is assumed to exist, and it is meaningful to talk 
about properties of constituents of the real world, independently 
of their being observed because, by assumption, they exist. However, 
the actual relationship between consciousness and the real world, 
a domain which could reasonably be considered as within the scope 
of a theory of measurement, remains problematical. 
of Shimony (1963); 
In the words 
"There are two distinct problems concerning the relationships 
between phsyical objects and consiousness. One is the ontological 
problem of accounting for the fact that two such diverse kinds of 
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entities occur in nature and interact
1 
with each other. The 
other ~s the epistemological pl:'oblem of justi£ying physical theorie s 
by refere nce to human experience. A complete solution to ei the r 
of the s e problems would sur·ely require a solution to the other 
as well. In particular, it seems that the epistemological problem 
cannot be completely solved without understanding how the effects 
of physical entities can be registered upon consciousness, s ince 
performing observations and formulating theorie s constitute a 
series of acts of consciousness. It is a remarkable fact about 
classical physical theory that considerable progress was made on 
the epistemological problem, at least 'o n that part of the problem 
which has been demarcated as ' scientific method', while the 
ontological problem remains obscure" , 
A brief examination of this ontological problem, which encompasses 
the "Mind/Bodyl Problem and the 'Problem of Knowledge' of philosophy, 
shows that it does not lend itself to simple solution , Consider, 
for instance, the following difficulty, as raised by Bertra nd Russell 
( 1940) : 
"The observer, when he s eems to himself to be observing a stone, 
is really, if physics is to be believed, observing the effe cts of 
the stone upon himself. Thus science seems to be at war with 
itself: when it most means to be objective, it finds itself plunged 
into subjectivity against its will. Naive realism leads to phySics
2
/ 
and physics, if true, shows that naive realism is false. 
naive realism, if true, is false: therefore it is false. 
Therefore 
And therefore, 
1. The notion that consciousne ss and physical r ea lity interact gives 
rise to the "mind/body" problem in some of its forms. It is not 
a necessary assumption; Consciousness and r eality, mind and body 
could, for instance, be different, non- interacting representations 
of the same thing. Neve rtheless, this assumption underlies much 
of the treatment of the problem of measurement (e.g, by Wigner (1971)). 
2. The link between naive realism and physics has bee n weakened by 
the failure of 19th century d eterminism. 
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the behaviourist/ when he thinks he i ,s recording observations 
about the outer world, is really recording observations about 
what is happening to him." 
The reader may feel, as does the author, that this inconsistency 
is not as clear cut as Russel l make s it out to be, Nevertheless, 
the problem to which he r e f ers is implied by classical theories, but 
is not dealt with by them . It is reasonable to assume tha t the 
'considerable progress' made with the ' epistemologica l problem' is 
achieved as a result of the way in which the ' ontological p roblem' 
is treated in classical theory; it is totally negl ected. All 
problems concerning the relationship between physical reality and 
consciousness are dealt with, in classical theori es , by omission; 
the Problem of Knowledge is shunned by physicists, being r egarded 
as strictly within the domain of philosophy. We will now consider 
an example of a classical description of measurement to illustrate 
how it is that any reference to consciousness can be omitted. 
Suppose that the object system in an experiment is an electro-
chemical cell, and the property which is to be measured is the 
potential difference between the two terminals of the cell. This 
potential difference is not directly observabl e . By this we 
mean that the 'apparatus' provided in the human body does not 
constitute a measurement apparatus for electric potential differences
l
• 
We therefore employ a measurement apparatus, a galvanometer. Now, 
by means of an analysis of the behaviour of a galvanometer in terms 
of classical theory, we construct a correlation between the 
position of the pointer needle (considered as an element of classical 
theory) and the potential difference of the cell (also considered 
as an element of the theory). By using the same procedure we could 
go on to relate, by means of classical theory, the position of the 
1. For convenience, we neglect the well~known method of 'tasting' 
a battery to see whether or no't it is 'flat'. 
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pointe~ and the behaviour of the illuminating light, the light and 
the human eye and retina, the retina and the optic tract etc. However, 
it is customary in classical physics, and, as we shall see, 
important, that we stop once the correlation between the position 
of the pointer and the potential difference of the cell has been 
demonstrated, The furthe r correlations are of interest in other 
contexts, but in this experiment, we would say that the observer 
sees the position of the pointer 'directly '. 
The identification of the position of the pointer'as an 
element of the theory and the position of the pointer as an 
element of the real world is considered to be established by 
means of this direct observation. By means of the above 
(theoretical) correlation, we consider a measurement of the 
potential difference of the cell (as an element of physical reality) 
to have been performed. 
The (implicit) identification of the position of the pointer 
as an element of the real world and the position of the pointer 
as a sense-impression registered in the consciousness of th~ 
observer, is not considered. 
If the 'ontological problem' mentioned by Shimony were solved, 
we would be able to pursue the process of making correlations 
into the brain of the observer and, knowing the relation between 
consciousness and the real world (via the brain, say), into the 
consciousness of the observer. This would establish a theoretical 
correlation between the sense impressions of the observer and the 
potential difference of the cell. Given the sense-impression of 
the observer (as an element of 'sensorial reality') we could deduce 
the potential difference of the cell, as an element of physical 
reality. However, the required 'connection' between sensorial 
and physical realities is lacking, and, in practice, correlations 
-125-
between elements of the real world and s ense-impressions are always 
made implicitly. For example, when the experimenter says "The 
pointer indicates 1. 5 volts II and not II I see "the pointer indicatinq 
1.5 volts", he has already made this identification, The properties 
of objects as elements of t he real world are identified with the 
elements of experience. 
In this way, the Probl em of Knowledge is avoided in classical 
physics. One of the conditions which must be fulfilled for this 
conceptual device to be implicit and unobstrusive (and hence 
plausable) is that the r elation between the sense impressions of 
the observer and the elements of reality be one-to-one (i. e. 
it must be an identification in the mathematical sense ) . Since 
the elements of the theory are in one-to-one correspondence 
with the elements of physical reali ty (in a complete theory), this 
requirement is equivalent to the following: 
The relation between the elements of a physical theory 
and the elements of experience should be a one-to-one 
correspondence, if the Problem of Knowledge (Shimony's 
'ontological problem') is to be excluded from physics. 
This reqUirement is so fundamental that it may seem obvious 
and trivial. However, as we shall see in the following chapter, 
it is not fulfilled by Q.M. without additional postulates. In 
classical physics, the relation certainly is one-to-one. To 
each property of a classical system in a given ' state ', there is 
exactly one sense impression. 
Once we make this identification , we may brush aside the problem 
posed by Russell as follows: the observer does not observe the effects 
of the stone upon himself; he 'sees' the stone 'directly '. The 
effects of the stone on the observer, when limited to physical effects, 
may be of interest to anothe r physical scientist, the object of whose 
observation is the first observer. The effects of the stone on the 
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conscious a,spects Of the obse:r:ye;t;' may be of interest to a 
psychologist, but not to a physical scientist, unless that 
observer were reporting what he had ' seen directly'. 
Thus the theory of measurement in classical physi cs is a lways 
incomplete l in that the final part of the measureme nt interaction, 
the interaction between the real world and the cons cious observer 
whereby the observer become s aware of the measurement result, is 
always omitted. However, it is upon this incompletenesss that 
the succe ss of classical realism rests. This omission is made 
plausable by the implicit identification of ' seeinq directly', as 
a conscious act, with 'interacting with l in the sense of physical 
interactions. In turn, this identity is only possible if there 
is a one-to-one corresponde nce between t he elements of the physical 
theory and the elements of experience (sense impressions). 
We shall see in the following section that this is not the 
case when the measurement apparatus and the measurement interactions, 
as well as the object system are described quantum mechanically . 
6,4 The Quantum Mecha,nical Description of Measurement 
As we have seen, (e.g. in §5.6) the behaviour of microphysical 
systems (at least over time intervals which include measurements) 
cannot be deterministic. Therefore, we cannot really hope to 
account for this behaviour completely in terms of Q.M., in which 
states develop deterministica lly, (as specified by t he Schrodinger 
equation, or by the action of a unitary operator) . However , since 
this is an important point, it is as well to go into the quantum 
mechanical description of measurement ,to show that this cannot account 
1. We use the term 'incomplete ' here in its general s ense and not 
in the context of the E.P.R. argument as di scussed i n Chapte r 2 . 
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for the non~deterministic behaviour of single, microscopic systems. 
The quantum mechanical description of measurement can be traced 
back to Von Neumann (193 2). Similar proofs of his results and some 
extensions' to them have been made by Wigner (1967, 1963, 1971) . 
d 'Espagnat (1971) and others. We present in detail only the most 
e lementary considerations, and argue that similar results must hold 
in the case of more compl icated situations. 
1 
Consider a system S which is prepared with a state IljJ > in . n 
. U. (.s) h I ,I,' . 1 f h . t . Hllbert space/! ' were o/n> l S an elgenva ue 0 erml lan 
operator A corresponding to some measurable observable of the system 
S with eigenvalue a 
n 
Le. a IljJ > n n 
6.1 
Now suppose that a system M is u sed to measure the observable 
corresponding to A on S. Let us suppose that the initial state of 
this apparatus is I~O>EJt (M) NOw, if M is to fulfil its function 
as a measuring apparatus, it must be left in some state which 
corresponds to IljJ > after interaction with S. Let us call this 
n 
state IljJ >. 
n 
(The states IljJo> and IljJn> could corre spond to the 
states of a measuring apparatus with the dial pointer indicating 0 
andn respectively.) These values would then be eigenvalues of the 
operator corresponding to the observation of scale-reading on M. 
In this case the time development of the system as a whole 
(S + M) can be represented as follows: 
6.2 
1. We consider all states to be normalized. 
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Here the arrow represe nts the a c tion of a unitary time 
development operator on the initial state in the outer product 
Hilbert space~ (M) x ~ (S) . I~~> r e prese nts the final state 
of S after measurement. In an idea l measure me nt, I~I > = I~ > , n n 
but, for the moment, we place no r e strictions on I~~> . 
For some other eigenvalue , I ~ > , of A, corresponding to a 
m 
different eigenvalue a , we would dema nd for Mto constitute a 
m 
useful measurement apparatus that I~ > +- I~ > a nd that they 
m n 
correspond to different eigenvalues (pointer positions) m and n, 
say. In this case , the time developme nt of the whole system 
can be represented by 
I~ > I~I > 
m m 
6.3 
Now, since the states I~ > and I~ > are possible states for S, 
n m 
by the superposition principle, any Linear combina tion of them must 
also be a possible state. (He re we igno r e the possibility of 
superselection rules by considering a situation to which they 
do not apply: I~ > and 11~ > could, for instance, be position n m 
eigenstates of S). 
Suppose that S is prepared with initial state I~ > = c I~ > + c I~ > 
2 m m 2 n n 
where c and c are complex coefficients such that Ic I + Ic I = 1 
m n m n 
By 6.2 and 6.3, and the linearity of the time-development operator (or, 
equivalently , the Schrodinger equation) we must write the development 
of the state of the whole system over the interval during which 
interaction takes place as follows: 
I ~ > (c I~ > + Ic I~ » o n n m m 
c I~ > I~ > + c I~ > 1~ > + c I ~ > I~I > + c 1~ > 1~1 > 6.4 
nO n mO m nn n mm m 
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Interpreted according to the physica l formalism of Q,M, , 
the r.h.s. of 6.4 means tha t we will find M in s t ate I~n> (I~m» 
and hence the result a (a ) with probability Ic 12 (Ic 12). n m n m 
Thus far, all is well. This is exactly the r esult we expect for 
a measurement of A on S in state I~ > according to the physical 
formalism . This means that the description of the measurement 
process in terms of Q.M. satisfies one of the aims of a theory 
of measurement: a correlation is provide d betwe en the states of 
the measurement apparatus and the state s of the object system. 
The possible results achieve d by observing the obj e ct system 
'directly' (if this were possible) are correlated with tho s e obtained 
by observing the measurement apparatus. Further, in the case of 
an ideal measurement (I~ > = I~'»,the object system is left in 
n n 
the eigenstate corresponding to the eigenvalue indicated by 
the measurement apparatus. A subsequent measurement of A, if 
performed soon enough (or if A commutes with the Hamiltonian, 
after measurement) will give the same result . 
This is yet another indication that the problems of interpretation 
of Q.M. are not formal, but physical or conceptual: the physical 
formalism is not at fault, since it predicts the correct results, 
The difficulty here is that the final state of the combined system 
contains terms relating to all possible outcome s, with no indication 
as to which result, a or a in 6.4, will actually be found in 
n m 
a specific experiment. The interaction between the object system 
and the measuring apparatus does not 'choose' one of the possible 
results. This is in contrast to the f a ct that, when we observe 
pointers 'directly I" we always see them in exactly one posi tion 
( t 1 t ' t d' d 't ' f ' 't )1, 2 h a eas 1n s u 1e SC1en _1 1C exper1men s • In terms of t e 
1. This is clearly a generalized version of the 'Schr6dinger Cat 
Paradox' • 
2. We can only determine the position of the pointer w~th limited 
precision. Nevertheless, we can construct the scale for a discrete 
spectrum of measurement results so that it is exact and unambiguous. 
For a continuous spectrum, we can be as accurate and unambiguous as 
we like, subject to technical difficulties. 
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analysis o~ §6.3, we cannoL make a one-to-one correspondence 
1 
between the state of the measu·;rement apparatus after measurement 
as a theoretical entity and the sense-impression that occurs 
1 
upon observing it: the final state of the measurement apparatus 
contains terms corresponding to all possible outcomes whereas 
we see only one, in each case. 
This difficulty cannot be resolved by considering further 
interactions in the measurement chain! If we consider a third 
system, E, (some physical part of the observer's body, say,) 
which interacts with M in such a way as to be 'sensitive' to 
the results of the measurement on S, we can consider the combined 
system (M + S) as the object system (in place of S) and E as a 
measurement apparatus upon it (in the place of M). By exactly 
the same argument as above, we must write the time development 
of the whole system (E + (r.1 + S» over a time interval during · 
which E and M interact as follows: 
Ie >(c I~ >I~'> + c I~ > I~'> ~ o n n n m m m c Ie >I~' > I~II > + c Ie >1 ~'>IiJ!"> n n n n m m m m 
6.5 
where Ie>, Ie >, Ie >, are states of E (with obvious notation), and n m 
I ~n">" I ~m"> are obtained deterministically from I ~. > and I ~'> 
n m 
respectively. 
This indicates that the correlation is 'transmitted' to the 
states of E so that the result obtained by observing E 'directly' 
must agree with those obtained by a 'direct' observation of M. 
However, this procedure is not sufficient to 'choose' one of the 
possiblities and result in the disappearance of the others, in 
1. Strictly, we cannot refer to the final state of the measurement 
apparatus alone since it is 'non-separably' linked with the object 
system (See §1.5). We feel our incorrect usage is clear. 
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a particular measurement. This is in contrast to the classica l 
case where the interactions between successive measurement apparata 
serve not only to correlate their results, but also pass a long 
the information as to what the measurement r esult actuarry is. 
Measurement, on classical systems, serves to r evear the values 
that the system actually has prior to measurement. A quantum 
system on the other hand, does not 'have' properties prior to 
measurement in the same sense. 'I'he quantum system has 'propensities ' 
which are expressed as the amplitudes of the different e igenvectors 
of the relevant Hermitian operator, or, on measurement, the probabilities 
(modulus squared of the amplitudes) that a given eigenvalue will 
be found. In the process of measurement, exactly one of the 
relevant propensities must be fulfilled, while the others must 
simultaneously disappear. It is this process that gives rise 
to unique unambiguous measurement results on quantum systems, and 
it is this process that cannot be described in a quantum mechanical 
treatment of measurement. Q.M. treats the dynamics of a system 
by describing how the 'propensities' transform. There i s 
no process in the physical formalism of Q.M. by means of which the 
propensities can be fulfilled. 
Some authors (especially d'Espagnat U971) and Wigner (1963,1971)} 
go to great lengths to show that this result cannot be avoided by a 
less schematic treatment of measurement than that given above. 
However, we expect difficulties to occur in the description of 
non-deterministic behaviour by means of a deterministic (or single~ 
valued) formalism (See §5.6). The problem of measurement arises 
f~rmally from the superposition principle (which is absolutely 
fundamental to the Q.M. formalism) and the linearity of the 
Schrodinger equation. For these reasons, we anticipate that the 
result of any detailed description of the measurement interactions, 
using Q.M., will be the same as that which we have shown above: 
a system cannot evolve, according to the quantum mechanical 
description, into a state which indicates a single unambiguous 
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measureme nt result (~nless , of course, the system is an eigenstate 
of the relevant hermitian operator}. 
d'Espagnat (197~ considers syst ems in which the initia l 
state of the measurement system is unknown (i. e . the initial 
state is a mixture ). The result of Araki and Yanase (see Stein 
and Shimony (1971) and Yanase (1971)} that idea l measurements are 
seldom possible, and then only as a limiting case , prompts him t o 
consider non-ideal measurements in detail. He consid ers the 
possible effects of super-selection rule s and the fact that we 
cannot expect a measurement apparatus to work perfectly e v ery time. 
While these detailed considerations are u seful in dealing with 
the dogmatic criticisms of sceptics , to some extent they amount to 
making paper tigers and tearing them up: they simply tell us 
that a result which follows from the general principles of Q.M. holds 
in these specific cases also. Still, it may appear more convincing 
to the reader if we deal with some of these cases speoifically. 
As we have s Gen, it is largely unimportant , in our treatment 
above, whether the measurement considered is ideal or not. To 
deal with superselection rules we need simply consider specific 
cases in which they do not apply . This would be so if A represented, 
for instance, a position measurement, We cannot understa nd t he 
motivation behind considering a measurement apparatus which does not 
perform its function properly, particularly in an 'in principle ' 
analysis. This leaves us with the c ase in which the initial quantum 
state of the measurement apparatus is unknown. (Our argument 
applies equally well to the case where the intia l state of the object 
system is unknown). In this case the intial s tate of the system 
is called a 'mixture' to distinguish it from a ' pure state' whe n 
the quantum state is exactly specified, Since we have mad e no 
assumption as to whether or not the state S or M is known in the 
discussion above, we can hardly expect the result in this case to 
be different . However, the motivation for conside ring the case i n 
which the initial state of the measurement apparatus is a mixture 
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arises from two sources. Firstly, it is unlikely that it 
will ever be pos s ible to specify exactly the state of a complex 
macroscopic body like most me asurement apparati. Secondly ~ it 
follows from the deterministic dynamic s of quantum states that, 
if the final state of the system is to be unknown (a mixture ) 
then the initial state of the system must also b e unknown (a mixture} • 
Formally, this is most clearly shown using th e 'density matrix' 
formulation, Suppose the initial state of the composite system 
is a 'pure' state I~>. Then the den s ity opera tor representing 
this system is given by 
6.6 
We use the following well-known propertie s of the density 
operator i). the density operator corresponding to a pure 
normalized state is a projection operator i.e, 
2 
P P fl,7 
ii). the density operator after time t is given by 
Pt = U Po U
t where U is the unitary time development operator on 
I~> from time 0 to t. 
Then 
2 utu ut Pt = U Po Po 
U Po 
2 ut by the unitarity of U 
= U Po u 
t 
Pt 6.8 
If the density operator for an isola ted system is initially 
idempotent, it remains so as long as the system is isolated. That is 
if a system is initially in a pure state, it remains so: a system 
cannot evolve from a pure state into a mixture of states subject to 
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the deterministic time-development as specified by a unitary 
operator U (or the Schrcdinger equation). This is equivalent 
to our earlier result but it is more suited to the present 
discussion. 
We require that the final description of the composite 
system (and hence, also, the initia l description) be in terms 
of a 'mixture' in the (vain) hope that each state in the mixture 
(i.e. each element of the ensemble of possible states for the 
composite system) should correspond to a different measurement 
result. If this were found to be the case, the fulfilling of 
one possibility and the disappearance of the others would 
correspond to nothing more than the change in our knowledge of 
the system. This process would be exactly analogous to finding 
the result of spinning a coin to be 'heads ', say, and not 'tails'. 
Wigner (1963) and d'Espagnat (1971) show by de tailed 
considerations that, in cases where the object system is in a 
superposition of states corresponding to different measurement results, 
each element of the mixture consists of . a superposition of similar 
terms, only now they will show the correlation between the states 
of the object system and those of the nleasurement apparatus. This 
conclusion follows easily from our viewpoint as long as the measurement 
interactions are described by the deterministic relations of ordinary 
Q.M., since we made no assumption as to whether the state of the 
measurement apparatus (or the object system, for that ~atter) was 
known or not. 
We conclude, then that the full description of the evolution of 
a system over any time interval during which measurement occurs 
cannot be described in terms of an ordinary deterministic quantum 
evolution without leading to complications. The final state of 
any combination of object system and subsequent measurement 
apparati thus achieved, will, in general, comprise a superposition of 
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states each corresponding to different "mutually elusive I measurement 
results. Thus, it is not possible to draw a one-to-one correspondence 
between the final state of the measureme nt apparatus (which is 
non-separably linked with the object system) and the impression 
registered by an observer (that a single unambiguous measurement 
result is indicated). 
6.5 Criticisms 
The above result depends on two major assumptions that Q.M. 
constitutes a complete description of physical reality (in the sense 
outlined in §2.3) and that the measurement apparatus can be described, 
independently of its environment, by a quantum state. The measurement 
interaction is to be described in terms of the Sc hrBdinger equation 
or its equivalent. 
these assumptions. 
Criticisms of our result stem from questioning 
We have given our reasons for assuming that the description of 
physical reality afforded by Q.M. is complete in §5 .4. However, 
we take this opportunity to remind the reader of the possibility 
that Q.M. provides an incomplete description of a non-deterministic 
physical reality. We rejected this possibility on the grounds 
that we cannot imagine how to 'complete ' this description if H.V . 
theories are not viable. Nevertheless, it may be possible to 
avoid the conclusion of this chapter in this way. 
Our second assumption, that the measurement apparatus can b e 
described independently by a quantum state, has been questioned 
by some authors (e.g. Belinfante 0_975)) on the grounds that a 
large system like a measurement apparatus cannot be isolated from 
its environment. (See Zeh (1970) and §9.1 -+ §9.4). This 
implies that, due to the problem of non-separability, it is not 
possible to assign a quantum state to the measurement apparatus 
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independently of its environment. 
arguments above. 
This invalidates our 
Our first objection to this criticism is that, since we 
are dealing with 'in principle ' considerations which apply to 
any measurement, and since, even in classical mechanics, systems 
are rarely completely isolated , it is somewhat 'unsporting' or 
pedantic to bring up this point here. All t hat we require on 
classical systems is that they b e ' significantly ' isolated from 
extraneous influe nces; that these influences can be made 
vanishingly small, which is very close t o the situation we are 
faced with here. Nevertheles s , we must concede that it is 
possible that by taking our measurement apparatus (including a 
radiation shield} into deep space to e nsure mechanical isolation, 
we would obtain significantly diffe rent measurement results, 
corresponding sa~ to finding the object system in more tha n one 'mutually 
exclusive' state. We therefore investigate the possiblities, 
should our conclusion (in § 6 .3) be invalid. 
If the measurement system cannot be described independently 
by a quantum state, it follows that the interaction between the 
object system and the meas urament apparatus cannot be descr ibed 
in terms of the deterministic evolution given by the Schrodinger 
equation or its equivalent. i.e. Our equation 6.S is incorrect, 
since we cannot even write down the l.h.s. as it is t here, never-
mind conclude that it evolves into the superposition given on the 
r.h.s. 
This leaves the possibilities for the description of the 
meas urement interaction open . However , we r equire that t he 
measurement apparatus should eventually indicate a single 
unambiguous result. We can distinguish two possible explanations 
for how this comes about under these circumstances . 
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Firstly, we could say that the fact that the measurement 
system is non-separably bound up with its environment introduces 
a change in its interaction with the object system which r esults in 
a non-deterministic transition from a situation relating to all 
possible measurement results to one in which exactly one measurement 
result is seen to occur. No matter how this transition is 
described, it falls into the class of transformation which 
we call state reduction, which we introduce in the next chapter. 
We discuss this kind of viewpoint in §9.1 ~ §9.4. Since our 
ultimate aim in this argument is to show that the introduction of 
non-deterministic evolution in addition to the deterministic evolution 
of ordinary Q.M. is unavoidable, this viewpoint l eads us to the same 
result as our contested proof. 
Of greater interest is the possibility that the fact that 
different results are obtained in successive measurements on systems 
prepared with the same quantum state could be explained by 
asserting that, although the object system is prepared essentially 
identically, the situation pertaining to the measurement system 
is different in each case. The possible actual situations pertaining 
to the measurement system could be divided into classes corresponding 
to each possible measurement result. This is equivalent to applying 
a kind of hidden variables theory to the measurement apparatus as 
opposed to the objeot system, allowing for the possiblity of a 
deterministic description. We have two major criticisms of this 
interpretation. The first is that it does not avoid the introduction 
of a new interaction to account for the interaction between the object 
and measurement systems, since this cannot be described by ordinary 
Q.M. (If it is, our argument above excludes this possibility altogether). 
This also casts serious doubts on the assumption that Q.M. is complete 
since we describe the actual situation of the measurement system while 
simultaneously asserting that it cannot be assigned a quantum state. 
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Secondly, we shall show that, by considering the process 
of measurement from another perspective, some apparent contradictions 
occur. We can safely suppose that, prior to measurement, the 
object system is isolated from its environment, including the 
measurement system, provided that we suppose that the object 
system is 'microscopic ". Instead of the measurement system by 
itself, let us now consider it together with as much of its 
environment as we need to constitute an isolated system. This 
super-system could even be the entire universe (with the exception 
of the object system) if necessary. Since the super-system is 
isolated, we can assert that it has a unique quantum state. Now 
equation 6.5 can be considered to describe the interaction between 
the object and the supersystem which contains and replaces the 
measurement system. Equa tion 6. 5 shows that, according to 
the quantum mechanical evolution which is applicable here, the 
final state of the supersystem and objec·t system combined is a 
superposition of states corresponding to different measurement results. 
If the ordinary quantum mechanical evolution and the interpretation 
outlined above are both assumed to be valid explanations of physical 
reality, this leads to an ambiguity, if not a contradiction; if we 
consider the interaction between the object system and the measurement 
apparatus alone, we conclude that exactly one measurement result is 
obtained. From this we can infer that the supersystem, which 
contains the measurement system, should have a state which corresponds 
to a situation in which only this measurement result exists. This 
isin contradiction to the result obtained by treating the evolution 
of the object system and the supersystem quantum mechanicallyl 
In order to avoid this ambiguity, we aSSlrne that either our 
argument in §6.4 is substantially correct (or at least in principle) 
or else the interpretation that S.R. occurs as a result of an interaction 
involving a non-separable system is valid. In both cases, the 
1. This type of consideration is treated differently in §7.6. 
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same result holds: meas.urement cannot b e fully d e scribe d by the 
deterministic relations of ordina ry Q.M. 
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Chapte r 7 
STATE REDUCTION 
7.1 The Concept of State Reduction 
In §5.6, we introduced the notion of state reduction (S.R.) 
to explain how the non-deterministic behaviour of microsystems can 
be described in terms of the deterministic formali s m of Q.M. In 
Chapter 6, we showed that the description of measurement in terms 
of Q.M., while providing a correlation between the states of 
measurement systems and those of the object system, cannot yield 
a final state for the measurement apparatus which is in one-to-one 
correspondence with the sense-impression an observer experiences 
when observing it 'directly'. This means that 'seeing directly' 
and 'interacting with' cannot be identified as they are in 
classical physics, thereby avoiding the 'Problem of Knowledge' and 
related 'philosophical' difficulties. 
Both of these problems (wh i ch are, of course, closely 
related) can be dealt with by postulating the occurrence of S.R. 
at some time before or during the measurement process . For the 
object system S and measurement appa ratus M considered in §6.4 , 
the transformation of the state of the combined system is given 
by Equation 6.4 as 
I~ >(e I~ > + c I~ » o n n ' m m -+ c I~ >I~' > + c I~ >I~'> 7.1 n n n m m m 
The transition brought about by the reduction of this state can be 
written as follows: 
c I~ >I~'> + c I~ >I~ > 
Icp >It/J' > n n Ie 12 n 
n n n m -+ I~ > I~' > m m 
with probabilitYlc 12 
m 
On the r.h.s. of 7.2, the states of the measurement apparatus and 
the object system are given seperate ly as Icp > and I~' > or I~ > and 
n n m 
It/J'> respectively. 
m Each of these s tates corresponds to a single, 
'/ . 2 
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unambiguous result (a or a r espectively), 
n m 
In thi s case , a ny 
further suitable interactions will simply pass thi s result along 
the measurement chain, in much the s ame Wily a s in c l a ssical mechanics. 
i.e. Suppose a second measurement appa r a tus , E, interacts with 
M. In this case the result will be 
or 
wi t h pr obability 
with probability Ic 12 
m 
7.3 
That is, the state of E is given unambiguously in e ither case (a s Ie > n 
or Ie ». 
m 
This is in contrast with Equat ion 6. 5 of § 6. 4 where 
in the absence of S.R. the fina l state of the composite system 
(S + M + E) does not correspond to one or o·ther re sult. 
Prior to S.R. we cannot assert that any particular value for 
a given observable 'exists' (See e.g. §3. 5 ). However, after S.R., 
exactly one of the measurement results ex i s ts, a nd i t rema ins for 
the observer simply to discover which one it is. 
the problem of measurement as posed in Chapter 6. 
Thus S.R. solves 
Furthermore, since the transition described by 7.2 (S.R.) is 
many-valued, in that, on different occasions, transitions to 
different (mutually exclusive) states occur, S.R. de scribes a 
non-deterministic transition. i.e. The development of the state 
of the system from initial state to final state after S.R. is non-
deterministic. Thus, the quantum mechanical formalism together 
with S.R. may be used to describe the non-deterministic behaviour 
of microphysical systems. The results of Chapter 6 show what 
we suspected all along; that non-deterministic behaviour cannot 
be introduced by considering the behaviour of the measurement 
system as well as the object system. This means that S,R. cannot 
be accounted for in terms of the time-development given by the 
physical formalism of Q.M. It must be added as a n extra postulate. 
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We note also that the process of S.R, is not time reversible: 
the 'propensities' which disappear when S.R, occurs would have to 
be resurrected from extinction in the time-reversed world. 
It may be as well to provide a less formal description of the 
phenomenon of S.R. This process corresponds to choosing (randomly) 
one of the possible results indicated by the final state , and 
causing the other possibilities to vanish. In terms of the double-
slit experiment considered in §6.l, this accounts for the fact 
that electrons are detected either behind one slit or the other, 
despite the fact that we can infer from the interference experiment 
that each mus~ in SOme sens e, pass through both slits. Each 
electron does indeed pass through both slits (as indicated by our 
argument in §6.1, or by the fact that terms correspondinq to 
passing through both slits occur in the complete quantum state 
of each electron) but, in the course of a measurement behind 
the slits, S.R. occurs, and the existence of the electron behind 
one slit vanishes as it becomes manifest behind the other. In 
this argument we have used the fact that, since Q.M. is complete 
(See §5.4) any transition of the quantum state must correspond 
to a transition in the actual physical situation described by 
that state. It follows that the transition described by 7.2, 
state reduction, corresponds to an actual physical phenomenon. 
Non-determinism is a notion that is novel in physical theories. 
S.R., which describes the non-deterministic transition, is therefore 
also a novel phenomenon which, from the classical point of view, 
appears very strange indeed. The 'strangeness ' of S.R. is further 
enhanced by the fact that it involves the transmission of virtual 
information over a space-like interval, a non-local interaction (see §5.2). 
While this does not conflict with the basic tenets giving rise to th~ 
prohibition of such interactions (see § 5.3) it retains ?ll the aspects 
of novel~y, artificiality and unfamiliarity of non-local interactions . 
These considerations have le~ many interested physicists to reject the 
notion of S.R. altogether. We consider S.R. to be the least unacceptable 
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alternative, as we have illustrated by our development so far. In 
the following sections, we deal with some of these objections ($ome 
of which we have already considered) . 
7.2 Criticisms 
Many authors have recognised that the notion of S,R, has at 
the heart of the problems of interpretation of Q.M . in general, and 
the problem of measurement in particular. The response of some 
of these authors has been to attempt to eliminate the concept from 
Q.M., either by restricting the purposes of physical theories or 
else by formulating an interpretation in terms of which the 
concept is 'unnecessary. 
If the aims of a physical theory are restricted to the correlation 
of empirical results and the prediction of further results, any 
theory of measurement becomes redundant (§6.2). Indeed, as we 
observed in §1.7 this aim is adequately fulfilled by the physical 
formalism of Q.M. It is therefore inconsistent to consider anything 
other than a trtvial solution to the problems of interpretation of . 
Q.M. (i.e. that no interpretation other than that in the physical 
formalism is necessary), while at the same time rej ecting the 
notion of S.R. on these grounds. Nevertheless, Margenau and 
Park seem to espouse this view. Park (1973) writes: 
"The flaw in F.Q.T.M. (interpretations including S.R.) is at 
root philosophical, inhering in a steadfast refusal to accept 
quantum mechanics for what it is , a theory about the statistics of 
measurement results". (My italics ). 
Again, in Park & Margennu (1968), we read 
-144-
'~The numbers they (measurementsl produce are called 
measur ement r esults , and it i .s, tbe responsibility of quantum 
theory to regularize , interpret and make predictions about them " , 
(p216) • 
Here, the word 'interpret ' l eaves open the possibility of 
a theory of measurement, but the emphasis on the primacy of 
measurement results indicates the empiricist viewpoint outlined 
above. 
Heisenberg1s observations that Q.M. deals with our knowledge 
of physical systems and not the physical systems themselves, 
can be viewed as an unfortunate truism, relating to the Problem 
of Knowledge, and necessarily applicable t .o all physical theories. 
If, on the other hand, it is viewed as an a priori restriction on 
the aims of Q.M., it is equivalent to a statement of the empiricist 
doctorine whereby a physical formalism is itself an acceptable 
physical theory. No problems of interpretation or measurement can 
occur, since neither interpretation nor theory of measurement is 
meaningful or necessary. 
While the adoption of this point of view certainly 'solves' 
the problems of interpretation and measurement of Q.M. (if trivially) 
we reject it on the grounds that it 'pulls the teeth' of science by 
denying the existence of its second purpose (see §1.8). If the 
'objects' of physical theories are 'measurement results' then 
it is difficult to see what physics has to do with 'physical reality'. 
If we restrict the aims of physical theories to those of predicting 
and correlating measurement r ,esul ts, we need some other discipline 
to deal with the relationship between the measurement results and 
their 'source': physical reality. Rather than formulate such 
a new discipline we include it a s part of physics by accepting t he 
second purpose: to understand and explain our e nvi ronment. 
-145-
Indeed, most authors find ·this doctrine overly r·estrictive 
and impossible to apply cons'istently . When Park and Margenau (1968) 
1 
assign the property of latency to quantum systems, or even 
consider physical systems at a ll, they go outside t he bound s of the 
empiricist philosophy and enter the domain where the problem of 
measurement in Q.M. is significant. A view r ather like a 'weak ' 
form of empiricism is ascribed to Margenau and subscribed to by 
Leibowitz (1975) who states 
"Measurement is a matter of observation~ not py·ediction . 
There is no problem of measurement since measurement is outside the 
scope of quantum theory. In this respect I follow Margenau even 
though his interpretation is based on the concept of an ensemble of 
systems, whereas ours is based on a single system conceptI'. 
Surely, from a realist ·point-of-view, measurement is just the 
place where prediction and observation coincide. If the relation 
between 'prediction' and 'observation' may, and even must be 
accounted for in classical theories (by means of a theory of 
measurement), what grounds are there for asserting that it is 
unnecessary with respect to Q.M.? 
Among the work of those authors who accept the second purpose 
of physical theories either explicitly or tacitly, by accepting 
the problems of interpretation and measurement, we can distinguish 
several different interpretations in which it is claimed that S.R. 
can be dispensed with. Some authors (e .g. Belinfante (1975», 
employ more than one of these, as well as t he assumption that the 
problems are trivial, in a single interpretation. This 'belt and 
braces' policy indicates some deeper aversion to the concept of 
S.R. than those dealt with explicitly. 
1. This terms means much the same as our 'propensity ' in §6 .4. 
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7.3 Ballentine's Statistical Interpret a tion 
We dealt with this interpretation (which i s s imilar to that of 
Lande (1955, 1965, 1975) in §3 . 5 where we showed tha t it is 
unacceptable on the grounds tha t it involves the a s sumption that 
non-local effects exist. Since this interpre t a t i on satisfie s 
our definition of a H.V. theory (§4.1) it foll ows that these 'non-
local' effects must be of the extremely unacceptable variety 
described in §5.3. Neverthe less, as this th eory still seems to 
carry some weight amongst physicist s,l we will deal with it here 
in the context of measurement. In this theory, the quantum state 
specifies an ensemble of different actual physical situations, each 
of which 'has' definite values for its classical-type properties 
(position, momentum, energy, spin, etc.). This is e specially true 
for the final state of the combined system of measurement 
apparatus and object system given, for instance, by the r.h.s. of 
Equation 6.4. 
In this case, by observing the measurement apparatus, we simply 
find out which of the possible actual situations had existed all 
along. This process is exactly analogous to looking at a 
spun coin (which may be described as having the 'state': heads 
with probability ~ or tails with probability ~) and finding out 
that the results is 'heads', say. In this case, it is unnecessary 
to assert that something must have happened to the system for the 
result 'tails' to 'disappear': this result or a state of the 
coin compatible with it never existed in the first place. The 
phenomenon of S.R. corresponds, in "this interpreta tion, to nothing 
more than the change in our knowledge of the system which occurs 
when we make an observation. 
It is this deceptive similarity be tween S.R. a nd the process 
1, Ballentine (19741 considers "hi s results to be lwell~know.n'\ 
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of increasing our knowledge or 'finding out' in c lassica l s t ocha stic 
theories that leads many physi c ists to favour the ' s tatistica l 
interpretation' , However, this inte r pretation c a n b e ma inta ined 
only if the severe non-local e ff e cts d escribed in §5. 3 can be 
accepted. We think not. 
The more sophisticated attempts at formulating H.V. theories (in 
which the behaviour of microphysical systems can be viewe d as 
deterministic) are unacceptable for the s a me reason. In view of 
the fact that Ballentines' theory is untenable, these theorie s 
can at most predict what will be found upon measur ement, i.e, They 
cannot give values for the classical-type properties prior to 
measurement. This means that we must expect something like S.R~ 
to occur when the variable being measured 'take s on' a specific 
value at measurement. Indeed, the concept of S.R . occurs in some 
H.V. theories. In the theory of Bohm and Vigi e r (1954) it is 
accounted for by the inclusion of non-line ar terms in the SchrBdinger 
equation which only became evident in 'measurement interactions', 
We mention this in passing since we rejected H.V. theories in §5.3. 
7.4 Ensembles and Single Systems 
In Park and Margenau (1968), we read " ... the idea of wave 
packet reduction does not survive close scrutiny. Such reduction 
cannot be consistently attached to quantum theory by postulation 
because of the inherent statistical nature of quantum states; i.e., 
the physical reference of the density operator to ensembles 
rationally precludes its changing abruptly in response to a single 
measurement". 
Belinfante (1975) states that 
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"When in quantum theory we assign exact valu es to probabilities, 
we consider the idealized case of an "infin ite ly" large collection 
of cases among which a ·relative frequence is calculated. The theory, 
therefore , deals with ensemb~et;. State v ectors d e termine the 
probability distributions in ensembles: State vector s are properties 
of ensemb~es and quantwn theoy,y is a theory about propert ies of 
ensemb~es ". (p8). 
Here Belinfante finds support for the idea tha t Q.M. d eals only 
with ensembles (i.e. actua l collections of many, similarly prepared 
systems) in the Ire lative frequency' theory of probability. As 
we showed in §5. 5, the absolute cha racter of the probabilities that 
occur in Q.M. makes possible an unambig uous definition of probability 
from the point of view of the 'betting' theory, 
probability can r e fer to s ingle systems. 
This type of 
Belinfante also finds support f or this view in the 'Schr~dinger 
Cat Paradox' or, equivalently, the results of our Ch apter 6
1
, where 
he views the occurrence of a s tate 'containing' terms corresponding 
to mutually exclusive measurement results as indicating that such a 
state must apply to an ensemble. 
What motivation do these and other authors have for restricting 
the domain of Q.M. to large (actual) ensembles of systems, and 
excluding the quantum mechanical description of a single system? 
Firstly, we note that Q.M., as applied to ensembles, is deterministic. 
This is d'Espagnat's (1971) principle of 'statistical d e terminism' 
(see § 3.4 ) • Each quantum state can be unambiguously related to a 
distribution of measurement results for an ensemble , depending on 
the observable being measure d. The restriction of Q.M. to exclude 
single systems means that the predictions of Q.M. are really 
' distribution patterns' as opposed to 'probabilities for the 
occurrence of given measurement results', The distribution pattern 
1, See the quote at the end of this s ection , 
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resulting from repe~ted ~easurements of a given observable on systems 
prepared in the same quantum state is completely de termined. 
The 'existence' problem of measurement, the main problem 
which we are concerned with here, also falls away, s ince it can 
only be arrived at by considering single systems. If we are not 
a~~owed to talk about single systems (in terms of Q.M.) we cannot 
arrive at the conclusion (as in §6.1) that, in the double slit 
experiment, each electron cannot pass through either one slit or 
the other, but must, in some sense, pass through both. Further, 
we are not a~~owed to infer that, because each electron is either 
detected behind one slit or behind the other, something (S.R.) must 
happen to its 'existence' at the other slit, 
The only remaining 'problem of measurement' is to account for 
the fact that 'interference effects' between the superposed states 
for the composite system corresponding to different measurement 
results are never observed. There are 'three related methods for 
doing this. One deals with the introduction of different random 
1 
phase factors for each element of the ensemble. As a result 
of these random factors, while interference may be thought of as 
o>ccurring for each system, the net effect will be 'washed out '" 
because the 'interference pattern' will be in a different position 
for each system, and no net effect will be observable. This 
explanation is used in the case of the double-slit interference 
experiment when attempts are made to measure through which slit each 
electron passes. If the measurement results on each electron are 
significant, (i.e. greater than the random fluctuations allowed 
by the uncertainty principle) it can be shown2 (see e.g. Bohm (1951), 
Bohr (1949» that the state of each electron is disturbed sufficiently 
for the 'interference pattern' to which each electron belongs to 
1, Here we are breaking the restriction of Q,M, to ensembles and 
dealing with the elements separately 
2. See, in this regard, §9.6. 
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overlap jU$t so as to be unobserva,ble. 
Secondly, it is argued that the s tates of the me asurement 
apparatus are 'macrosocpically ' distinguishable and hence should 
be orthogonal, In this case , t he cross terms of the inner 
product (those containing terms from different superposed states) 
will each contain an inner product of state vectors representing 
macroscopically distinguishable states. If the se are orthogonal, 
their inner product must b e zero . In this c ase , al l the ' c ross-terms' 
will be zero, Since the interference effects a rise from these 
cross-terms, this may be taken as proof that no inte rference effects 
can occur. We note that the term 'di stinguishable 'introduces the 
abilities and limitations of the observer. We cannot change this 
term to 'distinct', since interference between 'distinct' states 
(i.e. passing through the l eft/right slit) c ertainly do occur. 
Finally, it has been noted by some authors (e.g. Moldauer 
(1972)) that the final state of the composite system is a non-separable 
superposition of states for the composite system. In order to 
observe interference effects it would be necessary, according to 
this view, to perform a measurement on the composite system i, e . 
both the object system and t he measurement apparatus . 
Moldauer (197 2 ) 
cat paradox: 
writes about this in t erms of the Schrodinger 
"The veterinarians' stethoscope examines only the cat, and 
not simultaneously the atom, to discover whether the animal has bee n 
(quite literally) "collapsed" by its in'teraction with t he atom. And 
a separate radiation counter will tell us a bout the state of the 
atom ..•. It is even very difficult to think of an apparatus that 
measures the combined condition of cat and atom. If we attempted 
to learn this combined state by means of a scattering experiment, 
we would have to scatter a wave whose wavelength A is large e nough 
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to encompass both the vital organs of the cat and the atom in 
order to detect their coherent state, Such a ~ would be clearly 
too large to be sensitive to the details of the internal state of 
the atom. In fact, it appears that the complexity required for 
such a measurement is comparable to the complexity of operations 
required to revive a dead cat". 
again in §7.5 and §8.4. 
We shall consider this question 
However we choose to account for the non-occurrence of 
interference between superposed states which include terms relating 
to different measurement results, t h is is claimed to be sufficient, 
provided we are restricted to dealing with ensembles only, to 'solve' 
the problem of measurement. The predictions obtainable from the 
superposed final state of the composite system (as in the r ,h.s. of 
Equation 6. 4) can be no different from those obtained by substituting 
a 'mixture' of states corresponding to different results, 
Daneri, Loinger and Prosperi (1966) show that ' if the instrument i s 
ergodic, then a mixture of the above described type exists which is 
suitable at a time t and remains suitable at all times posterior to 
t" . (d'Espagnat (1971) p282). Hence, it is argued that we might: 
as well replace the superposition by a mixture. We find the ' ad hoc' 
nature of this replacement disturbing in the fac e of the fact 
that it is exactly what we are trying to explain. If the 'mixture' 
and the 'superposition' give exactly the same predictions, why 
bother to replace the superposition by a mixture? 
expresses our view concisely when he says 
d'Espagnat (1971) 
" it is in practice always possible to a t tribute definite 
macroscopic properties to the measuring instruments. The danger 
that the error we thus make should ever be detected has been proven 
to be vanishingly small. These theories do not show, however, 
that the instruments can, without contradictions, be said really to 
have these properties •.•. " (p283). 
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If we are allowed to deal with single systems, then, ev en if 
we can be sure no interference takes place, we s till have to account 
for the fact that the 'physical existence' of all but one of the 
possible measurement results vanishes on measurement, 
most forcibly illustrated in Chapter 8. 
This is 
However, our main quarre l is not wi t h the arguments that no 
subsequent interference can occur, but wi 'th the restriction of the 
domain of Q.M. to ensembles. Our main objection to this r estriction 
is that it is unprecedented and artificial. Even in the case of 
classical statistical mechanics, whe re a re lative frequency theory 
of probability is indicated, we are still not prevented from asking 
the question 
"what actually happens to a single s ystem? '! In fact, it is 
just by answering this question (many times over) that we determine 
the properties of the ensembles . We see no logica l reason why 
a similar question should be arbitrarily excluded from Q.M., especially 
since experiments have been done (by e,g. Janossy and Naray (1969) 
Clauser (1976)) which show that interference effects occur for single 
systems. The restriction to a description in terms of ensembles only 
precludes the treatment of a single electron, and yet it is incorrect 
to assert that Q.M. gives no information on suc h a system. If we 
know its quantum state (either by measurement on similarly prepared 
ensembles or by theoretical analysis of the preparation apparatus) 
we can enumerate the possible measurement results as well as give 
the relative likelihood of the occurrence of each. However, the 
treatment of single systems by themselves is seldom of interest, It 
is rather in the treatment of single systems a s the possible elemen'ts 
of ensembles that our interest lies. Since ensembles can be built 
up by repeating 'single system' experiments (which yield the same 
results as those predic'ted by Q.M.) the elements of the ensemble must 
be non-interacting and the quantum state must apply to each single 
system. That it is the same quantum state follows f rom the fact 
that the systems are so prepared. That the actual physical situation 
-153 -
is initially the same in each case follows from the ~~ct that H, V. 
theories are untenable (§5 ,3 ) and Q.M , is assumed to provide a 
'complete ' description of physical reality (§5 4), Instead of 
excluding the possibility of dealing quantum mechanically with 
single systems, we would derive the properties of an ensemble of 
similarly prepared systems from the properties of each element 
of the ensemble (in 'complete ' Q.M. , these must b e identical since 
they are described by the same state). This is in line with the 
treatment of ensembles in classical theories. We a lso contend tha t 
it is more satisfying from a realist point-of-view to be able to 
consider what happens to e ach system . From this realist point-of-view, 
an a priori restriction to dealing with ensembles makes no sense; 
if ensembles of large numbers of systems are the ' smal lest' entity 
we can consider, why are they considered to b e ' ensembl es ' a nd not 
'atoms' of some kind or another? 
Finally let us note that h ere, as in all choices between 
regulative principles (the principle a t stake here is 'Q.M. cannot 
give information relating to single s ys"tems') the arguments o f neither 
side can have logical force. It remains a mat t er of 'taste' or 
preference as to whether or not we accept this regulative principle . 
We, of course, consider our arguments to be persuasive! The 
assumption of this regulative principle is at odds with our aim of 
understanding 'what goes on' at the microp hysical level in a realist, 
objective fashion. Indeed, it seems that the restriction o f the 
application of Q.M. to ensembles is just a device to avoid the 
difficulties and novel concepts involved in the d e scr iption of 
S.R. T~is is, evident in Del infante (1975) who says " ... .. . The 
statement that $ describes an ensemble, obvious without explanation 
to many, is at the basis of much of the following, and therefore 
does require a few paragraphs of explanation in view of the tenacity 
with which others have tried to adhe re to the idea that state 
vectors $ should describe individual eleme ntary systems". ~vhence , 
I wonder, does he think this t e nacity arises? He goes on: 
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nAs these persons usually have found that this interpretation 
of IjJ leads to difficulties in understanding quantum theory, 
arguments in favour of the conventional interpretation of 1jJ as 
describing ensembles ought to be welcome to them as a way out 
of their difficulties". He goes on to justify this 'opportunist' 
methodology on the basis of the empiricism described in the last 
section, and rejected in §1. 8. 
" 'That this "easier interpretation" does not explain e v erything 
is obvious. Quantum theory do es not claim to explain everything. 
It merely claims to describe and predict the behaviour of ensembles 
of elementary systems. If it could explain or predict what in the 
one universe we know exactly happens to one individual elementary 
system we meet, the theory would be d eterministic like a hidden 
variables theory, and would b e entirely different from the conventional 
theory which we want to discuss here" pps 7 - 8. 
Let Belinfante's quantum theory speak for itself. Our quantum 
theory does not claim anything, but we claim that it should be 
possible to use it to interpret and understand the behaviour of 
physical reality at a microscopic level. If this were not possible 
then Q.M. would belong to the more pragmatic disciplines like 
engineering rather than physics, whose second purpose it could not 
satisfy . 
In his final statement he concludes that, if we could predict 
results for individual systems, the theory would be deterministic. 
This is a tautology which in no way prevents us from using Q.M. to 
investigate 'individual elementary' or single systems. In 
describing non-deterministic reality, we can say everything (from 
a physical point-of-view) about a system without being able to 
predict its future behaviour. In assuming that Q.M. is complete, 
we assume that this is accomplished by the state vector itself. 
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7.5 The system after mea~urement 
Much of the criticism of the postulation of S.R, relate s 
to the state of the object system after measurement; whether 
or not it is an eigenstate corresponding to the measurement 
result, i.e. whether or not an ideal measurement is possible . 
This arises from a commonly accepted formulation of the phenomenon 
of S.R.: that 'on measur ement ' the state of the system changes 
from a superposition of the eigenstates of the operator 
corresponding to the observablt being measured to one of these 
eigenstates (i. e. that corresponding to the measurement 
1 
result obtained) . 
This formulation was supposed to account for the fact 
that subsequent measurements on a system gives results which 
are correlated with the first one. 
As an example, Pearle (1967) considers consecutive 
measurements of the position of a particle in an evacuated room. 
Suppose the room is divided into N zones of equal volume, and 
equipped so that, at anytime , the presence of t he particle 
in one of the zones can be detected. We suppose that the 
measurement does not destroy the particle. Let the eigenvectors 
of the operator A associated with this measurement be 
{I~i>} for i = (1, •.•. , N) with eigenvalues i 
i.e. 7.4 
If the room is large enough , and if we wait long enough, 
the state of the particle will be given by 
1. We note at the outset that the final state of the object 
system has no bearing whatever on our difficulty with the 
quantum mechanical de scription of measurement (without 
S.R.) as expressed in Chapter 6. 
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11jJ> E a IIjJ > where l a . I % l a . I f or all i,j n n n 1 J 
and 
2 
E I a I = 1 
n 
That is, the particle is in the room, and it i s equally like ly 
that it will be found in anyone zone. 
7.5 
7.6 
Suppose that we now perform a position measurement and obtain 
th 
result k: the particle is in the k zone . Now, whether or 
not this is an ideal measurement, as long a s the pa rticle is not 
destroyed by the measurement, a s econd measurement very shortly 
after the first cannot give as a r esult that the particle is very 
th 
far from the k zone. 
However, Pearle contend s that, i f no S.R. is a ssumed to 
occur, the state of the particle after measurement will again 
be E a IIjJ >. This implies that the second measurement result 
n n n 
will indicate that the particle is in a ny zone, with equal 
probability, an empirically incorrect result. Pearle 
therefore assumes that S.R. is pos t ulated to account for the 
fact that the results of two subsequent measurements are 
correlated. i.e. After the first measurement and S.R., the 
state of the system will be IljJk> (or 11jJ'> = E b k lljJ > where n k n n n 
is restricted to those zones near to the kth zone) . A second 
measurement on this 'reduced' state will show the desired 
correlation. 
Of course, Pearle's assumption tha t, in the absence of S.R., 
the state of the object system is given by Ea IIjJ > is incorrect: 
n n n 
as we have seen, the state of the object system alone is not 
given after measurement, in the absence of S.R. Only the state 
of the composite system consisting of the objec t system and 
the measurement apparatus is given. If the measurement system 
M has initial state I MO> and states {I t\>} corresponding to measurement 
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result i, the final state of the combined system after the first 
measurement will be given by 
11Ji> L a 1M > 11Ji' > 7.7 n n n n 
By considering the correct formul ati.on for the state of the 
combined system after measurement, Pearle accounts for the 
correlation between subsequent measurem8nt results. For the 
measurement system to yield two successive measurement results 
which are comparable afterwards, it must record both results 
(even if we have to include the (physica l) 'memory ' of the 
experimenter as part of the apparatus). Thus, we require 
that the final state of the measurement apparatus reflect both 
results. To this end, let the state of the measurement apparatus 
prior to any measurements be IMoo > . Afte r the first 
measurement on the system in state IlJi i > it will be IMiO> and after 
a second measurement on the system in state 11Ji. > , it will be 
J 
1M .. >. 
1.J 
Hence, the time development of the composite system (object 
system + measurement apparatus) over tjme intervals in which 
both measurements occur should be given by 
IMoo >(L a It/J » n n n L a 1M >11Ji > + L 1M > 11Ji > + L 1M >11Ji > n n 00 n n nO n n nn n 
7.8 
in the case of ideal measurments. This gives the desired correlations. 
In the case of non-ideal measurement we should write 
L a 1M >11Ji > + L a 1M > IIJi' > n n 00 n n n nO n 7.9 
where 7.10 
However, since the particle is constrained to travel at finite 
speed, at time t + E: (E: + 0) even in the event of disturbing 
measurement, it cannot have travelled far from the zone indicated 
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by the first measurement. Hence bnk 
is finite only for values 
of k such that zone k is within some finite range of zone n at 
time t + E. Thus, the development of the system over the time 
interval in which the second measurement occurs must be given 
as 
7 .·11 
Now the constraint on the values of k for which bnk is finite ensures 
that the final state of the measurement apparatus I Mnk > still 
reflects the desired correlation. 
Thus, Pearle has shown that the desired correlation can be 
optained by a quantum mechanical treatment without S.R. As he 
assumes that the only purpose of S.R. is to account for this 
correlation, he considers t hat this is a demonstration that the 
postulation of S.R. is unnecessary. 
The fact that an (almost) continuous line is obtained as 
a particle trajectory in a Wilson cloud-chamber can be accounted 
for by an analagous treatment, and S.R. is not needed to 
explain why subsequent ionizations and droplet formations are 
along a trajectory and not randomly scattered. 
Belinfante (1975) concludes that the postulation of S.R. 
is 'optional'. By using S.R. we can give the state of the 
object system by itself, after measurment, and obtain the 
correlations shown above, without the complicated description 
involving correlated non-separable states. Belinfante 
therefore considers the introductions of S.R. to have pragmatic 
value as a labour-saving device. As such, its usage requires 
no other justification than that it gives the correct results. 
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We note, however, tha t these considerations l e ave the 
'existence problem' untouche d; this problem is to account 
for the fact that each particle yi e lds a single trajectory 
in a Wilson cloud-chamber or gives a Bingle pair of position 
measurements, despite the fact that the final state of the 
composite system contains terms relating to all possible 
trajectories or pairs of position measurements. 
To summarise, Pearle accounts for t he correlations between 
subsequent measurement results by a correct application of Q.M. 
He does not account for the fact that definite unambiguous 
results are obtained in measurements on quantum states. His 
conclusion that S.R. is unnecessary i s based on a mistaken idea 
of the reason for introducing the concept . 
7.6 Other objections 
Pearle (1967) also makes the asse rtion that the difference 
between the superposition E a 1M >I~'> and the mixture 
n n n n 
'1M >I~'> with probability la 12 'ca n be demonstrated by a 
n n n 
measurement on the composite system. He considers such a 
measurement to be so complicate d as to be impossible. This 
is the same as the point-of-view o f Moldauer (1972) quoted in 
§7. 4. We present a counter-example in Chapter 8, by comparing 
the state of a system for which interference does occur wi th 
that resulting from the treatment of measurement. 
Moldauer (1976) points out tha"t the me asurement chain 
considered in §6.4 should not be nested (where , for an object 
system I and two measurement systems II and III, III performs 
a measurement on (I + II) and not just o n II), as in the our 
treatment in Chapter 6 where we consid e r that each measurement 
apparatus interacts with a composite system (o r obj e ct system, in 
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the case of the first measurement) and not with a singl e sys tem. 
Moldauer's view is in accordance with what actually happens in 
measurement. The measuring instrument interacts with the object 
system . Suppose it has a visual display. Then the illumina ting 
light interacts with the measurement system only ~ and not the object 
system as well. Likewise, the eye of the observer interacts 
only with the light, and neither with the measuring apparatus 
nor the object system. 
identical. 
However, the mathematical treatment is 
In a private communication (submitted to Epistemological 
letters) Moldauer concludes, on this basis, tha t measurement 
effected by such a chain does not give the state of the combined 
system, even though the states of all t he component systems can 
be known. i.e. Even though we know, as a r esult of measurement, 
that the object system is in state Iw~> and the measurement 
apparatus is in state IMk> ' Moldauer asserts that we can not say 
that the state of the .' combined ' system is I Mk> I w~> . On t he 
contrary, it must still be given by the superposition 
E a 1M >Iw'>. n nan That definite unambiguous results are obtained 
in measurements on quantum systems follmvs, in Moldauer' s 
conception, from the fact that we observe only s eparate parts of 
a non-separable system. 
While there does not s eem t o be a ny logical objection to 
this point of view, it is certai nly not in accord with the idea 
that a single unambiguous r eality exi sts . independently of our 
desires and our point-of-view. If Moldauer and those who agree 
with him are prepared to say, while looking at a measuring 
instrument, and perceiving its indicator in a definite place, that 
it is 'actually' involved non-separably with the object system 
in a quantum state which does not indicate any particular 
measurement result (in particular t he one they perceive) and 
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further to infer that the obj ect system 'by itself', has the 
state indicated by the meas urement result, then th ere is nothing 
to stop them from rejecting the concept of S.R. While we 
agree that there are situations in wl,ich the "whole is greater 
than the sum of its parts", we cannot accept this ambiguity 
in the existence of physical reali 'ty. We f ee l tha t it is 
altogether more credible t hat a non-det e rministic random c ha nge 
(such as S.R.) should occur than that the exist ence of elements 
of physical reality should be this ambiguous. This remains a 
matter of personal choice, but we choose to disagre e with 
Moldauer. 
In order to s cape the conclusion that phys i cal reality is 
ambiguous in this manner, we could r e ject the assumption that 
Q.M. is complete. However, this exclude s the possiblity of 
using Q.M. to infer what microphys ica l reality 'is like'. 
In the same communication, Moldauer says that " ... it i s clear 
that in going from the correlated mixtures to the pure 
components (of the mixture), we proceed from a description of the 
ensemble to a description of an individua l membe r of that 
ensemble. This transition can therefore in no way be interpreted 
as representing a physical change in the individual system". 
However, in describing the final state of the separate systems as 
a 'correlated mixture', Moldauer has already made the significant 
step. 
While the separate systems may give the s ame results whether 
described by a non-separable superposit ion or by a 'correlated 
mixture' 1, this does not mean that the de scriptions are equivalent. 
1. The only description for such a correlated mixture that is 
known of by the present author is a mixture of the states 
1M > I~'>, exactly what Moldaue r asserts that it is not! 
n n 
-162-
Each particle in the ensemble is d e scribed by the non-separable 
superposition, whereas the particles described by a mixture either 
'have' one of t he previously superposed states or another. Moldauer 
solves the problem of 'existence ' by postulating that it doesn't 
exist! i.e. He assumes that the 'correlated mixture' and the 
non-separable superposition are equivalent descripLions b ecause 
they give the same results. He then uses this assumption to show 
that they are equivalent when we are not considerlng the measurement 
results but the physical system itself. 
Leibowitz (1975), who we mentioned briefly in §7.2, 
contends that measurement, being a matter of observation and not 
prediction, is outside the domain of Q.M. In vie w of our 
realist aims, we must disagree with him. However, he also says 
that 
"On measurement, the apparatus, purely randomly, selects 
just one of the a. and ~. or a combination ot ~'s in the c ase 
l l 
of interference". How does he suppose this process c an be 
described dynamically, in terms of Q.M., classical mechanics, 
or any other deterministic theory? He claims to reject the 
projection postulate and dismisses measurement theory as ouside 
Q.M. He nevertheless feels the need to explain measurement 
(in terms of what cannot be Q.M., by his own assumption) in a 
manner which looks very much like the 'orthodox' or traditional 
way of explaining S.R. It is difficult to detect any 
significant difference between the account quoted a bove and the 
traditional assertion that S.R. occurs as a result of the 
interaction between the object system (which is described by Q.M.) 
and the measurement apparatus (whic h i s not). 
MUller (1974) follows Fok's conception of Q.M., especially 
in this regard, where he says: 
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"Fok comes to the conclusion that the sta"te function ljJ refers 
to the probability distribution of the potentially possible 
state, while the distribution obtained from the results refers 
to the r ealized one. This is meant to dispose of t h e paradox 
connected with the "jump", or momentary change, of the wave 
function, since if ljJ does not refer to the realized but to the 
potentially possible state, its "jump" during t h e measur emen t 
does not mean the structural transforma tion of the object - that 
is a physical process of non-temporal character - but a change in 
the relationship of the object a nd the external condit i ons" (p.40). 
We feel that these semantic gymnastics , muc h like those of Leibowitz, 
are not in keeping with the realism we see as fundamenta l to 
physics. From a realist standpoint, such a change in t he 
'relationship of the objec t and the external conditions' should 
be explained in terms of the behaviour of the ob j ect and its 
environment, using the r e l e vant theory. In Chapter 6 we showed 
that this cannot be done by Q.M. without t he i ntroduction of 
S.R. Muller explains the behaviour of systems during measure ment 
by the existence of a special class of 'measureme n t -like' inter-
actions (see MUller (1974) p . 40). 'rhis is very much like the 
interpretation considered in §9.2 where S.R. is assumed to 
occur as a result of such interactions. 
It will have been noted by any reader familiar wi t h the 
literature that we have, so far, dealt very skimpily with the 
work of Nils Bohr, despite the fact that he has written profusely 
and profoundly on many aspects of the subject of our discussion. 
For instance, we have not even mentioned Bohr's equally famous 
reply (in 1935) to the paper of Einstein, Podolsky and Hosen 
which we dealt with in d etail in Chapter 2 . Indeed, it is 
d i fficult to assess the impact that the writings of Bohr h a v e 
had on the arguments and illustrations which we present h ere . 
There is however, a basic point on which we differ, making al l of 
Bohr I s work formally inconsistent with our approach . In adopting 
the dualistic doctrine of complementarity Bohr, ' explains' many of 
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the problems and 'paradoxes' which c oncern us, eithe r by a sserting 
that they are formulated in t e rms of 'meaningl e s s ' questions or 
else by incorporating them as fundamenta l ideas. 
In §6. 2, we mentioned our differe nce on opinion as to 
which theory should be used to describe ·the measurement 
apparatus. Another example is afforded by our tre atment of the 
double-slit interference experiment in §6.l. According to 
the doctrine of complementarity, it is not possible to compa re 
systems if they are to be subj e ct to mea s urements which are 
'complementary' (i.e. those that cannot be performed simultaneously; 
measurements of those obs ervables whos e corre s pond i ng operators 
do not commute). For thi s reason, while it may be possible 
to infer from the interference expe riment that electrons 
'pass through' both slits, we cannot assert tha t this is so in the 
case when we place detectors immediately behind ea ch slit, sinc e 
this is a 'complementary' situation. From our r ealist point-of-
view and the assumption that Q. M. is 'complete', j.t follows that 
physical systems which are prepared in the same way, to have the 
same quantum state, must be the same. In as far as we can deal 
with this type of situation in terms of Bohr's positivistic 
doctrine, the way the system behaves depends on the measurements 
that will be performed on the system in the future. Clearly, 
Bohr's doctrine can only be interpreted in a realistic manner by 
the assumption of non-local forces. This non-locality must, 
furthermore, be of the same unsavoury kind as that concomitant with 
H.V. theories (see §5.3) since it involves admitting situations 
in which 'effects' precede their 'causes'! 
We feel that Bohr's rejection of realism (materialism, in 
Mliller's(1974) discussion) can only be justified in the case that 
no realistic interpretation of Q.M. can be found. We feel that 
his proscription of the processes of inference used to describe 
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'physical reality' in classica l theories is a l ittle hasty. Bohr's 
enthusiasm for conceptual change is understandable at a time 
when the foundations of physics were being rocked by new discoveries. 
Nevertheless, no matter how commendable such revolutionary 
imagination may be, we must take care that we do not allow it to 
carry us off into the depths of uninteLLigabiLi ty . Judging by 
the variety of interpretations which are ascribed to Bohr by hi s 
followers, and which go unde r t he name of 'Cope nhagen Interpretation' 
after his school, it seems that this is where the imagination and 
zeal of Bohr for new ideas ha ve l ead u s . 
It may be tha t we shall fi nd a consistent realistic interpretation 
of Q.M. impossible. In this case we should return to t he work 
of Bohr for guidance. Howe ver, as we have indicated in §1.8 
and elsewhere in the present work we fee l that physicists should b e 
extremely loth to give up the doctrine of realism, a t l east as 
an ultimate goal. 
7.7 The Many Universe's Interpretation of Q. M. 
There is an interpretation of Q.M. due to Everett and Wheeler, 
and championed by de Witt (1971) known as the 'Many Univers e 's 
Interpretation ' (M.U.I.) in which it is claimed that the concept of 
S.R. is unnecessary. As we shall see it contains the phenomenon 
of S.R. in a disguised form. Nevetheless, this interpretation has 
some advantages from a logica l (if not a conceptual) point-of-view 
and it is consistent with our interpretation of Q.M. 
therefore review it briefly. 
We shall 
The conclusion of §5. 3 tha~ Q.M. cannot be rendered 
deterministic by 'splitting t he cause' as in classical stochastic 
theories can be interpreted as follows; If we suppose that 
the statistical predictions of Q.M. arise f r om t he fact that the 
quantmn state describes an ensemble of essentially different 
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possibilities, then we must conclude tha t, in order to account i r 
interference phenomena, the different elements of this ensemble 
must interact. This is very disturbing from a classical point-
of-view since/in such theories, the different elements of an 
equivalent ensemble cannot interact, since, in each case, 
only one element actually exi sts. We cannot make this conclusion 
in the quantum case, but must assume that all elements of such 
an ensemble must exist, in each case, for them to interact. 
From this standpoint, the problem of measurement which interests 
us is to account for what happens to all the possible outcomes 
other than the one actually found in a given measurement . In the 
M.U.I. it is assumed that all such possibilities continue to 
exist after measurement (or, more accurately 'measurement-like 
interactions') but that they exist in different universes. Every 
time a measurment or a 'measurement-like' interaction occurs, 
the universe 'splits' into at least as many components as there 
1 are possible results. In each resulting universe or branch, 
the observer sees a different result. In this way, the entire 
universe (meaning the 'super-set' consis t ing of all branches) can 
be described by a quantum state which evolves detenninistically as 
specified by the Schrodinger equation or its equivalent. The 
observer is considered as an 'automaton' i.e. no more nor less 
2 
than a physical system consisting of his body, who also 'splits' 
1. In the case of a measurement involving an observable with 
a continuous spectrum of eigenvalues, this implies the 
occurrence of a non-denumerably infinite number of 'branches', 
Some critics find this a bit hard to swallow! 
2. In so doing, the complete ide~tification of 'interacting with' 
and 'seeing directly' is achieved. Consciousness is relegated 
to the position which it occupies in class ical physics: while 
it is somehow related to certain phyiscal systems, (especially 
living human bodies) these systems can be described physically 
without reference to it, and it is therefore excluded from the 
domain of physical theory. 
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whenever a measurement-like inte ractio n oc curs . That we do nc t 
experience any strange, schiz ophre nic sensa tions a s a r e sult of 
this follows from the fact that the c o n s ciousne ss of the observer 
which is associated with his b ody also 'splits '. d e Witt 
concludes from the fact tha t each of the summands o f the super-
position of states of the c omposite sys t em (obj e ct + measuring 
instrument + observer) conta ins terms r e l a ting t o the same result 
only (a consequence of the requirement tha t the observer and 
apparatus function as measurement systems) tha t a n observer 
conscious in one branch cannot be aware o f consciousnesse s or 
bodies or other physical systems in other branches. He like ns 
the criticism that we cannot f ee l the universe split to the 
anti-Copernican argument tha t we cannot f e el the earth move: 
an apt comparison in that both phenomena, puzzling in terms 
of the old theory, are explained in terms of the new. 
From this interpretation, the protagonists of the M.U.I. 
are able to deduce the statistical predictions of Q.M. by 
considering the viewpoint of a single consciousness moving through 
time on a single branch of the universe. This is, perhaps, 
the strongest point of this interpretation. Instead of having 
to introduce a non-physical entity (observer) which 'observes' 
the system in a given quantum state in order to introduce the 
statistical predictions of the conventional physical formalism, 
these predictions can be obtained as a consequence of the M.U.I. 
(where the observers are simply physical systems) and the algebra 
of quantum states. Many critics state that the M.U.I. can be 
faulted on the basis of the p r incipl e of economy of postulates 
(Occam's Razor). On the contrary, as we see from the above 
analysis, the M.U.I. shows up b e tte r aga inst this standard than 
interpretations employing the orthodox p hysical f o rmalism. What 
the M.U.I. do es multiply, without bound, is universes. Since 
all but one of these is unobservable to anyone branch (a nd hence 
to us who read these words) we might a r gue that they are 
unnecessary, since they have no physical conse que nces. This 
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criticism can be repudiated by pointing out that the cons equenc 3 
of the existence of other branches a e pr ecisely the f orm and 
behaviour of microphysical sys t ems as described by Q.M! The 
M.O.I. provides a possible descript ion of what ha ppens to the 
'existence' of the other possibilities on measurement. 
What particularly concerns us is the claim tha t the M.U.I. 
dispenses with the need for S.R. If we view the world from 
the local point-of-view of a consciousness related to a single 
branch (as we must) then the 'splitting' of the universe would 
be manifest as the disappearance of all the propensities except 
one in a given measurement on a single system. This corresponds 
exactly with our notion of S.R. Prior to the branching, the 
observer must describe the state of the system as a superposition 
of terms each relating to d i fferent measurement results. This is 
necessary in case the intended experiment is r eplaced by one in 
which interference between the superposed terms can be observed. 
After branching has occurred, he can safely describe the system in 
terms of one of the states \'1hich were initially superposed, This 
change in description of the system can be written just like 
Equation 7.2 which respresents S.R. 
de Witt claims that, in the M. U. 1., this represents nothing 
more than a change in the knowledge of the observer. i.e. The 
observer becomes aware of in which branch of the universe he is 
conscious. He stresses that it has nothing to do with a change 
in the physical system itself and is 'therefore not a physical 
transition at all. de Witt first assumes that branching occurs, 
and thereafter shows that no furth er phys ical change is necessary. 
This is similar to Moldauer's argument where he first replaces the 
superposition by a 'correlated mixture' and then shows that S.R. 
is unnecessary. In both cases, we contend that the first change 
corresponds to S.R. In the M.U.I., S.R. corresponds to the 
branching of the universe. In Moldauer's terminology, it is the 
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occu;rr-ence of S,R, that allows us to r eplace the superposition by 
a 'correlated mixture '. 
It is true that it is not necessary to introduce S.R. as a 
separate postulate in the M.U.I. This is simply because it 
has been introduced already as the postul ate that the universe 
splits when 'measurement-like-interactions ' occur. It is useful 
to bear in mind that, in the M.U.I., measurement can be accounted 
for without introducing any processes which are not described by 
Q.M. The behaviour of the universe as a whole, which is deterministic, 
is adequately described by the detenninistic Q.M. formalism. However, 
this is achieved only by viewing the universe from a position which 
is not available to any observer (except, perhaps, God!). The 
'local' observer will see splitting or branching as a non-deterministic 
transition and he will not be able to apply Q.M. 'locally'. In 
order to build up a 'picture' of what is happening in a single universe, 
we will describe 'branching' as t he non-deterministic phenomenon of 
S.R. 
de Witt gives as a criterion for branching the occurrence of 
a 'measuremeht-like interaction', However, if measurement is to 
be described in terms of Q.M., it is difficult to see what special 
characteristics some interactions must have in order to be 'measurement-
like' and to cause branching,l 
In attempting to distinguish between measurement-like and 
non-measurement~like interactions we are faced with exactly the 
same difficulties as in looking for objective criteria for S,R, 
In the next chapter, we take up this problem, The arguments 
considered there can be 'translated ' into M.U.I. terminology. 
For instance, the theory due to Wigner where S.R. occurs as a 
result of the interaction between the consciousness of the observer 
and the physical system can be translated as a demand that a conscious 
observer must interact with the measurement system in order for the 
interact ion be 'measurement-like ' so t.hat branching should occur. 
1. See, in this regard, §9.2. 
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In conclusion, while the M.U.I. provides an explanation of 
'what happens to the other possiblities', and an account of S.R 
in terms of Q.M. applied to the whole universe , it does not 
provide objective criteria for the occurrence of branching or, 
equivalently, S.R. Since we are in"terested in the universe 
from the local point-of-view of a single branch, we will henceforth 
abandon the term 'branchillg ' in favour of the concept of S.R. 
However, when we say that S.R. is a non-deterministic phenomenon 
which cannot be described by Q.M., we should remember that this 
is so only if we restrict ourselves to the local point of view. 
Although it is essentially untestable, the M.U.I. reminds us that 
it is possible to explain this non-determinism in terms of Q.M. and 
any criterion for S.R. which we come to may be taken as a criterion 
for a 'measurement-like' interaction. 
7.8 Dualism in quantum mechanics 
We conclude and summarise our review of the criticisms of 
S.R. by considering the notion of dualism a s it applies to 
microphysical reality. 
In §4.3 we showed that all hidden variables theories consistent 
with Q.M. must be non-local, and in §5.3 we rejected these 
theories after demonstrating the unacceptable character of this 
non-locali.ty. Since any deterministic descr iption of microphysical 
reality is covered by our definition of a H.V. theory (given in 
§4. 1) we concluded that the behaviour of microphysical systems 
must be non-deterministic (at least at the l evel of single systems). 
Since this means that the behaviour of such a system cannot be 
determined unambiguously, it is difficult to imagine how it could 
be completely described by anything other than a stochastic theory 
such as Q.M. Thus~ we as sumed that Q.M. is complete. Since 
microphysical reality is completely described by Q.M., it must be 
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represented, for a given system, by the quantum me chanical state. 
Furthermore, the behaviour of the system under given conditions 
must be represented by the way in which these states transform. 
Now the quantum state of a system does not specify unambiguously 
the values that the dynamical variables (such as position, momentum, 
spin) of the system have at any given time: what it does specify 
is the probability that a measurement of a given variable will 
yield a given value. Hence, these probabilities or propensities 
should be taken as the dynamic~l properties of microphysical 
1 
systems In a sense, the 'equations of motion' of Q.M. 
describe how these probabiliti es transform under given conditions. 
We can infer that, although a microphysical system cannot 'have' 
properties like the dynamical variables of classical physics, 
or the variables which are measured in Q.M. (observables) , it 
can 'have' these propensities or probabilities. 
However, if we construct our 'picture ' of microphysical 
reality (microphysical ontology) on this basis ~nd it is 
difficult to imagine how it could be constructed on any other) , 
we are at once faced with a serious problem. The 'reality' 
which we observe, and to which we are accustomed does not appear 
to consist of probabilities. Indeed, if it did, we would have 
to ask what the probabilities represented, and what was 
more or less probable. Even in measurements on microphysical 
systems, we never simultaneously see mutually exclusive results, 
each occurring with a given probability. Clearly, we always 
find measurement results which are entirely present or entirely 
absent. Herein lies the problem which we have been discussing. 
Many authors respond to this situation by postulating, either 
implicitly or explicitly, that reality is dualistic: microphysical 
reality is completely described by the propensities of Q.M. 
1. Margenau calls this phenoll1enon 'latency'. 
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These somehow give rise to the definite properties of macrophysica l 
reality and the corresponding definite s ense impressions. Bohr 
subscribes to this duality explicitly in his Princ iple of 
Complementarity as well as implicitly, by insisting that the 
measurement apparatus be d escribed cla ssically. Leibowitz 
distinguishes between prediction and observation . This is similar 
to Moldauer' s point-of-view wher e we can ascr ibe quantum states 
corresponding to a definite r esult to both the measurement 
apparatus and the object system separately, whereas the sta te 
of the composite system is given by a superpos i tion of such states, 
each corresponding to a differ ent measurement result. Fok likewis e 
contends that there is a dua lism betwe en t he 'pot en t ially possible' 
described by Q.M. and the 'real ized' regarding measurement r esults. 
Margenau, in addition to his other obj ections to S.R.,deals with 
this problem by insisting on a dualism between state preparation 
and measurement, in that he a rgues that a measurement on a 
quantum system cannot be used to prepa r e a given quantum state. 
Park and Margenau (1968), referring to wor k present ed by the 
latter in 1937, write 
"Incidentally, the possessed quality of classical observables 
brought the concepts of measurement and preparation conceptually 
close to one another. Since a measurment operation simply 
revealed a possessed value, the same operation could also be 
called a preparation method for obtaining systems having that 
value of the measured observable. Despite such classical 
intuition, however, the constructs measurement and preparation 
must be severed in quantum theory. Failure to do so leads 
to the projection postulate with its attendant physical and 
philosophical problems". The M.U,I., in as f a r as it avoids 
S.R., postulates a pluralit y of realities in t he ma ny univers es 
resulting from each measurment \ 
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No discussion of dualism in Q.M. could be c omplete wi t hout 
treating the notorious "wave-pa rticl e dua lity". Many autho r s 
(e.g. Park (1974)) contend tha t this duality ar i ses from applying 
out-moded concepts to microphysics. He conte nd s that 'wave' 
and 'particle' are classical concepts which should not occur in 
a rigorous formulation of Q.M. Althoug h this ma y be corre ct, 
strictly speaking, we feel tha t the concern g e n e r a ted over 'wave-
particle duality' is not without premise, and that it should not 
be dismissed so lightly. It may be more logically satisfying 
if we rename it the 'continuum/quantum' duality. This duality 
can be traced back to its 'discovery' wh e n experime nts such as 
that of Michelson and Morl e y failed to reveal a n 'aether' 
consisting of ordinary matter as a medium of transmission for 
electromagnetic radiation. The 'electromagne tic field' 
began, thereafter, to take on a reality of its own, in addition 
to the older 'material' physical reality. Despite the 
unsatisfying character of such a duality, between electromagnetic 
waves, on the one hand, and matter on the other, 'light' was 
always a wave and never a particle, and 'matter' always 
consisted of particles, and never of waves. The only problem 
generated by this duality is the question of the interaction of 
a continuum with the infinitesimal mass points of point particle 
mechanics. In the absence of non-local interactions, a point-
particle can only 'experience' a vanishingly small part of a 
continuous wave, and there should be no interaction between 
'light' and 'matter'. 
The work of Planck, Einstein and de Broglie in postulating 
a dualistic 'wave-particle' nature for 'light' and matter is 
favoured by text-book authors, and hence well-known. However, 
as a result of the quasi-historical presentation of Q.M., an 
, erroneous interpretation of this duaLity has become quite widespread, 
if not amongst researchers in Q.M., then, at least, amongst students, 
lecturers and text book authors. 'l'his is that the 'wave' aspects. 
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reality are evident in some phenomena (e.g . double-slit interference 
using electrons and photons) and not in others, such as the 
photoelectric effect and scintillation counting, where the 'particle' 
aspects are evident. Although we agree that certain experiments 
are useful for demonstrating either the continuous wave-like 
behaviour or the discontinuous particle-like behaviour of 
microphysical systems, it is entirely cons istent to state that 
both aspects are evident in every experiment on microphysical 
systems. In some cases, the continuous asoects are hidden by 
the fact that, either interference does not occur, or else the 
interference effects are 'smeared out' by the introduction of 
randomly varying phase factor s . In others, the discontinuous 
aspects are hidden by the f act that vast numbers of single systems 
are detected simultaneously. Nevertheless, we can say that j 
every microphysical system (with the possible exception of those 
prepared in position eigenstates) exists in a wave-like 
configuration, occupying more than one position at a time, 
prior to measurement. This follows from the completeness of 
Q.M. and the fact that, except in the case of position 
eigenstates, quantum states are non-zero at more than one position 
at a time. 
On the other hand, all detection events have a particle-like 
or quantized nature. Le. At low intensities, detection events 
are seen to occur randomly at different localizations, indicating 
particle-like behaviour. This is so even when the 'particles' 
are detected in a distribution corresponding to an interference 
pattern! 
Thus we contend that the 'wave-particle' or 'continuum-
quantum' duality is closely allied with the duality between 
'potentially possible' and 'realized' states considered above. 
The 'potentially possible' states of Q.M. are~ in general~ 
wave-like~ whereas the 'real ized ' states are particle-like. 
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This 'wave-particle' duality is formally embodied in de Broglie's 
Theory of the Double solution or 'Pilot wave theory' (see e.g. 
de Broglie (1952» where he argues that the wave and particle 
f . t
l aspects 0 nature co-exls . It is the 'wave' aspect of 
reality which is described by the physical formalism of Q.M. 
The particle aspect is 'guided' by the wave aspect until measurement 
occurs, when the particle aspect gives rise to definite measurement 
results. The difficulty with de Broglie 's theory is that the 
particle aspect is viewed as interacting with its environment via 
the wave aspect except at measurement, when the particle is 
detected directly. However, from a realist point-of-view, every 
experiment consists simply of a sequence of interactions between 
the system of interest and its environment. There is no prior 
reason why some of these interactions should be different, in 
principle, from the others, simply because they are being used to 
make a measurement on the object system. If the particle usually 
interacts via the 'pilot wave', it is difficult to see, in the 
absence of S.R., why it should interact directly with the detection 
apparatus. This is especially so since it is,to a large extent, 
a matter of choice whether or not a given part of the environment 
of the object system constitutes a measurement apparatus. i.e. 
There are no unambiguous objective criteria as to which aspect of 
the duality should be evident in a given interaction. A similar 
objection can be raised against the dualisms of Leibowitz, 
Moldauer, Fok and Margenau: if we are simply describing an on-going 
sequence of physical interactions, the names which we give to 
different parts of the environment of the object system (i.e. the 
preparation system, the measurement apparatus) should have no 
bearing on which aspect of a dual reality occurs. The processes 
of prediction and observation, observing part of a system or all of 
it, system preparation and measurement, when seen as conscious 
acts of human beings can be distinguished and separated at will. 
However, from the realist point-of-view which we are trying to 
achieve, preparation and measurement, whether it be of part of a 
1. de Broglie's 'pilot wave' interpretation has been referred to 
as a 'non-deterministic H.V. theory'. Subject to our definition 
all H.V. theories are deterministic (and vice-versa). ' 
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system or all of it, are simply taken as physical interactions, and 
as such, these should be described in terms of a single consistent 
theory which applies to all physica l systems , irrespective of their 
application in the eyes of physicists. 
There is, however, no need to introduce any kind of ambiguity 
in the nature of reality, provided we are prepared to investigate 
and solve the physical and philosophical problems attendant on the 
projection postulate (Le. the postulate that S.R. occurs) 
mentioned by Margenau in the passage quoted above. The seemingly 
dualistic nature of reality can be explained in the same way 
that we account for the non-deterministic behaviour of microsystems; 
by regarding S.R. as an objective physical phenomenon that occurs 
during certain interactions, including all measurement interactions. 
e.g. Consider the following schematic representation of an 
experiment: 
Each "single system" is produced in a 'wave-like ' state (Le. 
one which can occupy more than one position or a spacial continuum) 
which is described by the quantum state with its concomitant 
propensities or probabilities. It must remain in the 'wave-like' 
state at least until any interference effects have been produced. 
At some stage during the measurement process S.R. occurs. In the 
case of a position measurement, the system 'takes on' a definite 
position and becomes 'particle-like '. The measurement 
apparatus likewise 'takes on' a state corresponding to the state 
of the object system, and a measurement is effected. 
This schema, making allowances for the 'loose usage' 
employed for simplicity, can satisfy the requirements of 
unirealism. However, in order for it to do this, we must f ind 
a criterion for S.R. which is objective and consistent. This 
task, which is not as simple as it may appear, is the subject 
of the following chapters. 
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Chapte r 8 
THE ROLE OF THE OBSERVER 
8.1 Introduction 
It is a conclusion of the preceding chap"t er tha t measurement 
cannot be described in a realist manne r withorit the introduction 
of S.R. as an objective phe nomenon. Further, a s we showed in 
Chapter 6, S.R. cannot be described in terms o f the deterministic 
1 
relationships of ordinary Q.M. Thus, in order to introduce S.R., 
it would seem that Q.M. must be changed in some way, either by 
restricting the domain of applicability of Q.M. or by changing Q.M. 
as it applies to all physical systems. The forme r possibility 
is considered in §9.1 and the latter is the main subject of 
Chapter 9. However, there is a third pos sibility where Q.M. 
may be considered to apply, unchanged, to all physical systems. 
S.R. is introduced as the result of a 'non-physical' interaction 
between the 'consciousness' of the observer in a particular 
experiment and the interacting physical systems which constitute 
the 'measurement-chain' and which must include par ts of the body 
of the observer. 
This interpretation due to Wigner (see e.g. Wigner (1967» is 
sometimes ascribed to von Neumann. However, we consider von Neumann's 
interpretation of measurement to be non-realistic in very much the 
same way as the dualistic interpretations considered in §7. 8 
Von Neumann considers a measurement chain consisting of interacting 
microsystems, and shows that any number of instruments can be 
added to the chain without resulting in S.R. Consider, for 
example, a chain consisting of the object system, measuring apparatus 
and the eye/optic tract of the observer. We can show, as in 
Chapter 6, that a description in terms of Q.M. cannot,in genera~ 
1. We shall use the term "Q,M.H to describe the theory as is 
given in the physical formali sm, without the introduction 
of S.R. 
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result in a final state which corresponds to only one measurement 
result. However, whether we consider the state of the object 
system alone, that of ·the obj ect system a.nd measuring apparatus 
or the state of ; the whole chain, and apply the dua listic rule 
for predicting measurement results expected in a measurement 
on that system, we get the same predictions. From this, 
von .Neumann postulates his notion of p s ychophysical parallelism 
that the place at which we make the 'cut' separating the 'observing 
system' from the 'observed system' is a~bit~a~y. This 
psychophysical parallelism is unsatisfactory from a realist standpoint. 
By employing the interpretive rules for obtaining probabilities from 
a quantum state von Neumann introduces a dualism between systems 
which observe and systems which are observed. This is an acceptable 
dualism which has many precedents in physical theories. However, 
he also insists that the point at which we consider the 
observed system to end and the observing system to start is 
arbitrary. In the absence of a dualism between observer and 
observed, this too cannot be faulted. In our ontology, for 
instance, 'observer' and 'observed' are both physical systems, and 
the distinction between them is arbitrary since it does not affect 
the description of 'what happens'. Both of these assumptions 
together cannot be realistic. Since the systems are described 
differently on either side of the cut, due to the dualism 
introduced, the theory cannot be realist and complete if the 
principle of psychophysical parallelism is correct i.e. the position 
of the cut is arbitrary. From a realist standpoint, a cha.nge in 
the description of a system (such as that which occurs at the cut 
in the measurement chain) must correspond to an objectively 
occurring phenomenon (i.e. S.R.). The occurrence of such a 
phenomenon cannot depend on the wishes of the observer (i.e. be 
arbitrary) in a realist theory ~ 
-179-
Wigner l assumes that Q.M. is universally applicable to 
physical systems. He interprets t he result of our Chapter 6 
that S.R. cannot be described by Q.M. to mean that S.R. cannot 
occur as the result of an interaction between physical systems. 
He assumes a naive realism in terms of which physical systems 
and consciousnesses interact. i.e. He assumes that the measurement 
chain leads into the brain of the observer via the sense-apparatus , 
and 'up to the door' of consciousness. Here, an interaction 
between physical reality and the domain of consciousness occurs 
whereby the result is 'deposit ed ' in the consciousness of the 
observer. Wigner argues t hat S.R. occurs as a result of this 
interaction. This accounts for the occurrence of S.R . while 
preserving the form and the universal applicability of Q.M . 
There are several obj ections to this schema: t he first is 
that it involves adopting a par ticular stance with respect to 
the 'mind-body problem' and the criticism of naive realism 
formulated by Russell as quoted in §6.3 applies. i.e. The 
'Problem of Knowledge' is introduced as an integral part of the 
description of physical reality. We have indicated (in the 
footnote on page 122) that alternative views on the relation 
between consciousness and physical reality are possible. Indeed, 
it is difficult to see why con3ciousness should be associated 
with the last link in the measurement chain (somewhere in the 
brain) and not other parts of the body of the observer as well. 
Current research into the function of the human brain indicates 
that this view in terms of linear chains of inte r act ion is 
simplistic and that interactions of a dialectical nature 
occur. Nevethe l e ss, this interpretation provides a 
realist schema which accounts for the existence of S.R. It still 
involves a dualism between mind and body, but the distinction 
between the dualistic aspects is not seen as arbitrary. Subject 
1, A theory similar to that of Wigner has been formulated 
independently by London and Bauer (1939 ). 
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to this interpretation, physical reality exists and behaves 
independently of the wishes and desires of human observers, 
although its mode of existence is radically altered by 
interaction with a conscious observer. A difficulty in 
identifying systems which are associated with consciousness 
occurs for all but the most anthropocentric amongst us, but 
if this interpretation should prove to be viable, it may be 
possible to identify those systems which are conscious (at 
least to the extent of being able to cause S.R.) by means of 
empirical tests. 
8.2 On the possibility of an experimental test. 
We have repeatedly stressed that S.R. must be considered as 
an objective phenomenon in a realist interpretation of Q.M. 
This is further exemplified by the introduction of a second 
observer and the consideration of the minimal requirement 
of intersubjective agreement on empirical evidence (measurement 
results in particular) . This is the famous example of 'Wigner's 
friend' • (See e.g. Wigner (1967». 
Consider an experimental situation such as the measurement 
of spin-component on a fermion where there are two possible outcomes. 
If the primary observer (myself) observes the detector (a flourescent 
screen, say) I either see a flash in one place or the other. By 
Wigner's postulate, immediately before I become conscious of the 
flash, photons are in a superposition of the states 'coming from 
point 1 on the screen' and 'coming from point 2 on the screen,' 
in so far as non-separability allows us to talk of the states of the 
photons alone after interaction with the microsystem. The state 
of my retina, optic nerve and the relevant parts of my brain will 
go into a non-separable superposition containing terms relating 
to both possible outcomes. As soon as my 'consciousness' interacts 
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with the system, I see the fl ash in one position or the other. 
Before this occurs, the system is complete ly de s cribed by the 
statement 'There is a certain probability ( ~ say) tha t I will 
see the flash in either position'. After I ha ve seen it, 
however, S. R. must have o·ccurred since the descrip tion of the system 
contains only one possible outcome , with certaint y; the outcome 
I observe. 
Suppose that I place a photographic plate behind the 
flourescent screen. Then, disregarding non-separability for 
simplicity, the photons which strike the plate in a superposition 
of two position states cause the production of spots in two 
positions on the photographic plate. ~-lhen I become conscious 
of the outcome by observing the flourescent screen the state of 
the photographic plate is r educed to one consistent with a spot 
in one position or the other. The correlations in the unreduced 
state ensure that, when the photographic plate is developed, the 
result recorded there will be correlated with the observed result. 
Suppose, now, that I ask a friend to obse rve the flourescent 
screen, while I leave the room. Thereafter, he is to refrain 
from communicating the result he observes to me until I myself have 
developed the photographic plate and looked a t it. I then ask 
my friend which result he observed. 
Assuming that my friend is both clear-sighted and honest, we 
should agree on the outcome of the experiment. There are two 
possible explanations for t his agreement, which is absolutely 
necessary for any scientific enterprise to succeed. If my friend 
is considered to be an automaton, then the agreement follows for 
exactly the same reason as agreement between my observations on 
the flourescent screen and the photographic plate occurs. The 
correlations occur in the unreduced state of the composite system 
(See e.g. §7. 5). However, t his means t hat I must assert that 
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my friend, along with all the rest of the apparatus and the object / 
system, was in a superposition of the states 'having observed 
outcome l' and 'having observed outcome 2 ' until I caused S.R. by 
developing and observing the photographic plate. 
Alternatively, I can say that he caused S.R. to occur when 
he made his observation of the f lourescent screen, a nd my observation 
of the photographic plate was the srune as an observation of a spun 
coin in the classical description. That is, the result was either 
1 or 2 after his observation and before mine, but I did not know 
which it was. (The state of the system was a 'mixt.ure' for me ) . 
Since solipsism is incompatible with realism (as well as with 
the communual activity of physics) I must assume that the same 
description would hold if our roles were reversed. However, I 
have never experienced any mental state, under scientific 
conditions at least, whereby I have felt that I am in a superposition 
of states. Neither have I obtained relief from schizophrenic 
indecision by my friend's developing and observing a photographic 
film in a nearby dark-room. 
Furthermore, at the same time as I describe my friend as being 
in a non-separable superposition of states (along with the 
rest of the measurement chain) he thinks, if I am to believe him, 
that he knows the result of the experiment unambiguously. This 
introduces a dualism of the arbitrary kind unacceptable to the 
realist. Physical reality is described differently, depending 
on the point of the view of the observer. If such a description 
is viewed as complete, it cannot satisfy the requirements of 
realism. 
For these reasons, then, we prefer the second alternative. 
Once again, this is really a matter of personal choice, but we 
feel that the reasons for our choice in favour of the second 
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alternative are both pressing and clear. I can now relinquish 
my special position as primary observer : all conscious 
beings possess the ability to reduce superpositions of states 
involving different measurement results, and thus S .R. is an 
objective (or, at least, intersubjective) effect. 
It is therefore possible that this effect should be 
detectable, providing an empirical test for Wigner's hypothesis. 
In order to detect the physical effects of Wigner ' s hypothes is, 
it will be necessary to demonstrate the existence of a superposition 
of states (by interference, say) in a system which does not include 
an interaction with a conscious observer. Then, with the addition 
of a conscious observer, S.R. should occur, and the effects of 
the superposition should thereupon disappear. Although the 
notion of such an experiment seems manifestly absurd, it is 
necessary to pursue the consequences of this interpretation to their 
final conclusion, thereby possibly revealing the reasons for its 
absurdity. 
It is difficult to imagine how to construct two situations 
which differ only by the presence or absence of a consciousness. 
The human consciousness carries with it, necessarily, the 
apparatus of the senses, It may be possible to include the 
apparatus of the human body without its state reducing element by 
ensuring that the potential observer is unconscious of the measuring 
apparatus (including those parts of his body which interact with 
the measuring apparatus proper) . This could be effected by 
the use of drugs, hypnotism, sleep or by means of rigorous mental 
discipline on the part of the potential observer, However , none 
of these measures can ensure that the state reducing element will 
be absent, It is possible though, to include or exclude an 
observer in such a way as to ensure that no disturbances of a 
physical nature (i.e. via the known force types) occur, This 
/ 
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could be done, for instance, by alternating the obs erver with a 
dummy which has the same mass, charge, temperatur e , conductivity 
and colour distribution as the observer. Such stringent measures 
should not be necessary since we already know t hat chang e s in the 
inanimate environment of the system (apar t from obvious cha nges 
to the measuring instrument or the prepar ation system) do not 
affect the Q.M. predictions appreciably. 
SUPPOSE', however, that \'le can demonstrate interference between 
two states of a composite system which contain t e rms corresponding 
to observably different states of a macroscopic s ystem, i. e . tha t macros-
copic systems can exist 'in a s uperpos ition of s tates ' (albeit non separably 
involved with other systems). If the mac r oscopic system is observed by 
a conscious observer to have a definite position, he cannot 
simultaneously observe ipterference effects without ambiguity. 
Therefore S.R. must occur, and we can rea sonably a s sume that this 
is as a result of the interaction between the physical system 
and the consciousness of the observer. This would support 
Wigner's hypothesis. If, on the other hand, we are unable to 
demonstrate the applicability of the principle of superposition to 
macroscopic systems, even in the case where no consciousness is 
present, we can suppose that S,R. occurs independently 'of the 
presence of a conscious observer and that Wigner's hypothesis is 
false. 
8.3 The' Interfering Schrodinger I s Ca t ,I 
Macroscopic bodies are never seen to occur in more than 
one place at one time, and further, in"terference between 
macroscopic states (such as 'cat alive' and 'cat dead') is 
1. This experiment and the related analysis is the subject 
of two papers by Bedford and the author (Bedford and Wa ng 
(1976a) and (1976Q). 
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very difficult to imagine. For this reason , we do not ttempt 
to demonstrate the existence of macroscopic bodies in a superposition 
of states directly. Instead, we use the macroscopic system as a 
trigger for a microsystem, with the intention of observing 




source shutter h.s.m. photomultiplier 
Figure 8.1 
In Figure 8.1, a low intensity light source is directed 
at a massive half-silvered mirror (h.S.TII.). Light which is 
transmitted by the mirror enters a sensitive photomultiplier 
tube which triggers a shutter and a relay. The shutter excludes 
the light source, while the relay activates a lever which moves 
in one direction. Light which is ,reflected at the mirror activates 
a second photomultiplier which triggers an identical chain of 
events, except that the lever is moved in the opposite direction. 
If the intensity of the light source is sufficiently low, this 
arrangement makes it extremely unlikely that more t ha n a single 
photon would impinge on the half-silvered mirror. Suppose that 
the photon is prepared with ilitial state lAo>' We know from 
considerations involving an interferometer that, after interaction 
with h.s.m., the state of the photon must be given by the 





>, I~> correspond to the states 'transmitted by the 
h.s.m and 'reflected by the h.s.m.' respectively. 
8.1 
Suppose now that the initial state s of the photomultipliers 
are I P > and I P > respectively. The evolution of the 
aT OR 
state of the combined system (photon + lOultipliers) over a time 
interval in which the photon interacts with the photomultipliers 
is given by 
'2 ~ I P > I P > ( I A > + I A » + 2 -~ ( I P > I P > I A' > 




> represent the triggered states of the two 
photomultipliers. IA~> and IA~> are final states of the photon. 
Since they both correspond to the state 'photon absorbed', they 







>' IpR> to apply to the relay as well, with 
obvious interpretation. 
Suppose the lever is described by state IL > before interaction 
a 
and by state ILRo> (ILT » corresponding to 'having moved to the 
right (left)'. The evolution of the composite system (including 
1. Rigorously, the state of the photon alone may not be given 
after interaction with the h, s . m. In this case, the 
state of the combined system (h.s.m. + photon) should be 
given by 2-~ ( I H > I AT > + I HR > I A » . where I H > and I H > 
correspond to tfie h.s.m. states '~aving transiitted a R 
photon to and 'having reflected a photon' respectively. 
In our simpler usage, we follow common practice. In any 
event, this simplification makes no difference to our 
development. 
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the lever ) over a time interval during \vhich the relay activates 
the lever is given by 
2-~IL > (Ip >Ip >IA'> + Ip > Ip > IA' » ~ 2-~( IL > Ip > Ip > IA'> o T OR T OT R R T T OR T 
+ I L > I P > I P > I A '> = 2 -~ ( IT> + I R> ) 
R OT R R 
8.3 
Now, according to Wigner' s hypothesis , this will be the fina l 
state of the composite system-consisting of the photon (i n an 
'absorbed' state'), the photomultipliers and relays and the 
levers - unless it is involved in an interaction wit h a conscious 
observer. This could be brought about by looking at the 
photomultiplier and relay system (if they give any visual 
indication of having been triggered) or at the lever itself. If 
this happens, S.R. occurs and the final state of the system is 
given by IT> = ILT>lpT>lpOR>IA~> or by IR> = ILR> lpOT>lpR> IA~> 
with a probability of ~ f or either outcome . 
Suppose that we adjust the lever so that, if it is moved to 
the left, it covers the left slit of a 'two-slit diaphragm, and 
if it is moved to the right, it covers the right slit. If it 
is unmoved, we suppose that it takes its place in a normal two-








Let the photons in this part of the experiment be prepared 
with initial state IBO>' and let us suppose that the initial 
state of the double slit assembly is Is>. 
In the case where the combined state containing the slit 
cover prepared in state 2 -~ ( ~> + I R» as above, the state of 
the whole system including the slit cover and its preparation 
system, the double slit diaphragm and the 'secondary' photon 
will evolve as follows, over a time interval in which the 
secondary photon interacts with the doubl e slit diaphragm: 
+ IR> ls' > IB » + absorbed terms 8.4 
L 
where C' = 2-~ C and C is a (complex) number proportional to the amplitude 
for the secondary photon's passing through the slits. The 
absorbed terms are all those terms containing photon states which 
do not influence the final screen. Is'> (I S·" » is the state for 
the double-slit diaphragm corresponding to 'having deflected a photon 
at the left (right) slit' and IBL> dBR» is the secondary photon 
state corresponding to 'having passed through the left (right) slit'. 
If the slit cover apparatus is described by the state IR>(IT» 
this means that the right (l eft) slit is covered . Hence, after 
interaction with the slit-cover apparatus, the states IT>ls'>IBL> and 
IR>ls">IBL> must be absorbed terms, which are no longer of interest 
in calculating the distribution of photons on the screen. Hence, 
after interaction with the slit-cover assembly, the state of the 
entire system, given initially by the last term in 8.4, must 
evolve to 
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c ( \ T I> \ S II> \ BR> + \ R f > \ S I > \ BL>). + absorbed t e rms 8 . 5 
i.e. Those parts of the final state for the entire system that affect 
the distribution of secondary photons on the screen contain terms 
from both slits. 
In order to interpret this final state, it is useful to 
determine the final state of the system when the slit-cover 
assembly is not triggered at all, since this corresponds to an 
ordinary double-slit experiment where we expect double-slit 
interference. Since neither the slit cover nor its preparation 
system take part in this interaction, we can omit its state 
entirely. Over the time interval during which the photons 
interact with the double-sl it diaphragm , the state of the composite 
system (photon + double-slit + diaphragm) must evolve as follows: 
\S>IB > -+ o C(IS'>\B> L + IS">IBR» + absorbed terms 
8.6 
Now Equation 8,6 differs from Equation 8.5 only by the inclusion 
of the final states of the slit-cover assembly in each case. 
The only difference, in principle, between these states and the 
states Is'> end I SOl> is that the former are distinguishably 
different whereas, if we want interference to occur, the latter 
1 d" 2 cannot be. Both pairs are, however, ~fferent states of 
macroscopic systems. Hence, at first sight, we might interpret 
Equation 8.5 to mean that double-slit interference occurs. We 
shall see that this cannot be so, but for simpliciity, we leave 
any objections until the following section. 
Recall that the final state of the slit-cover assembly is 
1. See in the regard Bohr (.1949). 
2. This may be contested . See §9.3 anJ §9.4. 
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only given by Equation 8.3 in the event that no conscious 
observer has interacted with the system. If an observer s ees the 
slit~<=over (or becomes aware of its position by any other means) 
then, according to Wigner's hypothesis , S.R. will occur and the 
state of the slit-cover assembly will be given either by IR> 
or by IT>. In this case, we must r eplace Equation 8,5 by either 
IT' ' !;> I S"> I BR> or by I R' > Is' > I BL> (neglecting the absorbed terms) • 
In either case, all the secondary photons must pass, unarr~iguously, 
through one slit or the other, and double-slit interference 
cannot occur. We expect to see precisely one single-slit 
diffraction pattern, displaced a little to the right, if the 
slit-cover is seen over the left slit or vice versa. 
Indeed, we could go so far as to set up conditions for two-slit 
interference by isolating the slit-cover assembly from any 
conscious observer, and then cause the two-slit pattern to change 
spontaneously to a single-slit pattern simply by looking at 
the slit cover! 
This result would provide explicit (and astonishing) confirmation 
for Wigner's hypothesis if it were found to be so empirically. 
However, as the result of such an experiment proves to be negative 
(thus maintaining the author 5" sanity, but cheating him of fame and 
fortune) we must deal with several objections to the supporting 
analysis before it can be taken as a refutation of Wigner's 
hypothesis. 
8.4 Criticisms 
The most pressing objection which we must meet is that,. as was 
mentioned in §7. 4, it is often contended that interference between 
terms containing macroscopically distinguishable states is impossible. 
Several reasons were given for this in §7.4. Perhaps the most important, 
is that macroscopically di s tinguishable s tates must be mutually 
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orthogonal. This is argued in a differ nt cont x t by Wigner (1971). 
This means that, when we take the inner product to determine the 
probabili'ty for detection of the photon, an inner product between 
these macrosocpically distinguisl:able states will occur in the 
'cross-terms'. Since these are mutually orthogonal, inner products 
must be zero o 
i.e. < R' IT' > ::: <T I I R ' > o 8.7 
Hence the 'cross-terms', which give rise to the interference effects , 
must be zero, and no interference can occur. 
We have some objection to the insistence tha't Equation 8.7 
must be valid since the fact that states are distinguishable may 
depend on our ability as observers . ( I t is this question of 
distinguishability which differentiates between Equations 8.5 and 8.6, 
also). However, this distinguishability can be seen as objective 
by noting that the minimum uncertainties of the Heisenberg Uncertainty 
Principle, upon which the concept is based, are properties of the 
quantum state and hence, if Q.M. is complete, of mic rophysical reality. 
A second counter argument to this objection is that the quantum 
states of microscopic systems are only considered to be orthogonal 
while they are distinguishable. Thus, in an ordinary doubles-slit 
experiment, the states 'having passed through slit l' and 'having 
passed through slit 2' are orthogonal if a measurement is made 
immediately behind the slits o In the case where interference is 
allowed to take place, they are no longer either distinguishable or 
orthogonal. It may be that by excluding the possibility of a 
measurement of the position of the slit-cover assembly, albeit by 
design, we render the states of this system indistinguishable 
and hence non-orthogonal. 
A second argument against the occurrence of interference in 
our experiment is that uncontrolably varying quantum mechanical 
phases are introduced during interactions involving a macroscopic 
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system.l Thus, while interference may indeed occur for individua l 
photons, the 'patterns' to which each photon belongs would be 
randomly displaced with respect to each other . The net effect would 
be to smear on any interference that occurred, making it unobservable. 
While we cannot counter this objection in terms of Q.M., we do note 
that the 'wave-like' behaviour of electromagnetic radiation is 
adequately dealt with by Maxwell 's equations. Thus, while it is 
not possible to consider the photons by themselves in terms of Q. M. 
(due to their inclusion in a non-separable state) it is difficult 
to imagine how these random phases could be introduced in terms 
of the phase of an electromagnetic wave . The phase difference 
is determined electromagnetically by considering the geometry of 
the situation (Le. the difference in path length) which is the 
same in our experiment as in an ordinary double-slit interference 
experiment. Moreover, while this may indicate a deficiency in 
the Q.M. treatment of composite systems, it is not sufficiently 
definite that we should demand that Q.M., which is the subject of 
our investigation, be changed on this point. 
It is clear that our defence of the existence of interference 
effects 1n our experiment is insufficient. However, this does not 
affect the usefulness of our experiment. Even if interference 
effects do not occur, and cannot be expected, either because they 
smear out over the detection of the many photons needed to make 
them observable or because the states of the slit-cover assembly 
are indeed orthogonal, we must still expect to see two superimpo~ed 
single slit diffraction patte rns, according to the interpretation 
of equation B.S. 
In this case, the expected outcome of the experiment must be 
slightly altered: in the event that the slit-cover assembly is 
unobserved, we must expect to see two superimposed single-slit 
diffraction patterns on the screen. Whe n the position of the 
slit-cover is determined one pattern must vanish, leaving only one 
1. See, e. g. I § 9. 7 . 
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such PGttern on the screen, This exper iment strips away the 
smoke-.screen of interference considerations from the ' existence I 
problem of measurement. 
Another class of obj ection which we anticipate is that, 
while the state of the composite system is given by the 
superposition in equation 8.5, the state of any particular 
system by itseZf must be given by a 'mixture' of the relevant 
states. Hence, the state of the secondary photons in our 
experiment must either be IBL> or IBR> in each case, and so 
interference cannot occur. We rejected t he dualism entailed 
by this point of view in §7.8. Nevertheless, it may be as well to 
demonstrate this as misunderstanding can arise in this context. 
Firstly, if it is rigorously applied/this argument implies 
1 
by consideration of equation 8.6, that double slit interference 
can never be observed! The notion that the state of a 
system which is non-separably involved with other systems is 
given by a mixture (when considered by itself) follows from the 
arguments discussed above which imply that interference effects, 
which are limited to those arising from the cross-terms in the 
inner product, cannot be detected under these circumstances. 
If, however, we assert that the slit-cover assembly is either 
in state IT'> or IR'>, and hence that the secondary photons are 
all described either by IBL> or IBR>, we are extending the 
argument outside the range of its validity. d'Espagnat (1971) 
stresses that the description of part of a non-separable composite 
in terms of a mixture (what he calls an 'improper mixture') is 
only valid if no correZations between the non-separable systems 
are considered. If we conclude that the secondary photons all 
have the same state (I BL> or I BR>) ·then we can only do so on the 
basis of a correlation between the slit-cover assembly and the 
secondary photons. In so doing the 'improperness' of 
1. We assume that IS\\;> =I lSI >, This may not be the case. 
See footnote 2 on page 237 and §9.4. 
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d'Espagnat's improper mixture becomes evident and the prediction 
on the basis of equation 8 , 5, that only one single~slit pattern will 
be observed is incorrect and invalid. 
On the other hand, the statement that the sta te of the secondary 
photons is given by a I mixt ure , of the states IBR> and IBL> implies 
that two superimposed single-slit diffraction patterns will be detected 
on the screen. This is in accordance with our conclusion above, 
and it does not invalidate the expe riment. 
A third type of objection relates to the description of a 
macroscopic system in terms of a quantum mechanical state. Zeh U970) 
has observed that the spectrum of energy levels of a macroscopic 
system must be extremely dense, and, as a result of this, it is 
virtually impossible to isolate a macroscopic system from its 
environment: a minute change in the mass distribution of the 
environment, even at substantial distances, is sufficient to cause 
. a transition in energy for a macros copic (massive) system. Hence, 
or for other reasons · (see §9. 3 ), it may not be possible to describe 
a macros opic system simply in terms of a quantum state. It is 
difficult to see how this could be so, except in that a macroscopic 
system may be continuously non - separably linked with different parts 
of its environment. By considering the fact that this observatioh 
applies equally to the macroscopic apparatus in ordinary interference 
experiments, such as the double-slit diaphragm in ordinary double-
slit interference, we can show that these considerations have no 
effect on our analysis: if ordinary double-slit interference can 
occur, then we must expect to find two superimposed single-slit 
patterns (or possibly a double - slit pattern) on the screen. The 
detailed analysis can be found in Bedford and Wang (1976a). 
The final objection which we consider is that, although our 
analysis of the system up to its final state is correct, observation 
of the distribution of secondary photons on the screen may 
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constitute a measurement of the position of the slit~over t In 
this case, according to Wigner's hypothesis, S , R. would occur, 
and the secondary photons would be seen distributed on the 
screen in exactly one single-slit diffraction pattern corresponding 
to the position of the slit-cover. Indeed, from one point of 
view, the final observation of the screen does appear to 
constitute a measurement of the position of the slit-cover. The 
secondary (double-slit) system is analogous to the illumination 
of, say, the pointer of a dial used to display the result of 
a measurement on a microscopic system, and looking at the 'shadow' 
cast by the pointer. In this case, we expect to see the 'shadow' 
in a single unambiguous position. 
However, in the absence of an unambiguous specification of 
what constitutes a measurement on a given system, we should be 
more careful: if the final result of our experiment is as we 
predict, i.e. two superimposed single slit patterns, we would 
be unable to determine which slit was covered by observing this 
pattern, and, according to Wigner's hypothesis, no S.R. would 
occur! 
This conclusion is supported by the conditions under which 
part of a composite system in a superposition of states can be 
described as a mixture; considered above. If we consider the 
secondary photons alone I we can describe t~em as being in a 
mixture of states IB > L and IBR>' i.e.Each secondary photon can 
safely be described as having either state IBL> or IBR>· If 
were the case., two single slit patterns, resulting from either 
this 
state would appear on the screen. In order to assert that a single-
slit pattern would be observed, we must suppose that all the 
,secondary photons have state IB
L
>, or else they all have state IB
R
>. 
If this is justified on the basis that the state of the slit-cover 
can be described as a mixture of the states 'covering slit l' 
and Icovering slit 2', we are violating the restriction under which 
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either sy~tem can be described as a mixture, 
From this point-of-view, when we observe the secondary 
photons alone, we expect ,to find two overlapping single-slit 
patterns on the screen. This supports the notion that an 
observation of the distribtuion of secondary photons does not 
contitute a measurement of the position of the slit-cover. How 
this is possible can be illustrated by considering the arrival of 
secondary photons at the screen if the experiment is performed 
at low intensities. Consider the first photon detected at the 
screen. While S.R. occurs as a result of this observation, this 
is the reduction if the state of the photon from 'all possible positions 
on the screen with differing probabilities' to 'exactly one position 
on the screen with certainty'. We canot infer the position of 
the slit-cover from the position in which this photon is 
observed. If we could, then we could likewise infer through 
which slit a given photon had =ome in an ordinary two-slit experiment, 
and no interference co"uld be observed. Hence, accordinq to 
Wigner's hypothesis, the state of the slit-cover is not reduced. 
Thus, when the second photon interacts with the slit-cover assembly, 
the latter is described by virtually the same state as when the 
first photon interacted with it. At the time of interaction with 
the second photon, the, slit-cover is certainly not covering one 
slit or the other since S.R. has not occurred. The positions of 
the first two photons are ~ot sufficient evidence for us to infer the 
position of the slit-cover. Therefore, by induction, we can extend 
this conclusion to any number of photons. It is possible that 
S .R., would occur when the pattern on the screen becomes distinguishable 
from the possible alternatives i.e. when sufficient photons are 
detected for it to be clear that one single-slit pattern is being 
formed. However, the very formation of one pattern depends on S.R. 
having occurred. In any event, for S.R'. to occur in this way 
depends upon the introduction of new effects as more photons land on 
the screen. It is difficult to see how a discrete change such as 
-197-
S,R, could be introduced as the pattern on the screen builds up 
almost continuously: we could ensure that no single observer 
was conscious of which pattern is 'favoured' by building up the 
pattern one photon at a time. Each observer could take a photographic 
plate containing a single detection event and observe it, fixing 
the position objectively. When a large number of results had been 
obtained (this would take an impossibly long time) the results 
could be superimposed. If one single-slit pattern is obtained, 
then either some observers will find that 'their' results are 
missing (as a result of S.R.?) or else we must assert that S.R. 
had occurred prior to the recording of most of the results. The 
former possibility is clearly unacceptable, and the latter, 
since it involves S.R. to one or other result without any observer 
becoming aware of it, is in contradiction to Wigner's hypothesis. 
Since it has been shown that 'quantum interference' is independent 
of the intensities involved, we can expect this analysis . to apply 
at ordinary intensities. . We conclude provisionally that either 
Wigner's hypothesis is incorrect or else two superimposed single-
slit diffraction patterns will be seen on the screen, when no 
conscious observer has interacted with the slit-cover. 
8.5 Performing the Experiment 
The final objection considered above introduces some doubt 
as to the outcome" of the proposed experiment, even if Wigner' s 
hypothesis is correct. Nevertheless, it is important that the 
experiment should be performed. In the event that our analysis 
is correct, it should yield some novel and interesting results. 
There are some difficulties which must be overcome in order 
to perform this experiment. The first is of a purely technical 
nature and concerns the triggering system which prepares the slit-
cover. In the absence of detectors with unit quantum efficiency, 
we are unable to use the single-photon trigger outlined in §8.3 
-198-
This problem can be overcome by using a radioactive source a nd 
Geiger counter: the distance between the source and the Geiger-
Muller Tube and the sens itivity of the counter a re arranged and 
adjusted so that the mean time between aounts i s ~t . Then, by 
~t 
activating the mechanism for a time 2' we can en sure that there 
is a probability of ~ that a count i s registered. Since atomic 
decay is a quantum mechanical process , we suppose that thi s 
produces a superposition of the state s 'registering a count' and 
-~ 'not registering a count' with an mnplitude of magnitude 2 in 
each case. A pulse from the Geiger-Muller tube activates a 
relay which moves the slit-cover from one slit to the other. - This 
is the same triggering system as that considered by SchrBdinger 
in the formulation of his 'cat paradox'. 
The second difficulty which we consider is of a mor e fundamental 
nature, and may indeed be - insoluble. .Since the nature of any 
interaction between 'consciousness' and physical systems is 
unknown, it is not possible to be certain that the triggering 
system and the slit-cover are sufficient~y isolated from any 
'conscil usness' to prevent S.R. from occurring. Whilst we can 
ensure that no observer becomes ' conscious of any clues as ·to 
the position of the slit-cover, it may be that S.R. occurs as the 
result of some .subconscious or preconscious interaction. This 
problem coul,d presumably be avoided by ensuring that any signal 
(electromagnetic, gravitational, etc.) from the system is be low the 
noise level of the environment. 
In order to effect this isolation, a switch was inser ted 
between the Geiger counter and the relay, which was on a long l ead. 
The switch was activated from outside the room containing the 
experiment. Thereafter, it was assumed that the only significant 
interaction between the observer and the slit-cover or triggering 
system would be visual, and this was prevented by suitable screening. 
A suitable exposure of a photographic plate by the secondary photons 
was effected by means of a shutter. 
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In performing the experiment, two types of exposure were made; 
one tcking all the precautions to prevent inte r ac tion between any 
conscious observer and the s lit- cover a nd the ot her whe n a de l i berate 
conscious observation and r e cor d of the slit-cover 's position was 
made prior to exposure of the photographic plate . The r esulting 
photographs, each representing what appeared t o be one s ingle-slit 
diffraction pattern, were compared under a stereoscope. Not 
surprisingly, no difference between them was obs erved. 
8.6 Interpretation 
' Even if our analysis of this experiment in terms of Wigner's 
hypothesis is correct and S.R. does not occur as a consequence 
of the observation of the distribution of secondary photons on 
the screen, this negative result is still inconclusive as a 
test of Wigner's hypothesis . Some interaction between the 
slit-cover and a conscious observer may have occurred in which 
case the state of the slit-cover would have been reduced, and 
the empj rically observed r esult would be expected. However, 
as reasonable precautions were taken to prevent such an interaction, 
it seems unlikely that a different result would be observed if 
the experiment were performed under conditions under which such 
an interaction would be impossible. i.e. When any signa l from 
the slit-cover assembly is demonstrably below the noise level 
of the environment. Certainly, no observer was conscious of 
1 the result • Hence, Wigner's hypothesis is, a t best, applicable 
in a restricted form: it is not necessary that a n observer become 
conscious of the result for S.R. to occur: the state reducing 
element of 'consciousness' must occur at some sub or preconcious 
level. 
1 . Here we may be in error by assuming that the bacterial or 
insect life that may have been present in the exper imental 
chamber at the crucial time is not conscious! 
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Further, if the negative result obtained empirically results 
from an interaction between an observer and the slit-cover, this 
interaction must be so 'delicate ' as to make Wigner's hypothesis 
empirically untestable: in any reasonable situation where 
Wigner's hypothesis is testable, we can expect an interaction between 
an observer and the appara tus which will bring about S.R.,giving 
a negative result. Hence , if we decide to reject Wigner's 
postulate, it is unlikely that an empirical demonstration of 
the · incorrectness of our choice will be possible. 
Other grounds for rejecting Wigner's postulate arise from 
two sources. The first relates to the ambiguity inherent in the 
application of this postulate while the second is concerned with 
the existence of certain non-local interactions. 
Clearly, S.R. cannot occur as the result of any interaction 
between a conscious observer and the physical system of interest. 
If this were the case, then interference effects (in, say, a 
Michelson interferometer) could never be recorded, except, 
perhaps, by remote control. To result in S.R., the interaction 
must be such that the observer can distinguish between the different 
(superposed) possibilities. This introduces the abilities of 
particular observers as a criterion for S.R., but a realist 
formulation may still be possible on this basis. We allow that 
human abilities affect the way in which physical reality behaves 
in classical physics. For instance, we could describe classically 
the procedures used by an artist in producing a drawing. Nevertheless, 
the fact that artists with differing abilities will produce different 
drawings does not detract from the physical r eality of the pencil 
strokes and the paper upon which they are executed . However, the 
difficulty which concerns us here may be stated as follows: if one 
single-slit pattern. is formed on the screen in our experiment, then 
the observation of that pattern is sufficient to determine the 
position of the slit-cover. Hence, according to Wigner 's hypothesis, 
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we expect S.R, to occur when the screen is obse rved, with the 
result that one single-slit pattern will be observed on the screen, 
On the other hand, if two slightly offse~ superimposed single-slit 
patterns are formed on the screen, we would not be able to 
determine the position of the slit- cover from an observation of the 
screen. Hence, according to Wigner's hypothe sis, S.R. cannot 
occur as a result of this observation. Consequently, we expect 
to see two slightly offset superimposed single-slit patterns on 
thE! screen. 
The circularity and concomitant ambiguity of both of the 
above arguments is clearly demonstrated. By accepting either 
alternative, we can introduce arguments which support that 
alternative! 
The situation is not much improved by introducing other 
arguments in favour of one or the other alternatives. Our 
argument in §8. 4 that S.R. cannot occur as a result of the 
observation of the screen may appear convincing. However, 
it appl~es equally well to any observation of a system in 
a superposition of sta'tes corresponding to different measurement 
results! If this argument is unambiguously. valid, we would 
not see pointers in specific positions indicating different 
measurement results, but interference effects in the illuminating 
light, resulting from the pointer's being in all possible positions: 
S.R. could not occur. On the other hand, if S.R. occurs as a 
result of the interaction between the observer and the screen, it 
is difficult to see how interference effects could ever be observed. 
In short, if Wigner's hypothesis is applied unambiguously, then 
ei·ther S. R. never occurs, in which case single unambiguous measurement 
results cannot be explained, or else interference is never observed 
and the principle of superposition and S.R. are both unnecessary. 
Clearly, neither alternative is satisfactory from empirical 
considerations. A criterion for S.R. which is ambiguous is 
unacceptable from a conceptual point-of-view. We note that this 
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difficulty does not arise if, in contradiction wi th Wigner's 
hypothesis, we assume that the state of the slit-cover (and its 
prepa.ratiQn system) is already reduced t o a s t ate conta ining one 
possibliity or the other, prior to illumination by the secondary 
photons. In this case, we expect the result which is achieved 
empirically. 
Our second criticism of Wigner' s hypothesis arises from the 
nature of non-locality that occurs in this interpretation. 
Let us suppose that our proposed experiment is set up and that 
two superimposed single-slit patterns appear on the screen. 
We could then trigger a camera by remote control to photograph the 
slit-cover, without bringing about S.R. The state of the light 
illuminating the slit-cover assembly would be included in the 
non-separable superposition describing that system, along with the 
state of the film in the camera. When the film is developed 
and observed , however, the image of the slit-cover will appear 
covering one or the other slit
l 
If the state of the slit-cover 
assembly has not already been reduced, this observation of the 
film wiJ l bring about S.R. Now, we anticipate an objection that a 
photograph taken when the slit-cover was 'in a superposition 
of the two position states' cannot show the , slit-cover in one 
place , on the grounds that history cannot ·be ambiguous. However, 
this objection is based on a misunderstanding of the behaviour of 
the camera which, in this case, will fail as a historically correct 
recording device. It is not that 'history is ambiguous' since, 
according to our analysis we can assert that the slit-cover was in 
1. This is a case in which the ambiguity mentioned above arises: 
in view of the arguments of §8. 4, we might expect two images 
o~ the slit-cover to appear on the film. However, since 
taking a photograph corresponds more nearly to 'viewing directly' 
and since cameras have never been known to fail in this way 
( "rhe camera never 1 ie s! ') we assUme that one image appears. 
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a 'superposition of position states' at the time the photograph was 
taken, The camera simply fails to provide an accurate record. 
Suppose that the state of the slit-cover had not been reduced 
at the time when the film was developed and observed. The S.R. 
brought about by observing the film would have as a consequence 
that one of the single~slit patterns displayed on the screen 
would instantly disappear. This would happen even if the 
photograph were taken miles away for developing and observation. 
We expect some sort of non-local interaction to accompany S.R. 
(S ee e. g. § 5. 4) . However, by means of the interaction outlined 
above, it would be possible to transmit intent. The disappearance 
of one of the single-slit patterns (it would not be possible to 
determine which) could be used to trigger some chain of events 
(such as the death of a cat!). An observer could then look at 
the film at any distance from the site of the experiment with 
the intention that the cat should die. 
the death of the cat instantaneously. 
This would . bring about 
Since this is a 
situation in which causes and effects are identified by more than 
just the i r time-ordering, i.e. by the transmission of intent, we cannot 
allow the reversal of this time~ordering without introducing logical 
~ncQn~~~tencies as considered in §5.2 and §5.3. Since the observing of 
the film and the death of the cat are separated by space-like interval, 
they will be seen to occur in different time-ordering depending on the 
reference frame of the observer, according to the special theory of 
relativity. Thus, Wigner'g interpretation of Q.M. and the special 
theory of relativity are mutually inconsistent. Indeed, we can extend 
this discussion to apply to any interpretation of Q.M. in which it is 
possible to demonstrate the occurrence of a superposition of macroscopically 
distinct states. 
If we assume that S . R. occurs without the intervention of a 
conscious observer, prior to the inclusion of macroscopically distinct 
states in the non-separable s uperposi t ion the n this situa tion cannot 
arise. Non-local interactions mus t still occur together with S.R., 
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but these involve the transfer of virtual information only. (See 
§ 5. 2 and §5. 6 ) and so are not prohibited by special relativity. 
These conclusions cannot be sufficient to make Wigner ' 
hypothesis i mpossible . The non-local effects considered above 
are not nearly as disturbing as those considered in §5.3 
relating to H.V. theories since in the present case acausal eff ects 
cannot be demonstrated in the rest frame of the experiment. However, 
the special theory of relativity is wide ly believed and held to 
provide a correct description of the macroscopic world. If 
Wigner's hypothesis were correct and testable we would be able 
to find counterexamples to spe cial relativity. 
For these reasons, we would have been very surprised had the result 
of our experiment turned out to be positive, i.e. if two single-slit 
patterns had been found on the screen. Nevertheless, we trust 
that our analysis has made it clear that it is not unreasonable 
to expect such a result on 'the basis of Wigner's postulate. 
8.7 Conclusions 
We have shown that Wigner' s hypothesis that S.R. occurs as a 
result of the interaction between a conscious observer and the physical 
system of interest (measuring apparatus + object system) is either 
false or else untestable. This conclusion follows from the empirical 
negative result of our experiment. i.e. Exactly one single-slit 
pattern is observed on the screen, even when no conscious observer 
has interacted with slit-cover. It is reinforced by the fact that, 
if this interpretation is correct and testable, i.e. i f a positive 
result to our experiment were pOSSible, a counterexample to the 
special theory of relativity would be obtained . 
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In view of the ambiguity which thi s interpret a tion gi ve s rise 
to, as well as the fact t hat it i ncludes bo t h consciousnes s and 
matter in the same ontol ogy ther eby inescapably i ntroduc i ng t he 
Problem of Knowl edge and its concomitant d i ffi cul ties into 
physics, we shall abandon it in favour o f possible alternatives 
which we consider in the next chapter . As is the case with 
all interpretations which a re not demons t rably empir i cally incorrect, 
the decision to accept or rej ect it can be made on the grounds of 
belief only, and is not suppor ted by l ogical imperative. We 
feel that our analysis shows clearly why we should rej ect this 
interpretation in favour of one in which the superpositions of 
macroscopically distinguishable states for macroscopic sys tems 
(or nonseparable superpositions which include such terms) do not 
occur. 
Finally, we note that, if we assume that S.R. does not occur, 
we must arrive at the conclusion that two single-slit patterns 
appear on the screen, irrespective of whether or not a conscious 
observer has interacted with the slit-cover assembly. Thus 
our neg tive result provides powerful empirical evidence in favour 




9.1 Restricting the Domain of Q.M. 
In rejecting Wigner' s hypothesi s (Chapter 8) , we xclude t he, 
possibility that the behaviour of microphysical reality be 
described in terms of Q.M. as it is given. by the physical formalism . 
We must either restrict the domain of Q.M. so that it does not apply 
to all physical system (measurement systems in particular), or else, 
if Q.M. is to be universally applicable, we must introduce changes 
in order to account for S.R. The former alternative can give rise 
to objective interpretations of Q.M. subject to certain difficulties. 
However, we prefer the l atter which we consider in §9.5 et seq. 
As we shall see, these alternatives are not strictly mutually 
exclusive as they can be viewed· as different perspectives on the 
same physical phenomena. 
Our primary complaint against the r estriction of the domain 
of Q.M. is that it introduces a dualism, with all its attendant 
physical and philosophical problems: i.e. physical systems must 
be divided into ·those which are subject to a qua ntum mechanical 
description and those which are not. Further, in order to 
-deal with measurement on systems within the domain of Q.M., it will 
be necessary to formulate a theory which applies to those 
systems which cannot be described by Q.M. as well as a formula 
for the interaction between the two kinds of system. As was 
pointed out in § 6.2, this theory cannot be a classica l theory 
or any other theory which is not logically compatible with Q.M. 
Hence, if we restrict the domain of Q.M., we will have to 
formulate a new theory to describe those systems outside the 
quantum domain. Since this new theory would only be useful , at 
the present time, in the description of measurement on quantum 
systems, it seems that this alternative entails a lot of work with 
limited purpose. If, on the other ha \d , we assume that Q.M., as 
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modified by some changes or additional postulates relating to S.R., 
is universally applicable to physical systems, the need for such 
a new theory does not arise. 
As in all cases where dualisms occur, when restricting the 
domain of Q.M. we are faced with the diffi.culty of formulating 
an unambiguous criterion for the theory to be used in the description 
of a given physical system: we must be able to decide, both 
objectively and unambiguously, to which of the dual aspects of 
reality a given system belongs. In §9.2 and §9.3 we will be 
concerned mainly with this problem. 
be soluble, but it is unsolved. 
We see that it is likely to 
We consider two related ways in which the domain of Q.M. 
is commonly restricted in order to account for S.R. One is to 
assert that Q.M. does not apply to measurement apparata or certain 
parts of such measurement systems. This mayor may not be a 
special case of the second way which is to restrict the domain of 
application of Q.M. to microscopic systems. 
9.2 Measurement Interactions 
It is often asserted that S.R. happens 'on measurement'. As 
a statement of one of the properti.es of physical systems, this is, 
of course, true (as we have taken pains to demonstrate in the 
preceding three chapters). In all measurements on a system which 
is not described by an eigenstate of the operator corresponding to 
the measured observable, S.R. must occur. However, if this statement 
is taken to be an explanation of (or a criterion for) S.R., it is 
equivalent to asserting that Q.M. does not apply to the measurement 
apparatus, some part of it, or the interaction between the object 
system and the measurement apparatus. This point-of-view, that 
S.R. occurs as a result of interactions which take place during 
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measurement is held by many authors. The details of the different 
interpretations vary wide ly, but the y coincide in the belief that 
the criterion for S.R. is the occurrence of measurement. 
For example, de Witt (1971), in his presentation of the 
Everett-Wheeler Many Universes Interpretation, a sser ts that the 
universe 'branches' whenever a 'measurement-like ' interaction 
occurs. As we pointed out in §7. 7, the branching of the 
universe corresponds, from the local point-of-view of the single 
consciousness of an observer , to S.R. 
Rosenfeld ( 1%5), who claims to support the interpretation 
of Daneri et al (see §7.4 ) believes that S.R. occurs as a result 
of interactions within the measurement apparatus. He writes in 
apparent contradiction with the theory he supports, that "the 
reduction of the state has nothing to do with the interaction 
between this system and the measurement apparatus, in fact, it is 
related to a process taking place in the latter apparatus after all 
interaction with the atomic system ha s ceased". In the absence 
of any specific postulates to account for S.R o , this is equivalent 
to asserting that Q.M. does not apply to the measurement apparatus 
since, as we showed in Chapters 5 and 6, the non-deterministic 
phenomenon of S.R. cannot be accounted for in terms of the 
deterministic relations of Q.M. 
In one of his attempts at a H. V. interpretation , Bohm (1957) 
accounts for the occurrence of S.R. by the inclusion of non-linear 
terms in Schr8dinger's equation. Since these terms are only 
assumed to be operative 'duri.ng measurement', this theory belongs 
to the type considered here . 
Muller (1974) writes that 
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"By the help of measurement - t ype i nteractions , or as a r e sult 
of them, one of the potentia lly poss i bl e sta t es is r ealized .... 
These interactions •••• s tabilize o r realize o ne mome ntar y s t ate 
of the many potentially repre s ented by the l atter" (p 65). 
Apart from the gene ral conceptua l objecti o ns to the introduction 
of a dualism, it is difficult to see why th e interactions which 
occur during measurement should be different, in principle, from 
any other physical intera ctions. The measurement apparat us does, 
after all, consist of physical systems, and the inte ractions 
within the measurement apparatus or be tween th e me asurement sys tem 
and the object system should, on "the f ace of it, be nothing other 
than ordinary physical i nteractions . Thes e interactions should 
therefore be describabl,.e in terms of Q.M. 
If the special character of these interactions is jus tified 
on the basis that the measurement apparatus or part thereof is 
macroscopic, this is equivalent t o asserting tha t Q.M. do e s not 
apply to macroscopic systems. This point-of- view is considered 
in §9.3, 9.4 below. If, on the other hand, interactions which 
result in S.R. are explaine d by the fact that they are part of 
a measurement, we are faced with the problem that it is a matter 
of human choice whether or not a given chain of suitable interactions 
constitutes a measurement. This makes the cr iterion for S.R. 
(or alternatively the criterion for the dualism: 'measurement typel 
non-measurement-type' interac tion) subj ective and ambiguous. i.e. 
We cannot achieve an objective criterion for S.R. by assuming that 
a given interaction resul t s in S . R. becaus e it const itutes part of 
a measurement. Muller (1974) recognizes this di f f iculty when he 
states that, while measuremen t- type jnteractions a re necessary f or 
measurement to occur, "it is neverthe le ss unjustifi ed "to limit the 
sphere of those interactions which " r:eal i ze t he potent i al " t o 
de facto measurements ~I 
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If measurement-type interactions can occur in the absence 
of de facto measurements, we can avoid the problem of subjectivity. 
However, we now require another criterion for the occurrence of 
these interactions. Instead of seeking and formulating a criterion 
for the occurrence of a type of interaction which is not described 
by Q.M., and which brings about S.R., we find it more satisfying 
to look for and formulate a criterion for S.R. directly. In this 
latter case, we can assume that Q.M. applies to all physical systems. 
Both of the above programmes, if they ach ieve their obj ecti ves, 
are capable of yielding an objective interpretation of Q.M. However, 
we feel that the latter, apart from being more economical conceptually 
and preserving the universal applicability of Q.M., can provide a 
more general solution to the problem of measurement: in this case, 
interactions would be 'measurement-like' if they lead to states which 
satisfy the criteria for S.R. In any event, it is clear that the 
occurrence of non-quantum mechanical interactions which give rise 
to S.R. cannot be explained objectively on the basis that they 
constitute part or all of a de facto measurement process. 
9.3 The Restriction of Q.M. to Microscopic Systems 
It has been noted by many authors (e.g. Bohr (1935» that at least 
some part of every measurement system must be macroscopic. 
conclusion appears to be valid despite Wigner's assertion 
This 
that the well-rested eye can respond to a few photons, since here 
the eye itself constitutes a macroscopic measurement device. Also, 
as we showed in Chapter 8, the assumption that the superposition 
principle can be shown to apply to macroscopically distinguishable 
states leads to difficulties. These observations, coupled with 
the empirical fact that we never do experience cats as both alive and 
dead or pointers in more than a single position at any instant, have 
lead many physicists (e.g. Ludwig (197l»to believe that Q.M. does not 
-211-
apply to macroscopic systems , and that S.R. can be explained in 
terms of the interaction between microscopic (quantum mechanical) 
and macroscopic systems. As we pointed out in §6 . 2 and 
again in §9.1 above, we cannot describe macroscopic systems in 
terms of classical theories if they are to be considered as part of 
the same ontology as microsystems, and indeed, to consist of many 
interacting microsystems . Hence, this view-point involves us in 
having to construct a new theory of the behaviour of macroscopic 
systems which is consistent with their parts being described by 
Q.M. and in terms of which S.R. can be explained. At the present 
time, such a theory would have the limited purpose of explaining 
measurement on quantum mechanical systems. Nevertheless , it 
may become useful in the future when new macroscopic effects, 
inexplicable in terms of both classical theories and Q.M., may 
be discovered o The detailed development of such a theory is beyond 
the scope of the present work, especially since we shall present an 
alternative explanation of S.R. in terms of which Q.M. applies to 
all systems and a new theory of macroscopic systems is unnecessary. 
We confine ourselves here to outlining some of the major difficulties 
to be encountered in formulating such a theory. 
Firstly, we must be able to distinguis h, objectively and 
unambiguously, between micro- and macroscopic systems. While it is 
clear that a billiard ball, a galvanometer and the human body are 
macroscopic and an electron, a photon and an atom are microscopic 
systems, this clarity is achieved only by taking extreme examples. 
There exists a range of systems whose size, complexity and many other 
properties vary continuously or nearly continuously from the values 
associated with one extreme to those associated with the other. It 
is difficult to see how a point on any such continuum could be 
fixed unambiguously as a dividing mark between those values indicating 
that a system is definitely macroscopic and those belonging characteris-
tically to microscopic systems. The distinction implied by the names 
is one of ' s ize'. However , we are faced with the difficulty that 
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some systems which display essentially quantum characteristics 
are greate r in size (dimension , volume , mass) than others which are 
commonly considered to be macroscopic. A beaker of superf l uid , 
for example, can have greater size than the proverbial macroscopic 
billiard ball. 
We may therefore attempt to distinguish between micro- and 
macroscopic on the basis of complexity . It is general ly believed 
that macroscopic systems, in being composed of many interacting 
microsystems, must have a more complex internal structure. In 
order to render this notion sufficiently definite as to achieve a n 
unambiguous criterion, it may be necessary to come to a precise 
understanding of the notion of elementary or single systems, and 
then specify the number of elementary subsystems which must be 
present for the combined system to be macroscopic. Although 
the former requirement would be extremely difficult, if not 
impossible to fulfill, we can use the general intuitive notion 
of elementarity to demonstrate a problem that arises in attempting 
to fulfill the latter. 
One atom is clearly a microscopic system within the domain of 
applicability of Q.M. A two-atom system is likewise microscopic, 
whether or not the atoms interact. Indeed, it is difficult to see 
how the inclusion of a single atom (or any other elementary or near 
elementary microscopic system) could change a microscopic system to 
one which is macroscopic. It follows by induction that a ny system 
composed of finite (or even countable) numbers of microscopic systems 
must itself be microscopic and describable in terms of Q.M. If the 
generally accepted notion of atomicity, whereby macroscopic systems a r e 
assumed to be composed of many interacting microsystems, is va lid, 
then all systems must be microscopic and Q.M. mus t be universally 
applicable! While this conclusion seems a little too far-reaching, 
it depends on assumptions which look innocent enough. 
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More generally, there is a procedure in the physical formalism 
of Q.M. (taking the outer product) which enable us to extend a Q.M. 
description to include any other system described by Q.M., whether or 
not these systems interact. The domain of the physical formalism 
is closed under this inclusion in that, for any two systems 
describable by Q.M. their combined system is also describable in terms 
of Q.M. i.e. Unless our ideas of atomicity are incorrect, or Q.M. 
breaks down within its domain of applicability, Q.M. must be universally 
applicable to physical systems. This built-in generality of the 
formalism of Q.M. in effect excludes any restriction of the domain 
of Q.M., subject to generally accepted views on atomism. 
It seems that we have been seeking in the wrong direction for a 
distinction between micro- and macroscopic systems. The change from 
micro- to macroscopic systems appears to be one of quality which 
cannot be strictly correlated with quantity per se. The preceding 
arguments support our view that the division of physical reality into 
macro- and Inicroscopic systems is a subjective distinction made for 
convenience and for historical reasons, and that it does not represent 
a dualism in the objective existence of physical systems. Still, it 
is essential to the interpretation under consideration that such a 
dualism be 'discovered' or formulated. For the purposes of the 
remainder of this section, we shall assume that such a dualism is 
possible, even if it implies some relaxation of our notion of 
t 
. 1 a om1sm • 
It may, for instance, be possible to come to an objective 
distinction between micro- and macroscopic on the basis of Zeh's 
observation. Zeh (197Q has noted that the spectrum of energy 
levels for macroscopic (massive) systems is extremely dense. Energy 
1. See in this regard §l. 5. 
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trans i tions as a result of uncontroll able interactions in the 
environment cannot be avoided in such a s ystem . In terms of 
Q.M., this means that a macroscopic system (i .e. one with a 
sufficiently dense energy spectrum) on its own cannot be 
described in terms of Q.M. which could only give a non-separable 
state for the combined system including the interacting par ts of 
the envir,onment. It seems plausable , therefore, that a distinction 
between microsystems which can be described individually by Q.M. 
(under suitable circumstances), and macrosystems , which can never 
be so described, can be achieved in this manner. There are, 
however, at least two serious difficulties involved in this 
approach. 
Firstly, this criterion does not allow us to identify any particular 
system on its own as either macro- or microscopic. Before we can 
apply it, we must know the magnitude of the energy transitions 
possible as a result of uncontrollable environmental interactions. 
If we could reduce the leve l of environmental interaction (by moving 
into deep space, say) we could ensure that the entire system (including 
the body and necessary life-support systems of any human observer) 
would become sufficiently isolated as to be microscopic, and 
describable in terms of Q.M. In this case, if S.R. is to be explained 
as a result of the interaction between micro- and macroscopic systems, 
we would expect no S.R. to occur~ While this is not impossible and 
the consequences with respect to the observer 's consciousness are 
not entirely clear, (needless to say, the experiment has not yet been 
performed) it is unsatisfying, to say the least. 
Secondly, Q.M. does not apply to macroscopic systems in this 
schema only if we wish to describe them by themse lves" independently 
of their environments. This seems , at first sight , to introduce a 
subjective element, since it is a matte r of huma n choice whether we 
consider a system together with its environment or by itself. This 
objection can be overcome, in a sense , by observing that we have no 
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choice as to how we see macroscopic bodies: we s ee them primarily 
as independent entities. Their interaction with other systems 
(including their environments) is seen (at least in western cultures) 
as a secondary characteristic. This shifts the b sis of the criterion 
from a subjective human decision to a fact about our senses and our 
perception. 
In any event, if we suppose that we can find an unambiguous 
objective distinction between microscopic systems which can be 
described by Q.M. and macroscopic systems which cannot, there are 
still some problems to be overcome. The analysis of Chapter 6 no 
longer applies. By assuming that macroscopic systems cannot be 
described by Q.M. (in order to account for S.R.) we forfeit the 
ability to describe the time-development of composite systems 
involving macroscopic subsystems in terms of a unitary operator or 
the relations given by the Schrodinger equation, even supposing that 
a 'state' for a macroscopic system can be written down. Consequently, 
we cannot pl'OVe , using this schema, that S.R. must occur under 
certain conditions. There is no existing theory in terms of which 
such a proof could be formulated. The problem to be solved is 
to construct a theory which is conceptually satisfying, logically 
consistent and which accounts for the empirically verifiable data 
on S.R. 
9.4 Towards a Macroscopic Mechanics 
It is commonly stated that S oR. occurs when a microscopic 
system interacts with a macroscopic system. If this is understood 
as a criterion for S oR., then it is easy to come up with counter-
examples. Consider, for instance, the double-slit interference 
experiment. Here, if S.R. cccurred a s a result of the interaction 
of a microscopic system (the interfering system : a photon, electron, 
etc.) with a macroscopic system (the double-slit diaphragm) then 
interference effects involving terms relating to different superposed 
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states for the microsystem would never observed. Likewise, in the 
Michelson Interferometer, a microsystem (photon) interacts with 
macrosystems (the half-silvered mirror , the reflecting mirrors) 
without resulting in S uR., as is demonstrat ed by the occurrence 
of interference fringes" Clearly, the criterion for S.R. must 
be refined if it is to account for empirical observations. 
We can show that interference effects c an only be observed 
if the state of the macrosystem is not distinguishab~y altered 
by interaction with a microsystem in each of the superposed states. 
Consider the double-slit arrangement (illustrated in Figure 9.1) 
in which photons of wavel ength ~ A pass through the slit assembly 
and are detected on a photographic plate , one at a time. After 
the passage of each photon, the slit diaphragm (which is free to 
move in the x direction, perpendicular to the direction of 
propagation of the inciden-t photons) is repositioned to within 
a specified precision ~xH of some value x = O. In the normal 
course of events, a double slit pattern will 'eventually form on the plate. 
yU ____ _ 
------------------- ---







If the slit-spacing is d « D and t he distance between the slits 
and the photographic plate is D, the first subsidiary maximum should 
AD 
occur at a distance of W = d from the central maximum at x = O. 
Now, consider a photon which lands at a point x on the screen. If 
it traversed the double-slit assembly through sl it 1, it would 
h x + dl2 
impart a momentum Pi = I D in the x - d irection to the diaphragm. 
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_ d/ 1 
h x 2 
If it passed through slit 2, it would transfer momentum P2 A D 
If the difference between these momenta ~PT = ~~ is greater than the 
uncertainty in the momentum of the diaphragm predicted by the Heisenberg 
Uncertainty principle, we could, in principle, detect through which slit 
the photon had passed by exrunining the motion of the diaphragm. 
i.e. In order to be able to distinguish through which slit the 
photon passed, we must have the following: 
6PT > 6PH 
hd h h 9.1 or -= > --AD w 6xH 
i. e. 6xH > w 
The uncertainty in the initial positioning of the diaphragm must 
be greater than the separation of the interference fringes on the plates. 
This means that, even if we consider each photon detection to form part 
of an interference pattern, each detection event will belong to a 
different pattern, randomly distributed with a standard deviation of 
at least the fringe spacing. 
pattern will be observed. 
The ne t effect is that no interference 
Similar results have been shown (e.g. by Feynmann (1965) and 
Bohr (1949)) for other attempts to obtain measurement results indicating 
different eigenstates while simultaneously observing interference between 
those states: in each cas e, the condition that the eigenstates be 
distinguished is just sufficient for the interference pattern to become 
undetectable. 
1. This calculation is for I x I >,~. For I x I ~ %, similar results follow, 




In the case where the macroscopic system (the double slit 
diaphragm) responds in a detectably different way t .O each of the 
superposed microstates, no interference effects c a n be observed. 
This fits in well with the conclusion of § 8. 7 that superpositions 
of macroscopically distinguishable state s cannot be shown to 
exist . Since the existence of a superposition can only be 
demonstrated by interference effects, which cannot be observed 
in this case, we would be safe to assume that S ~ R. had occurred. 
In order to make this idea more generally applicable and 
transparent, let us suppose that macroscopic systems such as the 
double-slit diaphragm, although they are not subj ect to Q.M. in 
this schema, can be described by a state something like a keto 
Let the initial state of the slit diaphragm be Iso>. The state 
Is
l
> (ls2» corresponds to "having been traversed via slit 1 (2)". 
Let ~o> be the initial (quantum mechanical) state for the photon 
and let I·Al > ( I A2» correspond to the state "having passed 
through slit 1 (2)". Then, over the period during which 
interaction with the diaphragm takes place, the combined system 
may evolve something like this: 
Now, if Is l > and Is2> are detectably different, no interference 
effects will be observed. On the other hand, if we cannot, in 





can expect to see a double-slit pattern on the plate. 
In the latter case, if we can formulate the definition of a 
macroscopic state so tha't states which are indistinguishable in 
principle are identical, i oe. Is l > = Is 2> = Is>, t hen 9.2 becomes 
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That is , the states of the microsystem and macrosystem become 
separable, and the state of the microsys tem, in particular can 
be given by itself as 
I~> 9.4 
as is common practiceo 
If, lSI> and Is 2> are significantly different, no interference 
effects will be observed, and we can assume that S.R. has occurred 
without fear of empirical contradiction. 
write 
i.e. From 9.2 we can 
with relative frequency Icll2and Ic212 respectively. 
In this case, the final state of -the composite system is again 
separable into macroscopic and microscopic components, but interference 
is not expected since S.R. has occurred. Note that it is no longer 
necessary to employ the Heisenberg uncertainty principle to show that 
no interference pattern will be observed if we can detect 'through 
which slit each photon passed'. Interference cannot occur, subject 
to this formalism, because S.R. has removed one of the interfering 
states. 
Clearly, whenever S constitutes a macroscopic measurement device 
on A, Is l > and Is 2> must be different in order for S to perform its 
function. Hence the situa-tion described by 9.5 obtains. When a 
macroscopic system plays a 'passive' role in the interaction in that 
it does not respond appreciably to the microsystem, the situation 
is described by 9 0 3 and 904, and no S.R. occurs. This 'explains' 
the common practice of describl.ng the microsystem by itself when it 
has interacted with a macrosystem. 
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In general, we can formulate a reduction postulate as follows: 
S.R. occurs if and only if a superposition containing 
different macroscopic states is formed. After S.R. 
the macroscopic system is left in exactly one macroscopic 
state. The microscopic system will be left in a state 
or superposition of state s compatible wi"th this 
macroscopic state D 
We take this opportunity to stress the need for a distinction 
between microscopic and macroscopic states in this schema. If the 
above criterion for S.R. were applied to microscopic systems, then 
the superposition principle could not be valid or useful since all 
non-identical quantum states are, in principle, detectably 
different. i.e. If two states are not identical (or equivalent) 
there must be some experiment which would give different results 
with certainty, on each of the two states. By distinguishing 
between micro- and macroscopic and defining what is meant by 
similarity and dissimilarity for macroscopic states, we avoid this 
difficulty. 
In conclusion, we remind the reader that the contents of this 
section are speculatory in that postulates have been made without 
an analysis to show whether or not they are mutually consistent. 
The development of this schema depends on the formulation of an 
unambiguous, objective distinction between micro- and macroscopic. 
The criterion which we considered has serious defects as we 
demonstrated in §9.3. Further, the proof of the closure of 
Q.M. under the combination of systems places the whole concept of 
the restriction of the domain of applicability of Q.M. in jeopardy. 
Therefore, having demonstrated how it may be possible to formulate 
a new macroscopic mechanics, thereby 'solving' the problem of 
measurement in Q.M., we move on to the alternative which we prefer. 
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9.5 Spontaneous state Reduct ion 
While an objective interpretation of Q.M~ Inay be obtained by 
restricting the domain of Q.M . , we have shown that this type 
of approach leads to non-tri v i a l di.fficulties. These can be 
avoided by assuming that QoM., in a modified f orm, applies 
to all physical systems, including macroscopic systems, measurement 
apparati and the human body. The modifications we make to 
Q.M. must account for the occurrence of S.R. and the related fact 
that superpositions of macroscopically distinguishable states 
(or non-separable superpositions containing such states) are 
never observed (see § 8. 7 ) 
In order to do this, we propose, as did von Neumann (1932) 
and several others, that the quantum state of a system evolves 
with time in two distinct ways. Firstly, there is the continuous, 
deterministic evolution of the state which is formally described 
by the schrodinger equation (or the action of a unitary operator) . 
Secondly, there is the discontinous, non-deterministic change 
of state which we call S oRe Together, these two processes are 
suitable for the description of the behaviour of microphysical 
systems, which must be non-deterministic (See § 5.3). The 
apparently deterministic behaviour of most macroscopic systems 
can also be accounted for by noting that, in the limit of large 
numbers of similarly prepared single sytems, every possible 
outcome of a given measurement will occur, with relative frequencies 
in proportion to the relative probabilities given by the quantum 
state for each outcome. This is d'Espagnat' s l1 9 71) Principle of 
'Statistical Determinism'. 
In contrast to the assertion by von Neumann that the position 
in the measurement chain at .which S.R. occurs is arbitrary 
(his Principle of Psychophysical Parallelism), we note that, since 
we have assumed that Q.M. is complete (see §5. 4) the formal 
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occurrence of S.R. must correspond to some actual physical phenomenon, 
which must therefore occur at a de finite point in the evolution of 
a physical system, subj ect to definite conditions. We therefore 
propose that S.R. occurs spontaneously whenever certain objective 
criteria are satisfied. These criteria should be formulated only 
in terms of the quantum s t ates of the systems conc erned, since these 
are supposed to provide a complete description of the physical 
situation. They should be objective in that they are unambiguous 
and independent of the knowledge, qesires or the point of view of 
any human observer" In particular, the criteria for S.R. should 
not depend on which eigenvectors we choose as a basis for the 
decomposition of the quantum state, or what will be done to the 
system in the future. Clearly, the conditions for S.R. must be 
satisfied during the course of any measurememt on a system which is 
not described by an eigenstate of the operator corresponding to the 
measured observable o However, the occurrence of states which 
satisfy these criteria should in no way be restricted to de facto 
measurements. (See §9.2) Q 
Provided that criteria which satisfy the above requirements 
can be found, this interpretation satisfies the requirements of an 
objective, realist theory. Physical systems are seen as 
existing and evolving according to the deterministic relations of the 
.Schrodinger equation. Under certain circumstances, particularly 
during measurement, a system will evolve, by this means, into a 
superposition of states which cannot be maintained. When this 
happens, S.R. occurs spontaneously. Since S.R. is a non-deterministic 
phenomenon, it is not possible to predict the state in which it will 
leave a system, even whe n its state prior to S.R. is completely knowp. 
However, the spect1'WT1 of possible states, describing the system 
after S.R., together with the probability that each should occur, is 
determined by the state of the system immediately before S.R. occurs. 
Further, the human obs erver is treated in much ·the same manner 
as in classical theories: the human body is treated as an ordinary 
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(if complicated) physical system, and the phenomenon of consciousness 
is excluded from the domain of physica l reality. The influence 
of human consciousness on physical sys tems is limited to those 
changes brought about by any control it may have over the human 
. I body with which it is assoc~ated. Since the occurrence 
of S.R. is seen as independent of any conscious act (in contrast 
to the consequences of Wigner' s hypothesis outlined in § 8. 6 ) 
only virtual information is transmitted non-locally in this process . 
Hence, it is not necessary to admit non-local interactions of the 
kind which give rise to acausal relations and contradictions with the 
special theory of relativit y. (See §5.2 and § 8.6). 
We take this opportunity to assert most strenuously that this 
interpretation is not a H.V. theory of any kind. Firstly, the 
overall evolution of quantum states (and hence , physical systems) 
is seen as non-deterministic. Secondly, in assuming Q.M. to 
be complete, we have assumed that the quantum state contains all 
relevant information relating to the system at that time. This 
excludes the possibility of any additional 'hidden' variables, 
particularly those which give rise to a deterministic description 
of physical reality 'at another l evel' " It is for this reason 
that we insist that the criteria for S.R. be formulated only in 
terms of the quantum state of a system: by looking at the quantum 
state of a system (usually a composite system) we should be able 
to decide unambiguously whether or not S.R. will occur. 
Clearly, the success of this interpretation depends on whether 
or not suitable criteria for S.R. can be formulated, or, at least, 
shown to exist. It may be that many different sets of criteria 
can be found to satisfy our requirements. In this case, we can 
1. As with classical theories, there may be a 'scientific ' 
(e.g. behaviourist, microbiological) explanation of any 
such changes, making any conscious sensations of control 
and free will illusions from this point of vie\v. 
-224-
hope that empirical testing or further analysis will support one 
in favour of the others. However~ we only r eally need one 
example of a satisfactory s et of criteria to justify our 
interpretation, which can be used to account f or the non-deterministic 
behaviour of microphysical systems as well as the success achieved 
in their description by the deterministic rela tions of the physical 
formalism of Q.M. without restricting the doma in of Q.M. or 
imposing a dual nature onto physical reality. 
The empiricist may argue that our arguments have been speculative 
and metaphysical all along. However strongly we have denied this, 
at this point in our treatment we must employ assumptions which are 
clearly speculative and inductive in order to formulate a criterion 
for S.R. Although our attempts in this direction appear, at 
the moment, to be successful, we must point out that the viability 
of our interpretation does not depend on the success of the particular 
set of criteria we shall formulate. Bearing in mind the speculative 
nature of our approach, it would be surprising, historically, if one 
of our first attempts turned out to be satisfactory. As we shall 
see, our proposed criterion gives rise to an empirical test. Thus, 
it may be hoped that, as more empirical evidence comes to light, 
the path to a satisfactory criterion will become clearer, and a less 
speculative approach will become possible. 
9.6 Towards a criterion for state Reduction 
What amounts to a crit erion for spont aneous S.R. was postulated 
by Bohm and Aharonov (1957) where they assume that t he quantum 
mechanical description breaks down for non-interacting non-separable 
systems (e.g. systems which have inter acted in the past) which 
are sufficiently far apart spacially. They propose that the non-
separable state decomposes into a statistical ensemble of pure component 
states, with suitable correlations. If we consider this statistical 
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ensemble from the point-of-view of 'maximum possible information' 
this amounts to postulating that .S uR. occurs, leaving the composite 
system in one of the states which were initially superposed. Their 
description in terms of a statistical ensemble simply emphasises 
the fact that S.R. is non-deterministic and, in the absence of 
measurement, we cannot know to which state the combined state 
will reduce. In some ways, this approach is equivalent to 
taking the size of the composite system as a criterion for S.R. 
It can be shown (see Ghirardi, Rimini and Weber (1976) and 
footnote 2 on page 24~ that results in contradiction with the 
predictions of Q.M. should be found in the experiments discussed 
in §4. 5. There we indicated that most of the results obtained 
empirically favour Q.M. and hence exclude this interpretation. It 
may however, be argued that in experiments thus far performed, the 
systems of interest have not been sufficiently separated prior to 
measurement for S.R. to occur according to this interpretation. 
In any event, it is clear that, even if this criterion for S.R. 
is correct, it cannot be the only one. This criterion cannot account 
for S.R. when it occurs in measurements where the object system and 
the measurement apparatus do not become widely separated in space 
(as when the object system is absorbed). Further, since Q.M. does 
not give the state of each subsystem on its own, it is not clear 
that their spacial separation can always be defined purely in terms of the 
quantum state of the composite system. (This will be so when the quantum 
state of the composit~ . system is an eigenstate of its position 
operator). 
Another criterion for S.R. can be postula ted as follows: it can 
be shown (see e.g. Bohm (1951» that, in sufficiently complex 
interactions, random variations in the relative phase of the components 
of a superposition must occur. We showed in §9.4 that this must be 
the case, particularly if a measurement giving results corresponding 
to one or another of the superposed states is performed. If these 
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fluctuations are large enough, as they must be in the case of 
measurement, they ensure that no interference effects can be 
observed. Even if S.R. does not occur, and each s ingle system 
in the experiment 'interferes with itself' giving rise to a 
(potential) interference pattern, each such system, on detection, 
1 
can only give rise to, say, a single dot on a photographic plate 
If S.R. is assumed not to occur, each dot can be viewed as a 
(minute) part of a definite interference pattern. Since the 
relative phase of the interfering systems varies randomly each time 
a single system passes through the apparatus and is detected, each 
dot will form part of a different interference pattern which 
is shifted randomly with respect to all the others. The net 
effect of this random fluctuation, if it is large enough, is that 
the interference pattern will be 'washed out': the maxima of 
some patterns will fall at the minima of others etc. We could 
therefore postulate that S.R. occurs whenever the relative 
phase of successive superposed states varies sufficiently for 
interference effects to be unobservable. Since the existence 
of a superposition of states can only be demonstrated by allowing 
the superposed states to interfere and produce observable effects, 
this postulate cannot be shown to be false by experiment. The 
non-occurrence of observed interference would then be ascribed to 
the fact that S.R. had occurred, removing all but one of the 
interfering states. Further, it follows from a generalization 
of the gedanken-experiment considered in §9 u 4 that such a 
'washing out' of the interference pattern must occur whenever a 
measurement which distinguishes the superposed state is performed. 
Hence, according to this postulate, S.R. must occur in every such 
measurment, thereby explaining the occurrence of single, unambiguous 
measurement results. This postulate therefor e seems quite 
1. S.R. must occur for this to happen but this reduction, from 
a state containing non-zero terms allover the photographic 
plate to a state corresponding to a single, d i screte detection 
event, does not concern us directly here. 
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appealing at first sight, Neverth e l ess , it contains some 
serious difficulties which we consider below. 
Firstly, it is extremely unacceptable from the falsificationist 
viewpoint since it is untestable, even in principle. In any 
case where S.R. is predicted, we would expect not to find 
interference effects whether or not S.R. had occurred. Conversely, 
when interference effects are observed, and, empirically, S.R. 
cannot have occurred, the relative phase fluctuations cannot be 
sufficiently large for S.R. to be predicted by this postulate. 
Any test whether or not S.R. has occurred must consist in producing 
interference (or correlation) effects when S.R. is. predicted or 
demonstrating the absence of such effects when S.R. is supposed not 
to have occurred. No such tests of this criterion are possible 
because of its tautological nature. There is a viewpoint from 
which such a tautological nature indicates the aptness of this 
criterion . Neverthless, we would prefer, if possible, the 
confirmation or rejection of an empirical test. 
A second, more serious difficulty relates to the form taken 
by this criterion. Although it is unambiguous, in that we can 
determine a definite limit on the magnitude of phase fluctuation 
that can occur without destroying the interference pattern, it 
is difficult to imagine how it could be formulated as a general 
principle involving only the information contained in the quantum 
, d' 'd .,1 state of an ~n ~v~ ua~ system. The phase fluctuation which 
features so prominently in this criterion is an accidental or 
statistical phenomenon which is defined only on an ensemble of 
single system experiments. In an interaction where the fluctuations 
are just sufficient to 'wash out' any interference effects, many 
individual systems will be disturbed from the mean value (which, in 
any case, is undefined for an individual system) by less than the 
1. By 'individual' here, we mean the systems involved in a single 
run of the experiment, culminating in single detection event, 
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the critical amount . Far from preventing the washing out of 
interference, these sub-critical fluctuations are essential for 
it to occur. In contrast, S.R. is meaningful in terms of 
individual systems in the ensemble. It is therefore difficult 
to see how this criterion could be applied to individual systems, 
. 1 
particularly those with sub-critical phase dlsturbances 
It is possible that a criterion applying to individual systems 
could be formulated in terms of the conditions which give rise to 
the washing out of the interference pattern. i oe. The occurrance 
of sufficiently large phase fluctuations and the occurrence of 
S.R. could be viewed as common effects of the same cause, which is 
applicable to single systems. In §9 0 7, we attempt an analysis 
along these lines, but we shall see that the resulting criterion does 
not have identical consequences to the one considered here. 
We seek a criterion which can be formulated in terms of single 
systems and which is, at least in principle, testable. Nevertheless, 
the fact that the above criterion can be formulated, even in such an 
ad hoc manner, indicates that our concept of spontaneous S.R. may 
indeed be justifiable, and sheds some light on the way ahead. 
2 
9.7 Conditions on Interference 
In §9.4 we used the Heisenberg uncertainty relations to show 
that we cannot observe interference between quantum states while 
simultaneously obtaining measurement results corresponding to one 
or other of the interfering states. In terms of the double-slit 
interference experiment considered there, this condition is expressed 
1. For consistency, we could treat the statistical fluctuation in 
phase as a 'superposition'. In the same way that probabilities 
in Q.M. are applicable to single systems, the 'spread' in phase 
could be a property of a single system. In this case, this 
objection to this criterion is invalid. 
2. Similar considerations are treated in Bedford and Wang (1975). 
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as a limit on the minimum uncertainty (as given by the Heisenberg 
Uncertainty Relations) in the momentum of the double-slit 
diaphragm: 




This condition, while necessary for interference to be observed, 
is not sufficient. In the case where w, the fringe spacing, is 
greater than d, the distance between the slits, we can have the 
above condition satisfied with ~d > t. > ~. The minimum uncertainty 
PH w 
in the position of the double-slit diaphragm according to the 
uncertainty principle, is 
9.7 
i.e. The uncertainty in the position of the slits is greater than 
the slit separation. From the point-of-view from which 
we derived 9.6, this simply means that the 'patterns' resulting 
from each photon will be mutually displaced by an amount greater 
than d. Since t.x<w, the overall pattern should still be observable. 
On the other hand, a photon detected at a given point on the 
screen will have, as possible trajectories, all paths passing 
the diaphragm at -t.x <' ·· ·x< +t.x. Since , the uncertainty in position 
as given by the Heisenberg relations is a property of the quantum 
state of the diaphragm, we should argue that this is so, even in the 
case of a single photon. (i.e. The diaphragm is 'superposed' in 
position over the range -t.x<x < + t.x). Hence, in this case, we 
should expect to observe a single-slit pattern, corresponding 
to one emanating from a slit of width ~t.x. Thus, for w>d, the 
condition for two-slit interference becomes t.x<d 
or 9.8 
Suppose we prepare the position of the diaphragm, before the 
passage of each photon, to a precision consistent with 9.6 or 9.8 
as the case may be. 
moved a distance 
Then, after a time ot, the slits will have 
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L\p 




Ox > kIn ot where k min (d,w) 9.9 
and m is the mass of the diaphragm. This places a limit on the 
length of the time interval during which each photon must 
interact with the double-slit diaphragm since it must do this before 
the 'spread' in its position reaches the critical value of k 
i.e. 
DA 
NOw, since w = <r' 9.10 becomes 
ot < DAm k' where k' 
h 
9.10 
mm(~, ~) 9.11 
This limit on the interval during which the photon must 
interact with the diaphragm implies that the initial photon state 
(prepared with a shutter open for ot, say) has a frequency 
1 




In order for the pattern to be observable, we must have 
D >: OA < A 
OA av 
y=V-' 
DoV < AV C 
at > £ 
c 
9.12 
This conditionl, when combined with 9.11 gives a condition on the 
mass of the double-slit diaphragm which is necessary for interference 
1. This condition has not been seen elsewhere by the author. It 
is interesting in that it is equivalent to a requirement that 
the 'front end' of the photon state should reach the screen 
as the rear passes through the double-slit. 
-231-
to occur. This is 
m > ~ k" for k" 
AC 
d _w) 
max (-W-' d 9.13 
We now seek a criterion for S.R. which reproduces, as nearly 
as possible, the above condition which, if it is not satisfied, 
implies that no interference pattern will be observed, whether or 
not the motion of the diaphragm is actually observed, and whether 
or not the state of the photon is reduced. 
We postulate that the 'lifetime' of a superposition 
of two quantum states, i.e. the time from formation 
to reduction, is the order of ~t ~ ~ where ~E is 
s ~E 
the difference in energy between the two states of 
a single system. 
We shall see that this 'reduction postulate' will require some 
refinement, in order to specify clearly what is meant by '~E' 
in more complex situations, as well as to avoid some obvious 
counterexamples. However, for the meanwhile, we shall consider 
some of the consequences of this 'loose' formulation. 
On encountering the slits, a photon (it if gets through) goes 
into a continuous superposition of trajectories corresponding to 
detection events allover the photographic plate, but we consider 
only those states which give rise to detection at a point x from 
the central maximum. The momentum transfers to the diaphragm, 
for the two states of interest, are (for ' x ~ ~)l 2 • 
d d 
h x+- x - "2 2 h 
Pl A D 
and P2 "5: 9.14 D 
1 F d "1 l' • or x<2" a Slml ar ana YSlS applies, ' 'giving an identical 
expression for ~E. 
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For a diaphragm of mas s m, the difference in energy transfer 





Therefore, by the reduction postulate, the superposition of the 
two photon states which, by the conservation of energy, differ 






9 . 16 
In order for interference to be detectable, the superposition 
must be intact at the time of interaction with the screen. This 
means that the 'time of flight' or transit time for the photon 









ADm w - --
h x 
9.17 
Since we require that the first subsidiary maximum, at least, 
be visible, we can set x = w so that 9.17 becomes 
m > h "C 9.18 
Comparing 9.18 with 9.13, we find thzt, as the mass of the 
double-slit diaphragm is reduced, interference effects will 
be washed out before S.R. occurs, except in the case w = d when these 
conditions coincide. This means that our postulate is empirically 
correct as regards this experiment: the absence of a pattern when 
S.R. has not occurred can be explained in terms of phase randomization. 
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In other experiments, this criterion for reduction can be 
fulfilled before phase randomization washes out the interference 
pattern. This indicates the possiblity of an experimental 
test. Indeed, there are some well-known experiments which 
provide counter-examples to the reduction postulate in its 
present form. 
For example, radio-waves from different sources with different 
frequencies (and hence, different energies) can and do give rise 
c 
to beats (interference) at distances much greater than ~t = ~v' 
Also, spin-rotation experiments indicate the preservation of 
coherence, or, equivalently, superposition for time intervals 
h 
longer than flE. 
Furthermore, the way in which a composite system is viewed 
as consisting of subsystems is not clearly or objectively 
defined. flE is so loosely defined that our criterion is not 
even Galilei invariant. We used semi-classical arguments to 
arrive at the energy difference ~E, between the photon states, 
whereas ~E should be clearly and objectively defined in terms of 
relevant quantum states only. 
We find that the above short-falls can be remedied by a 
more detailed analysis and specification of the criteria for S.R. 
Although some of the above analysis will become superflous, we 
shall do this without altering the fundamental idea of spontaneous 
S.R. or the notion that the criterion is somehow related to the 
energy difference between superposed states. 
9.8 The Criterion for Spontaneous State Reduction l 
We introduce our revised criterion in terms of a simple 
schematic example. Consider two systems A and B, initially non-
interacting, and prepared with initial states IA > and IB > which o 0 
1. This work has appeared in Bedford and Wang (1977a). 
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are eigenstates of the respective Hamiltonians. (This is for 
simplicity: if they are not in energy eigenstates, their states 
can be so expanded). Assume that the systems interact by means 
of a short-range (or effectively short-range) interaction, so 
that later the sub-systems of what is now a non-separable composite 
system are again non-interacting. Suppose further (also for 
simplicity) that the state of the composite system after interaction 
is a non-separable superposition of energy eigenstates (eigenvectors 
of the individual sub-system Hamiltonians) so that the evolution of 
the system over a time interval in which the interaction occurs will 
be given by the Schrodinger equation and can be written as follows: 
where H IA > A 1 
9.19 
etc. where 
E ,etc. are real numbers. lEA - E I = 6EA and B2 1 A2 
= 6E
B 
where the states and the energies are defined 
the center of momentum (CM) frame of the composite 
system A + B. We postulate that once the above conditions of non-
separability and non-interaction have been satisfied, the final state 
of the composite system (u l I A] > IB1> + u2IA2>IB2» will spontaneously 
reduce after a time of order 6~ or 6~ (whichever is smaller: 
A EB 
they will be equal if energy is to be conserved in single processes) to 
either 1Al>IB1> or IA2>IB~ with respective probabilities rl l 2 , 
lu212. The 'lifetime' L\E of this non-separable state refers to the 
time interval following the satisfaction of the conditions for S.R. 
This reduction of the state of the composite system is a process 
in C.M. proper time, and the criterion 'for its occurrence is formulated 
in terms of objectively defined energies of the individual systems 
(i.e. as opposed to ensemble properties) in their common C.M. frame. 
Because the futures of these two sub-systems are inextricably linked 
through the non-separability of their combined state, the choice of 
-235-
their common C.M. frame as a basis for the definition of the 
energies concerned has some objective validity. In general, 
the choice of a reference frame is arbitary, and this would 
make the criterion for S.R. both ambiguous and subjective. 
However, in the case of non-separable systems, their common 
C.M. frame is objectively and unambiguously fixed. Conceptually, 
we might consider such a frame to have 'objective reality' through 
being defined, in each case, by real, non-separable systems. 
We have required that the two sub-systems be effectively non-
interacting for S.R. to occur. i.e. The interaction energy, EI , 
must be small compared with ~E. This is nece ssary in order for 
the conceptual separation of the composite system into sUb-systems 
to be objectively meaningful
l 
If ~E tt E
I
, this persistent 
interaction would make it impossible to distinguish, objectively 
and unambiguously, distinct SUb-systems in the non-separable 
composite. Hence, according to our postulates, the non-separability 
would persist, and no S.R. would occur. 
Furthermore, ~E must also be large compared with any energy 
fluctuations of A and B resulting from environmental perturbation 
(See §9. 4 ): the energy states of each SUb-system of the non-
separable composite must be objectively different for the criterion 
for S.R. to be applicable. This restriction is quite appropriate 
in the case where B is a measurement apparatus since, as we shall see 
in § 9 . . 9, an apparatus whose SUb-systems undergo fluctuations larger 
than ~E would either spontaneously ' fire', or would be incapable 
of measurement on A. 
In the case of a system consisting of two sub-systems with 
1. Note that the systems A and B considered above in the final 
state need not have been initially non-interacting. The final 
state (which satisfies the criterion for S.R.) could have resulted 
from pair-anhilation, a decay, the interaction of some other systems, 
etc. 
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discrete energy spectra, we propose that all of these conditions 
are necessary, and together they are sufficient, for S.R. to 
occur as indicated. The criteria for S.R. can therefore be 
written formally as follows : 
1). The state must be non-separable. 
where Al and A2 are eigenstates of HA with energy difference 
~EA etc., defined in the C.M. frame of the composite system. 
2). The systems must be effectively non-interacting: 
3). Environmentally induced energy fluctuations of A and B 
must be such that ~EIA « ~EA and/or ~EIB « ~EB' 
(This does not, however, refer to non-random energy changes 
resulting from interaction with some background field, which 
may be responsible for ~E in the first place) . 
Once these conditions are satisfied, the non-separable composite 
state will reduce to !Al>! Bl > or !A2>!B2>, with probabilities 
! CL l !2 and! CL 2 !2 respectively, after a time interval of the order of 





can e V1ewe as caused by the energy differences which will be 
operative if they can be. 
In general, the C.M. frame, the time at which the above conditions 
are first satisfied, the energy differences etc. may themselves be 
'superpositions'. However, the values superposed are objective and 
unambiguous, and hence can be dealt with by this method. The 
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event of disintegration of a compound system into two sub-systems 
(as in the experiment considered below) will, in general, be superposed 
over an interval of the order of the lifetime of the compound system, 
giving rise to 'spacially extended wave packets'. The reduction 
into separable energy states of this system will not affect this 
'spacial extension', and the final states of A and B will not be 
position eigenstates. 
9.9 Application 
In order to clarify the meaning and purpose of the above scheme, 
we apply these ideas to a number of revealing examples; firstly some 
in which interference occurs and S.R. is not predicted, and secondly, 
some cases such as measurement where S.R. is expected. 
a). Double-slit Interference 
Consider again the familiar double-slit interference experiment. 
Upon interaction between each photon with the dmuble slit diaphragm 
S, we have, in obvious notation, the following evolutionl . 
9.20 
NOw, as we showed in §9.7, interference can only be observed if 
the mass of S is large enough for the difference between its possible 
final states, lSI> and Is2>, to be unobservable: when a normal, 




> cannot be orthogonal . 
Indeed, for the usual treatment (in which the state of the double-slit 
is omitted) to be valid, their inner product < 51 I S2> must be close to 
uni ty i. e. I Sl> and I S2> must be essentially the same state for 
interference to occur2. 
1. Here, in assuming that the state of the macroscopic slit-cover 
can be written separably and independently of its environment, 
we ignore the difficulties raised by Zeh (1970). See §9.4. 
2 . We are aware of a possible circularity in this argument. 
See §9.10. 
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If we therefore assume that Is l > = Is2> Is>, 9.20 becomes 
This state is separable giving the state for each photon and the 
double-slit ir0ependent Zy as cll wl > + c2 1~ 2> and Is> 
respectively. Since the final state in 9.21 is not non-separable, 
our criteria for S.R. are not satisfied, S.R. does not occur, 
and interference may be expected. 
b). Interference between photons of differing frequencies 
Consider two radio sources t r ansmitting essentially monochromatic 
signals which differ in frequency by ~v. According to the first 
version of the reduction postulate (§9.7) these signals could not be 
C 
expected to interfere at distances greater than ~v from the nearest 
transmitted since this would involve the persistence of a superposition 
h 
of states, differing in energy by ~E = h~v for longer than ~E' The 
fact that such interference (i n the form of beats) does occur is a 
counter-example to the original formulat i on. Here we test the new 
formulation against this example. 
Consider two transmitt ers , R a nd S, which are initially described 
by quantum states IR > and Is > respectively. If the photon vacuum o 0 
state is denoted by I~>, and I~R>' I~s > are the .states of photons 
originating from Rand S, we can write the evolution of the combined 
system, over the time interval of interest, as follows: 
where 1Rl>' Isl > denote the states of the tra nsmi t ters when they have 
emitted a photon. 
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NOw, if the emission of a photon could be detected by examination 
of the transmitters, no interference would be observed due to phase 
randomisation (cE§9.7). Hence, 
the previous example, we can write 
consequently, 9.22 becomes 
by a similar argument to that in 
IRo> = IR1 > and Iso> = Is l >, 
9.23 
This separable state gives the state of the photon independently 
as of those of the transmitters as + c21~ s >' Since the 
conditions for S.R. given in §9.8 are not satisfied (the state is 
separable), and the photon state is a superposition of different 
frequencies, · we expect to observe beats at any di s tance from the 
transmitters. The persistence of phase- coherence in spin-rotation 
experiments, and, as far a s we can tell, all other such cases can be 
treated similarly. 
c. Bohm ' s E.P.R. experiment 
We apply our criteria for S.R. to the experiment proposed by 
Bohm (1951) as ·an illustration of the E.P.R.'paradox' which we discusse 
in Chapters 2 and 5. This is of interest since the experiment is 
conceptually equivalent to the experiments discussed in §4.5 which test 
the possibility of local H.V. theories. We show that our interpretation 
gives rise to predictions which are consistent with the provisional 
experimental results i.e. that the predictions of ordinary Q.M. are 
correct. However, we show also that, by making a slight change in the 
experimental set-up, we can use our criteria to predict results in 
contradiction with those of the physical formalism of ordinary Q.M., thus 
indicating the possibility of an experimental test. 
Recall that, in Bohm's experiment, a spin- zero system decays into 
two oppositely directed f e rmions via a spin-conserving interaction. 
The quantum state for the two particle system, after decay, is given by 
I~> = 2 -~ (IA >IB > - IA >IB » +z -z -z +z 9.24 
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where A and B refer to each fermion and the subscripts +Z and -Z 
indicate spins parallel and antiparallel with the Z direction, which 
is arbitrary. 
Now the expression on the r.h.s. of 9.24 represents a non-separable 
state for two systems which have ceased to interact. 
usual case, prior to any measurement on the system, 
However, in the 
9.25 
and S.R. is not expected, according to our criteria. 
Thus, we can expect interference between the superposed states to 
occur, as long as they have a definite phase relationship. In this case, 
the interference between the superposed two-particle states in 9.24 
results in 9.24 having the same form, irrespective of the direction in 
which the spin-components are considered. i.e. The anti-correlation 
between the spin-component directions of A and B will be observed 
independently of the direction in which they are measured. 
Suppose that we modify the experiment by allowing the fermions to 
pass through a uniform magnetic field in the ~-direction. Note that 
this interaction 'will have the same effect on the motion of the particles 
irrespective of the direction of their spin components and hence does 
not constitute what would normally be called a measurement of spin-
1 
component. Suppose the magnetic field is produced by a large 
magnet described initially by quantum state 1M> (in as far as it can 
be given independently of its environment) . 
can now be described as follows: 
The evolution of 9.24 
IM>I~> + 2-~(IM >IA' >IB' > - 1M >IA' >IB~ » 1 Z+ Z- 2 Z- Z+ 9.26 
1. This is in contrast to the case whe:re the magnetic field is 
non-uniform, as in a Stern-Gerlach machine, where the trajectories 
of particles with different spin components in the direction of the 
magnetic field are separated. 
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Now, since the magnet is a macroscopic element, we may suppose 
that the remarks above (relating to the double-slit assembly) apply, 
and IM1> % 1M2>, Thus, 9.26 is separable and the state of the 
magnet alone is given by IM1> = 1M2>, The state of the two-particle 
system is also given independently as 
NOw, 9.27 differs from 9.24 in that 
- lA' >IB' > Z- z+ 9.27 
9.28 
where ~ is the magnetic moment of A and B (assumed equal) and B is the 
magnetic field. 
Therefore, 9.27 satisfies the 
place after a time of the order of 
criteria for S.R. which will take 
6t ~ ~ =~. If the particles are 
6E 2~B 
subjected to the magnetic field for this period or longer, S.R. will 
occur, according to our criteria, and the state of the system given in 
9.27 will transform spontaneously to 
or lA' >IB' > z- z+ 9.29 
with a probablility of ~ for either possibility. 
The S.R. will not be apparent in subsequent spin-component measurements 
in the Z-direction hecause the components will be anti-correlated in either 
of the possibilities given in 9.29. However, when the spin-components are 
measured in any other direction, there will be some cases in which they 
will not be anti-correlated. This effect will be most pronounced for 
measurements at right angles to the Z-direction (in the x-direction, say). 
This can be seen by substituting the following relations into 9.29. 
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IA > 2-~ (IA > + IA » IB > = 2 -~ (I B > + I B » +z +X -x +z +X -x 
2 -~ (I B >-
9.30 
IA > = 2 -~ ( I A >- I A » IB > 1 B » -z +X -X -z +X -X 
This gives 
II/J'> ~(IA '>IR '> - IA ' > IB ' > + IA '>IB ' > - IA '>IB ' > +X +x -X -X - X +X +X -X 
9.31 
or ~ ( IA '>IB '> +X +X - ,IA ' > IB '> -- x - X IA ' >IB '> + -x +x 
IA '>IB '> +x -x 
In either of these possibilities, a meas urement of spin-component in 
the x-direction would give results consistent with the system bei ng in 
one of the four component two- particle eigenstates, with a probability of 
~ for each. 
This means that, when the exper i ment is peformed repeatedly, the 
spin-components of the two particles will be found to be parallel in 
about one half of the c~ses. This is in contradiction with ordinary 
Q.M. 'which predicts that the spi n-components of the two particles 
will atways be anti-parallel l • 
This experiment, or its equival ent, therefore provides an empirical 
test of our criteria for S.R., as well as the whole concept of spontaneous 
2 
S. R.. Unfortunately such an e'xperiment, if it is feasible, is beyond 
our means and abilities. We c a n only hope that it will be performed 
shortly. We note that it is not equivalent to t he tests of Q.M. 
discussed in §4.5 since, i n t he se experiments, there was no suitable 
energy difference induced pr ior to measu r ement. 
1. Note that this does not imply a violation of the principle of 
conservation of angular momentum because the micro systems have 
interacted with a (massi ve) macrosys tem (the magnet) . 
2. Any spontaneous S.R. will, in general, give rise to results in 
disagreement with Q.M. In f act, inequalitie s analogous to that 
derived by Bell (1964) have been der ived for reduction theories 
by Fortunato !l9 76 ). 
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Finally, note also that, by varying the period during which the 
particles interact with the magnetic field and/or the magnetic field 
strength, it should be possible to test the specific formulation of 
our criteria for S.R., provided that S.R. occurs at all. 
d). Measurement 
The fundamental motivation behind the introduction of S.R. in the 
first place was, of course, to account for the occurrence of single 
unambiguous measurement results in measurements on single systems 
which are not described by an eigenstate of the operator corresponding 
to the measured observable. Thus, the 'acid test' of any criteria 
for S.R. is that they should be fulfilled whenever such measurements 
occur. 
Consider again the double-slit interference experiment. Roughly 
speaking each incident system (photon or electron, say) must, in some 
sense, pass through both slits if interference effects are to be 
observed. If, however, we place a detector (e.g. photographic film) 
close behind each slit, each incident system is detected either behind 
one slit or the other. Hence# the superposition of states 'having 
passed through slit' and 'having passed through slit 2' must be reduced 
in this second experiment. 
As in equation 9.21 above, the state of the incident system, after 
it has interacted with the double-slit diaphragm (and been transmitted) 
is given by itself as I~l> + i~2>' Let us suppose that detection systems 
P and Q (grain centres on a photographic plate, say) are placed behind 
slits 1 and 2 respectively. Then, if the initial states of P and Q are 
Ipo> and IQo>,l and their excited states (corresponding to a positive 
reading) are Ipl > and IQ1>' the evolution of the combined system over 
the time interval during which interaction takes place is given as 
1. Here, again, we assume that the states of these systems can be 
given independently of their environments. 
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+ C Ip > IQ >I~'> + C Ip >IQ >I~'> 1 1 0 1 201 2 
9.32 
If the incident systems are photons, · I~~> = Iw? = 1<1», the 
photon vacuum. In this case, the state given on the r.h.s. of 9.32 
is separable, but the state of the combined detection system, 
cllpl>IQo> + c2IPo>IQ1>' is not. If the incident systems are 
rest-massive, IW i > ::f 1~:2> and the state of the combined object and 
detection system is non-separable. In either case, provided that P 
and Q are viable measurement systems, we contend that the non-separable 
state satisfies our criteria for S.R. 
Since our criteria for S.R. are formulated in terms of pairs of 
non-separable systems, we deal with the case of photon interference 
first. Thereafter we extend our criteria to apply to cases where 
more systems are involved. In the former case, the state of the 
measurement apparatus is given as cllpl>IQo> + c 2 Ipo>IQ1>. The 
energy difference 
~E = E 9.33 
p 
1 
will be large compared with the environmental fluctuations (gravitational, 
thermal, etc.) in the energy of P in the C.M. frame of P and Q. If this 
were not so, P would be useless as a measurement apparatus: the 
environmental fluctuations would be sufficient to cause P to be triggered 
spontaneously, giving spurious readings. Furthermore, the interaction 
between P and Q is much less than ~E for, say, a visible photon and a 
gravitational interaction. Once again, if this were not so, we would 
expect this interaction to give rise to spurious results. Thus, 
according to our criteria, ·the state of the combined measurement 
apparatus will reduce to a single term, in a 
1 




For a visible photon, this implies that S.R. would occur very soon after 
the measurement interaction and certainly prior to any interaction 
between the measurement apparatus and a conscious observer. 
In the case where the incident systems are rest-massive, the state 
of the system after interaction is given by 
C Ip >IQ >1$'> + C Ip >IQ >1$'> 110 1 201 2 
The same arguments as above apply to the states of P and Q except 
that here, the energy difference is of the order of the initial kinetic 
energy of the incident system in the C.M. frame of P and Q. This energy 
difference wil~ in general, be greater than that between I $i> and 
1$2> (supposing that these are energy eigenstates) . However, we can 
extend our schema to more than two systems by assuming that the energy 
differences induce S.R. whenever the criteria are fulfilled. Thus, S.R. 





satisfying the other criteria. Hence, in a time of the order 
S.R. will occur, yielding a final state for the system which is 
IP1>IQO>I$1> or Ipo>IQ1>1~2>' 
This schema can clearly be generalized to other measurement 
situations since any interaction capable of yielding satisfactory 
(distinguishable) measurement results will result in the system evolving 
into a state which satisfies the criteria for S.R. i.e. If the measurement 
systems ' distinguishes' between the states of interest, and it does not 
give rise to spurious readings as a result of interactions either between 
its different parts or between it and its environment, then the 
deterministic evolution of the system as given by ordinary Q.M. (the 
Schrodinger equation) will result in a non-separable state which 
satisfies our criteria for S . R. 
In contrast, let us consider the case where the detecting system 
placed far away from the slits, and interference is observed. Now, the 
superposition of states 'having passed through slit l' and 
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'having passed through slit 2' should not be reduced. This follows 
from our criteria since the measurement apparatus does not distinguish 
between these superposed states. Any grain of the film can be excited 
by any system incident on the screen, irrespective of which slit it 
traversed: the final state of the combined object and detection system 
does not contain non-seperable terms relating to particles passing 
through either slit. Nevertheless, we expect S.R. to occur when this 
type of measurement is performed: each incident system arrives at the 
detection screen in a state containing terms corre sponding to all 
possible positions on the screen. This state should be reduced to 
one referring to exactly one such position. 
Since this measurement does distinguish between different positions 
on the screen (otherwise it would not constitute a satisfactory measurement) , 
the final state given by deter ministic quantum mechanical evolution will 
contain non-separable terms , each one corresponding to the excitation 
of a different grain-centre. Since the grains are essentially 
non-interacting with each othe r or the ir environment (for the reasons 
discussed above) and the non-separable states differ in energy (in the 
sense defined in our criteria) by the photon energy, or the kinetic 
energy of a rest-massive system, we expect S.R. to occur in a very short 
time. The state after S.R. will correspond to the excitation of 
exactly one grain, consistent with the occurrence of an unambiguous 
measurement result viz. a dot with a definite position on the photographic 
plate. This final state does not, however, correspond to the passage 
of the incident system through exactly one slit, but contains terms 
relating to its passage through both slits: the probability that the 
unreduced state will reduce to a state corresponding with a given 
position depends on the relative phases of the states 'having passed 
through slit l' and 'having passed through slit 2' at that point. Thus, 
if the experiment is repeated many times unde r the same conditions (i.e. 
with identical or equivalent initial states for the incident particles, 
the double-slit diaphragm, and the detection system) the distribution of 
dots (excited grains) will form a double-slit interference pattern. 
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In both the 'Schr~dinger's cat' and our 'Interfering Schrodinger's 
1 cat', the detection of the triggering system will bring the combi.ned 
system into a state satisfying the criteria for S.R. Thus, Schrodinger's 
cat is either killed or left alive, and the slit-cover in our experiment 
either covers one slit or the other, according to this interpretation. 
i.e. We not only do not expect to observe interference, either between 
the states 'cat alive' and 'cat dead' or, in our case, between the 
photons in the secondary interference system, but we can also expect 
to observe the cat to be either alive or dead or to see one single-slit 
pattern on the screen in our experiment. 
9.10 Criticisms 
As far as we can tell, then, our criteria for S.R. are objective 
and unambiguous. They can be used to predict S.R. in every case where 
measurement occurs, but not when interference is expected. This is 
achieved without resorting to a dualist conception of physical reality, 
but rather by asserting that the evolution of physical systems is 
dualistic: on the one hand, we have the normal, deterministic evolution 
of a system as given by the Schrodinger equation and on the other, 
we have the spontaneous non-de terministic occurrence of S.R. whenever 
the criteria are fulfilled. Q.M., including now the postulates concerning 
S.R. provides a complete2description of a non-deterministic microphysical 
reality. 
We contend that our criteria are subject only to an experimental 
test of the kind outlined above. However, we are awar e of some difficultie s 
which have not proved amenable to a simple solution. 
Possibly the least i.mportant of these is the fact that our formulation 
can be seen to inply that Lhe fina l state of any system after S.R. should 
be an energy eigenstate: a stationary state. It is clearly not our 
1. See Chapter 8 and Bedford and Wang (197 6a, 197 6b). 
2. We use this term in the specific sense outlined in §2.3. 
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intention to imply that systems cannot be localized at all after 
S.R. ! We note that this difficulty is not trivial in that it 
has its origins in the application of classical ideas of energy 
exchange (as, for example, in the analysis in §9.6) to a 
quantum mechanical situation. However, since measurements do 
not, in general, distinguish between the different momentum (and 
hence energy) states which must be superposed to give spacial 
localization to, say, the measurement apparatus, it may be possible 
to formulate our criteria for S.R. in terms of the difference between 
the 'average' energies of the states of interest. 
Alternatively, we could extrapolate our criteria thus: if S.R. 
is predicted for each of the states which must be superposed to 
form localized 'wave packets' then it will occur for the superposition 
as well. In any event, we do not consider this difficulty to be 
particularly damning unless it is a symptom of a graver misinterpretation 
on our part. 
A second and more serious problem is our treatment of large 
(macroscopic) systems in this interpretation. As we have repeatedly 
pointed out (having first discussed the problem in §6. 5 ) i ·t is not 
strictly correct to ascribe a quantum state to a large system, 
independently of its envirorunent. According to Zeh's (1970) 
observation, such systems, having extremely dense energy spectra, will 
interact continually with their environment. Thus, strictly, a 
macroscopic system can only be described by a non-separable state which 
includes its environment. Indeed, the problem of non-separability 
runs very deep, since it relates back to the concepts of atomism , 
and the even more fundamental notion that systems can be analysed into 
parts. We have largely ignored the role of non-separability when 
ascribing states to macroscopic systems. Nevertheless, we also assume 
that environmental interaction occurs in order to describe macroscopic 
states which are indistinguishable as identical. This assumption is 
not only inconsistent, but may also involve some sort of circularity: 
we have been unable to discover the significance of the assumption that 
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indistinguishable macroscopic states are identical and it may be that, 
although it is in line with common practice, we are in some way 
assuming what we are setting out to prove. 
On the other hand, we feel that there are powerful reasons for 
assuming that the macroscopic aspects of the universe, at least, can 
be analysed independently of each other. Our point-of-view , amounts 
to this: when environmental interactions are negligable from a classical 
viewpoint, they are also negligable from the quantum mechanical viewpoint, 
at least in so far as large systems are concerned. We feel that it 
is more reasonable to view such perturbations as a second-order 
effect rather than assume, as does Belinfante (1975) that they are 
1 
the reason that unique unambiguous measurement results occur . 
A further related problem concerns the division of a given 
non-separable system into subsystems: some notion of the elementarity 
of the subsytems involved is necessary for our criterion to be 
unambiguously applicable. This was clearly indicated by Ballentine (1976) 
who pointed out that, under certain circumstances, our criteria might 
lead us to expect S.R. to occur between states describing different 
degrees of freedom of a single elementary system! We must rely on 
our intuitive understanding of the concept of a ' single system' to exclude 
such a possibility. 
9.11 Conclusion 
Given that the difficult ies mentioned above l end themse lves 
to amenable solution (or else can be ignored!) we consider our criteria 
to be objective and unambiguous2 They can be used to predict S.R. in 
every case where measurement occurs, but not when interference is 
expected. 'This is achieved without resorting to a dualistic conception 
1. See §6.5. 
2. It is our hope and belief that this s t atement does not reduce to 
a tautology! 
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of physical relaity, but rather by asserting that the evo lut ion 
of physical systems is dualistic: on the one hand, we have the 
normal, deterministic evolution of a system as described by the 
Schrodinger equation or its equivalent, and on the other, we have 
the spontaneous non-deterministic occurrence of S.R. whenever our 
criteria are fulfilled. Q.M., including now the postulate s concerning 
spontaneous S.R., provides a complete description of a non-deterministic 
microphysical reality. 
Finally, let us dispel a misconception which seems to arise 
regarding the status of our interpr etat ion: it i s not a hidden 
variables theory. This ca n be seen in two ways. Firstly, since 
we assume that Q.M. is a comp l et e description o f r eality, that 
reality cannot be determinis tic. Thi s is bor ne out in our inter-
pretation, in which the evolution of quant um state s and physical 
relaity is overtly non-determinist ic . Hence our interpretation 
cannot be a hidden variables t heory as defined in Chapter 4. 
Secondly, we have taken pains to provide cr iteria for S.R. which 
relate only to factors which are de fined by the explicit form of 
the quantum states involved; no furthe r variables are postulated: 
indeed we assume that any specification of a physical situation which 
is additional to the relevant quantum state (i.e. a 'hidden' variable) 





Let us suppose that the test of our criteria for S.R. proposed 
in §9.9 or an equivalent experiment is s a tisfactorily performed, 
and the results turn out to be positive: i.e. results are obtained 
which contradict the predictions of ordinary Q.M., as expected in 
terms of our interpretation. This will provide powerful evidence 
in favour of the notion of spontaneous S.R. in general, and our 
criteria for S.R. in· particular. The opposite result, which somehow 
seems more likely in the face of the general predictive successes 
of the Q.M. algorithm, will result in our particular criteria being 
dismissed on empirical grounds. However, it will not exclude the 
possibility of an interpretation involving spontaneous S.R. 
Thus, it seems that we may have found a solution to the problems 
of interpretation and measurement in Q.M. Physical systems are seen 
as being completely specified by quantum states. These states, and 
hence the systems themselves, usually evolve in a deterministic fashion, 
as described by the Schrodinger equation or its equivalent. Under 
certain circumstances, a given phyiscal system will evolve into a 
situation described by a quantum state which satisfies our criteria 
for S.R. (an S-state, say). An S-state denotes a physical situation 
in which a superposition of certain states cannot be maintained. This 
situation is recognizable from the expLicit form of the state describing 
the system, so no hidden variables need be involved. 
Further, a physical system can evolve into the situation described 
by an S-state without being involved in the affairs of conscious beings, 
whether by interaction with their associated biological systems or by 
being involved in what they may choose to call 'measurement' or 
'measurement-like' interactions. (See Chapter 8 and §9.2) . The 
connection between measurement and the occurrence of S-states lies in the 
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fact that interaction between a system not described by an eigenstate 
of the operator corresponding to the measured observable and a system 
which can be employed in a successful measurement (see §9.9) of 
that observable will necessarily result in the combined system evolving 
into a situation described by an S-state. i.e. Situations described 
by S-states (and hence S.R.) may occur independently of measurement, 
but during measurement, an S- state must necessarily occur, if the 
measurement is to be successful. In such cases, S.R. brings about a 
transition from a state which contains all possible measurement results 
to a state which corresponds to exactly one measurement result being 
obtained. 
Also, although this point is not entirely clear (see the discussion 
in §9.10) it seems that none of the systems involved in the evolution 
of an S-state need to be distinguished as either macroscopic or micro-
scopic: no dualism in the nature of physical reality needs to be 
introduced. Indeed, a classical dualism, between 'wave' and 'particle' 
indicated by the failure to detect an aether in, say, the Michelson-Morley 
experiment, . is resolved in our interpretation of Q .M. Systems are 
completely described by quantum states, which may be 'wave-like' or 
'particle-like' with respect to certain observables, depending on the 
circumstances. 
When a system evolves (deterministically) into an S-state, which 
. h 
is maintained for a time of the order of ~E' S.R. occurs. The system 
transforms spontaneously into a situation described by one of the 
superposed terms (of different energy) of the S-state. This transformation 
is non-deterministic in that it is not possible to predict what the 
state of the system will be after S.R. We contend that S.R. is an 
absolutely random transformation, governed only by the probability 
amplitudes in the S-state. Since there is no way of predicting 
which of the superposed states will describe the system after S.R., 
hidden variables constructed for this purpose are superflous. The 
information as to which substate will emerge simply does not exist 
prior to S.R. This gives the probability amplitudes which occur in 
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quantum states an objective meaning (see §5.5). Given the S-state, 
the probabilities for different outcomes of S.R. are objective and 
absolute: they cannot be altered by obtaining more information since 
there is no more information to be obtained.' 
1 
The transition described by S.R. is also non-local by this we 
mean, roughly, that it involves the transmission of information over a 
space-like interva1
2
• However, as we noted in §5.3, this information 
must be virtuaZ in that it cannot be used to transmit intent or, 
equivalently, a message. This sort of non-local relationship, which 
we have dubbed relative causality, cannot lead to violations of our 
concepts of free-will and the certainty of the past, even if the special 
relativistic concept of the relativity of simultane ity is empirically 
correct. Consider, for example, Sohm's (1951) illustr ation of the 
3 
E.P.R. argument. When one of the decay products, P say, interacts 
with a Stern-Gerlach machine Griented in the Z-direction, the combined 
state of both particles and the measurement apparatus evolves into an 
S-state, and S.R. occurs, resulting in the following transition: 
either Ip ' >IQ >Is > +Z -Z 2 or Ip '>IQ >Is > -Z +Z - 10.1 
where Is+>, Is_> represent states of the measurement apparatus 
corresponding to spin. parallel and anti-parallel to the Z-direction. 
This final state is separable, giving the state of particle Q alone as 
either IQ_z> or IQ+z>' depending on the result observed at P. 
NOw, the state of particle Q has changed instantaneously from 
part of a non-separable state involving both IQ z> and IQ > 
+ -z 
to a separable state of either IQ+z> or IQ-z>. i.e. The possibility of 
finding the spin-component of Q parallel (or antrparallel, depending 
on the measurement result at P) with the Z-direction disappears 
immediately as a result of an interaction which occurs as far away from 
1. See §5. 2. 
2. This term is used in the sense of the special theory of relativity. 
3. See §9. 9. 
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Q (in as far as the position of Q can be specified independently, 
prior to measurement) as we like. The information that S.R. has 
occurred, and one of the possible measurement results on Q has 
'disappeared' is what is transmitted non-locally in this case. A 
similar situation applies whenever S.R. occurs: if, in the double-
slit interference experiment, a 'particle' is found behind one of 
the slits, the possibility that it will be found behind the other 
immediately disappears. Note that, in our interpretation, we 
cannot ascibe this change to a change in our subjective information, 
since a change in the complete quantum state described by S.R. indicates 
a change in the actual physical situation. 
However, the important point, which makes this sort of non-locality 
preferable to that involved in hidden variables theories (see §5.3), 
is that no information in the form of a message or signal can be 
transmitted by this interaction. Observers performing measurements 
on P and Q at widely separated positions cannot infer, from local 
measurements, whether S.R. was brought about by the measurement on P 
or by the measurement on Q. It is only by finding out the time 
ordering of the measurements that they can determine which one caused 
S.R. to occur. 
If the reader is concerned about 'what happe ns' to the states 
which cease to exist (in our universe !) after S.R., he or she should 
consult the Many Universes Interpretation
l 
for a possible explanation. 
This interpretation is in no way incompatible with our 'spontaneous S.R.' 
interpretation, and, if it seems implausable, it is only because all 
theories dealing with occurrences in universes other than our own (in 
terms of the past, at least) must be implausable. Our interpretation 
simply augments their criterion for universe 'branching' or 'splitting'. 
This is given by the protagonists of Many Universes Interpretation as 
the occurrence of a 'measurement - like interaction'. We identify 
universe splitting with S.R., and make the criteria for it (the occurrence 
of an S-state) objective and unambiguous. Since the states which 
1. See §7. 7. 
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disappear after S.R. (i.e. appear in different universes) can never 
affect our branch again (unless history is ambiguous in fact, as 
well as in interpretation) we consider the Many Universes Interpretation 
,to be of passing interest only. 
10.2 Prognosis 
Given the above schema, we feel that there is no need to go to 
the extremes of rejecting the concepts of realism or materialism 
(more specifically, what we have called unirealism) as a basis for 
physics, for all the problems they present, both in general, and 
in the particular context of the interpretation of Q.M. Furthermore, 
it is not only unnecessary to discard or neglect the 'second purpose 
of science' - to understand our physical environment - but vitally 
important that we should retain it. 
However, even supposing that the difficulties described in §9.10 
can be satisfactorily dealt with, there are yet aspects of our 
interpretation which we find most unsettling. Two of these sources 
of disquiet relate to regulative principles which we have adopted, 
albeit on what we consider to be reasonable grounds, and a third concerns 
the overall form which our interpretation assumes. 
While we accept the conclusion that some classical regulative 
principles must be discarded in the interpretation of Q.M. (see e.g. §3.5) 
we still find it difficult to accept the existence of any form of non-
local interaction and the implications of non-separability in a Q.M. 
which is assumed to provide a complete description of physical reality. 
1 . In a recent paper we show that, prov1ded the results of more 
sophisticated experiments like those discussed in §4.5 turn out as 
expected (i.e. to confirm the predictions of Q.M.), we can choose 
1. Bedford and Wang (1977) 
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between the assumptions that (i) physical processes are absolutely 
deterministic with no possibi1ity of 'free~will' or (ii) physical 
processes are non-deterministic and must involve the concomitant 
non-local transfers of virtual information. Although we prefer the 
second alternative, we are yet unsettled that such an undesirable 
feature as non-locality should occur in our interpretation. 
Secondly, if Q.M. is assumed to be complete, the existence of 
non-separable states calls in~o question our concept of atomism (see 
§l.5) and, with it, the notion tha t the universe can be analyzed 
into parts without undue approximation and oversimplification. 
One paradigm common to all 'scientific methods' is that analysis 
is a valid method for investigating material of interest. In 
physics, this amounts to the assumption that physical systems can 
be described independently of their environments. In accepting 
the completeness of the quantum mechanical description we fear that 
we may be rushing headlong onto dangerous ground by invalidating 
the very methods we have used to corne to that acceptance. 
Finally, we come to the formal issue, which involves the 
'ad hoc' nature of the whole concept of state reduction. It is an 
amendment to the quantum mechanical formalism which is made with the 
specific purpose of getting us out if the difficulties into which this 
formalism has lead us. ' What we have done or attempted to do here, 
is to show that this amendment can be formulated in an objective and 
unambiguous manner. However, this does not really make the process 
of achieving an explanation and an understanding of physical reality 
on the basis of the ad hoc 'patching up' of a n unacceptable theory 
any more acceptable. On the other hand, the problems of interpretation 
of Q.M. relate back to no more complicated considerations than the principle 
of superposition and the linearity of the evolution in time of quantum 
states, and we consider that S.R. would be necessary in any realistic 
description embodying these concepts. Furt hermore, i t seems that the 
use of the superposition principle and linear time development are directly 
related to elpirical phenomena: the occurrence of interference in 
systems which are detected discretely, as particles rather than as waves. 
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These objections indicate some of the reasons as to why our inter-
pretation is unlikely to gain ascendency over its rivals, and become 
accepted. More accurately, since we realise that scientific acceptance 
is an essentially sociological phenomenon, they indicate the reasons 
why we ourselves cannot wholeheartedly accept our interpretation and 
crusade for its acceptance. We advocate instead that mOre fundamental 
research be done into achieving a generally acceptable interpretation of 
Q.M., with the hope that our work may prove to be useful in such research. 
To this extent, we feel rather like some self-conscious pre -
Galileanmechanist attempting to descr ibe projectile motion in terms 
of an inadequate theory of forced and natural notions: by adjusting 
certain concepts and parameters we have been able to formulate a 
description which, as far as we can t e ll, is neither logically nor 
empirically incorrect. Furthermore, it is testable. Nevertheless, 
our description lacks the conceptual coherence and simplicitity which 
is the hall-mark of a successful and acceptable interpretation. I -t 
may take somebody with Galileo's genius for working from first 
principles and, in view of the controversy associated with this field, 
for convincing the world that he is correct, to produce such an interpretation. 
The simpZe solutions which have eluded us may even lie in Bohm' s (l971) 
attempts to formulate a new, non-classical language, or in Ludwig's (1 971) 
to produce a new logic. 
"What is Fate?" Nasrudin was asked by a scholar. nAn endless 
succession of intertwined events, each influencing the other.tl 
-That is hardly a satisfactory answer. I believe in cause and effect. tl 
"Very well," said the Mulla, "look at tha t." He pointed to a procession 
passing in the street. "That ma n is being taken to be hanged. Is 
that because someone gave him a silver piece and enabled him to buy the 
knife with which he committed the murder; or because someone saw him 
do it; or because nobody stopped him?" 
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